United States v. Oliveras

96 F.4th 298

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Alex OLIVERAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-2954

August Term 2022

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Argued: June 30, 2023

Decided: March 15, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Arcara, J.)

Tiffany H. Lee, Assistant United States Attorney, for Trini E. Ross, United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY.

Timothy P. Murphy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Buffalo, NY.

Before: Lynch, Bianco, and Pérez, Circuit Judges.

Joseph F. Bianco, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Alex Oliveras appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Arcara, J.), entered November 23, 2021, following his guilty plea, sentencing him principally to sixty-three months' imprisonment and a three-year supervised release term for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Oliveras's sole contention on appeal is that the imposition of a special condition of supervised release that subjects him to suspicionless searches by a probation officer (the "Search Condition") violates the Fourth Amendment.

We conclude that the "special needs" doctrine of the Fourth Amendment permits, when sufficiently supported by the record, the imposition of a special condition of supervised release that allows the probation officer to conduct a suspicionless search of the defendant's person, property, vehicle, place of residence or any other property under his or her control. However, the district court exceeded its discretion in imposing that special condition here because it failed to make the individualized assessment required to support the special condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), including a sufficient explanation as to how the condition is reasonably related in this particular case to the applicable statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary under those factors.

Accordingly, we VACATE the Search Condition and REMAND to the district court for further consideration of whether it is necessary to impose the Search Condition in this particular case and, if so, for the district court to explain the individualized basis for imposing the Search Condition.

BACKGROUND

On November 27, 2018, Oliveras was charged in an indictment in the Western District of New York with the following: two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Counts One and Two); one count of maintaining a drug-involved premises in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (Count Three); one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count Four); one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Count Five); and one count of possession of a defaced firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k) and 924(a)(1)(B) (Count Six).

On October 22, 2020, Oliveras pled guilty to Count One (possessing cocaine with intent to distribute) and Count Four (possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking), pursuant to a plea agreement with the government. On November 23, 2021, the district court sentenced Oliveras principally to sixty-three months' imprisonment and a three-year supervised release term. In connection with the supervised release term, the district court imposed the Search Condition at issue on this appeal, to which Oliveras objected both in writing prior to the sentencing and at the sentencing proceeding.

Prior to Oliveras's sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") in which it recommended a search condition as a special condition of supervised release. The search condition initially provided for searches "based upon reasonable suspicion." United States v. Oliveras, No. 18-cr-00234, Dkt. No. 82 at 23 (Initial PSR). The Probation Office subsequently, without explanation, revised the proposed condition to remove the reasonable suspicion requirement. See Oliveras, No. 18-cr-00234, Dkt. No. 101 at 24 (First Revised PSR). More specifically, the Search Condition provided:

The defendant shall submit to a search of his person, property, vehicle, place of residence or any other property under his control, and permit confiscation of any evidence or contraband discovered. (This condition serves the statutory sentencing purposes of deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D)).

Id.

Oliveras did not object to the search condition as initially proposed. However, in his sentencing submission, he objected to the Search Condition as revised because it omitted reasonable suspicion as a requirement for any search by the probation officer. See Oliveras, No. 18-cr-00234, Dkt. No. 106 at 2 (Statement with Respect to Sentencing Factors).

In response to Oliveras's objection, the Probation Office submitted another revised PSR with an addendum that explained the omission of the reasonable suspicion language from the Search Condition by relying on this Court's decision in United States v. Braggs, 5 F.4th 183 (2d Cir. 2021). Specifically, the PSR stated:

Under the special needs doctrine, a parole officer may search a parolee, without violating the Fourth Amendment, so long as the search is reasonably related to performance of the officer's duties. The duties of a parole officer include the supervision, rehabilitation, and societal reintegration of parolees, as well as assuring that the community is not harmed by parolees being at large. Because a search undertaken by a parole officer of a parolee to detect parole violations is reasonably related to the parole officer's duties, such a search is permissible under the special needs doctrine and accordingly comports with [the] Fourth Amendment.

Oliveras, No. 18-cr-00234, Dkt. No. 109 at 25 (Second Revised PSR) (citing Braggs, 5 F.4th at 184). The Second Revised PSR also relied on this Court's reasoning in United States v. Grimes, 225 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2000), and stated:

[W]hile parolees do not surrender their constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, their status as parolees diminishes the extent of their Fourth Amendment protection. Parolees may be subject to warrantless searches and seizures by a parole officer, as long as the officer's conduct is rationally and reasonably related to the performance of his or her duties.

Second Revised PSR at 25. The Probation Office noted that both Braggs and Grimes involved "individuals under a sentence of state parole supervision," but concluded that "the same analysis applies to a defendant who is under a sentence of supervised release, which is the federal counterpart or equivalent of state parole." Id. at 25-26.

At sentencing, the district judge rejected Oliveras's objection, imposing the Search Condition as a special condition of his supervised release and declining to add the reasonable suspicion requirement. In doing so, the district judge explained that he had a "problem with the reasonable suspicion requirement" given his view regarding the nature of supervised release:

[W]hen you're on supervised release, that [is] to allow [you] out of prison at an earlier time. And it seems to me that, all of a sudden, you have some legal rights that you would not have when you were in prison, and that is a search of the cell based on reasonable suspicion. They can search a cell any time whenever they feel.

Joint App'x at 100. The district judge stated that he was "open-minded," but that he was "not inclined to put the reasonable suspicion [requirement] in [his] sentences unless somebody can point to [him] a valid reason why in a particular case it should" be included. Id. He further clarified:

So I'm going to not require reasonable suspicion in my sentences. I don't want to say all the time. I always want to keep an open mind . . . . [I]t's my intention that [in] the general case, I will provide [that] reasonable suspicion is not required, but I'll keep an open mind, and I'll note in this case here, I'm not going to require reasonable suspicion. I can tell you up front.

Id. at 100-01.

As to the legal basis for the ruling, the district judge, referring to Braggs, explained that this Court has "clearly indicated" that reasonable suspicion is not required. Id. at 101. Further, the district judge stated that "even before [Braggs]," he "was always somewhat surprised in a way that the probation office was requiring this reasonable suspicion requirement" and that he "just never went along with it." Id.

In response, defense counsel attempted to distinguish Braggs, pointing out that "Braggs involved a defendant who was on New York State Parole . . . . not a defendant who was on federal supervised release." Id. Further, defense counsel noted that "there has not been a Second Circuit or a United States Supreme Court decision that has expressly decided that there is anything lower than reasonable suspicion required for the search of a person's home while on federal supervised release." Id. The district judge, however, maintained that reasonable suspicion should not be required for a probation officer to search a defendant on supervised release, particularly in this case which involved drugs. The district judge stated his view, based upon past cases, that individuals convicted of drug offenses "often are involved in drugs when they're on supervised release." Id. at 102. In addition, the district judge noted that, because "[d]rugs are normally a surreptitious type of thing" and are not "out in the open generally," a probation officer should be able to conduct a search without a showing of reasonable suspicion. Id...