United States v. Odom

588 F.Supp.3d 1032

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Cameron Anthony ODOM, Defendant.

Case No. 21-cr-00259-JST-1

United States District Court, N.D. California.

Signed March 2, 2022

Alexis Jasmine James, Assistant US Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff.

Joyce Leavitt, Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Oakland, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Re: ECF No. 34

JON S. TIGAR, United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendant Cameron Anthony Odom's motion to suppress the gun and ammunition found on Odom's person pursuant to a warrantless search and seizure. ECF No. 34. The Court will grant the motion.

I. BACKGROUND¹

On August 26, 2020, at approximately 2:32 AM, Odom drove past two California Highway Patrol officers at 92 miles per hour, in violation of California law. ECF No. 1 at 5. The officers followed the vehicle and instructed Odom to stop, roll down the windows, and turn off the car. He complied immediately. Dashcam 1:04-1:12. After the car stopped, Officer Guajardo approached the passenger-side window and Officer Lee approached the driver's side. Id. at 1:32-1:42. Officer Guajardo told Odom that he was speeding and asked for his license, insurance, and registration. ECF No. 1 at 5. Odom explained that he did not have any of those items, and his license was suspended, but provided Officer Guajardo with a California Identification card. Id. According to Officer Guajardo, Odom "was shifting and moving around in the vehicle" and "appeared nervous." ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 5. Odom explained that the car belonged to his sister. Dashcam 2:22. A few seconds later, Officer Guajardo asked "How far are you from home?" Id. at 2:19, and Odom replied that it was "literally right up the street." Id. at 2:21. When asked whether he was on probation or parole, Odom said he was not. ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 5.

The officers then conducted a DMV records check and a Criminal Records Information Management System (CRIM) check. The parties dispute whether Officer Guajardo ran both checks himself or whether he requested help from dispatch.² Based on the DMV records check, Officer Guajardo learned that Odom's license was withheld for failure to appear. From the CRIMS record check, Officer Guajardo learned "that Odom had affiliations with criminal gang activity and that Odom had firearms-related criminal history." Id. ¶ 7.

Because Odom did not have a valid license, Officer Guajardo "planned to have the vehicle towed after the completion of the stop." Id. ¶ 11. Officer Guajardo asked Odom to step out of the vehicle, conducted a pat-down search, and felt a firearm near Odom's waistband. Id. Officer Guajardo removed the firearm, which contained one round of ammunition in the chamber, placed Odom in handcuffs, and then recovered 19 rounds of ammunition from Odom's person. Id. Officer Guajardo then placed Odom under arrest pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ECF Nos. 1 at 1; 39-1 ¶ 11. "The National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) later revealed that the rounds in the firearm and magazine matched shell casings previously collected at the scene of a shooting in Oakland, CA on May of 2020." ECF No. 39 at 7.

Odom now moves to suppress the gun and ammunition found during the search because (1) Officer Guajardo unconstitutionally prolonged the stop by asking about Odom's probation and parole status; (2) Officer Guajardo unconstitutionally prolonged the stop by running a CRIMS check on Mr. Odom; (3) the Government has not carried its burden of establishing that towing the car was lawful; (4) the Government has not shown that the pat-search was constitutional; and (5) the Government has not established any exception to the exclusionary rule. ECF Nos. 34; 42. The Government opposes the motion. ECF No. 39.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." When determining whether someone's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, "the ultimate touchstone ... is ‘reasonableness.’ " Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart , 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (citations omitted).

Even when an initial seizure is based on probable cause, "a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution." Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (citation omitted). For example, courts have found that a traffic stop may "become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission." Id. In the context of a traffic stop, the mission is "to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns." Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (citation omitted). Thus, a traffic stop becomes unlawful when officers engage in unrelated actions that "measurably extend the duration of the stop," Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009), unless these actions are supported by independent reasonable suspicion. United States v. Landeros , 913 F.3d 862, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). "Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer is aware of specific, articulable facts which, when considered with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for particularized suspicion." Landeros , 913 F.3d at 868 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

The government bears the burden of demonstrating that a warrantless search or seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Cervantes , 703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012). If the government fails to meet its burden, all fruits of the violation must be suppressed. Id. at 1143.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The CRIMS Record Check

If the CRIMS check was within the scope of Officer Guajardo's traffic-stop mission, then it did not violate the Fourth Amendment.³ Odom argues that the CRIMS check was unrelated to the traffic-stop mission because it "provide[s] information about a person's prior ‘ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’ " ECF No. 42 at 14. The Government disagrees, explaining that because the CRIMS check includes warrant information, the search was proper. ECF No. 39 at 9.

The Supreme Court has determined that "an officer's mission includes ... checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance." Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Court in Rodriguez distinguished these activities from dog sniffs which are "aimed at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing" and therefore outside the scope of a traffic stop. Id. (cleaned up). In dissent, Justice Thomas noted that warrant checks "look more like they are directed to ‘detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing’ than to ‘ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.’ " Id. at 363-64, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (citation omitted). Thus, Justice Thomas concluded, there is no logical reason why courts should create an "artificial line" between warrant checks and dog sniffs. Id. at 364, 135 S.Ct. 1609.

In some ways, Odom's argument reflects Justice Thomas's concern in Rodriguez. Odom asks this Court to distinguish between traffic-warrant checks "aimed at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing" and traffic-warrant checks that "make[ ] it possible to determine whether the apparent traffic violator is wanted for one or more previous traffic offenses." ECF No. 42 at 13 (emphasis in original). But neither the Rodriguez majority, nor any other authority the Court has found, make such a distinction. Instead, the majority in Rodriguez noted that a "warrant check makes it possible to determine whether the apparent traffic violator is wanted for one or more previous traffic offenses." Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (quoting 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(c), p. 516 (5th ed. 2012)). The Court did not hold that a warrant check must be limited in scope to reveal only information regarding traffic offenses.

Odom argues that Officer Guajardo should not have run a CRIMS search because the DMV records search generated information regarding traffic convictions, DMV actions, and vehicle code violations. ECF No. 42 at 14. There is no indication in the record that Officer Guajardo could have determined whether there were outstanding warrants from the DMV records search alone. In fact, according to the DMV website, "[y]our driver license or motor vehicle agency doesn't provide information regarding checking or searching for warrants. "⁴ Indeed, Odom's DMV record does not include a section regarding outstanding warrants. ECF No. 43-1 at 5-6. Finally, Odom apparently concedes that the DMV search does not provide sufficient warrant information when he argues that Officer Guajardo should have run a state-wide warrant search instead of using a county-specific database.⁵ ECF No. 42 at 15. Because the record does not show that a DMV search provides sufficient information regarding the existence of a driver's outstanding warrants, the Court cannot find that the CRIMS search performed by Officer Guajardo was outside the scope of the traffic stop.

The records search in this case is distinguishable from United States v. Evans , 786 F.3d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 2015), where the Ninth Circuit found that an ex-felon registration check which returned information about convictions for drug-related charges was "wholly unrelated" to the traffic-stop mission. A CRIMS check, as Odom concedes, "shows warrants ... from Alameda County" as well as general criminal information. ECF No. 42 at 15. Thus, the CRIMS search was not "wholly...