United States v. Olney, 13–CR–2094–TOR–19.

129 F.Supp.3d 1063

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Shane Scott OLNEY, Defendant.

No. 13–CR–2094–TOR–19.

United States District Court, E.D. Washington.

Signed Sept. 8, 2015.

Benjamin David Seal, United States Attorney's Office, Yakima, WA, for Plaintiff.

Blaine Thomas Connaughton, Blaine Connaughton Law Office, Yakima, WA, for Defendant.

ORDER RE: PRETRIAL MOTIONS

THOMAS O. RICE, District Judge.

BEFORE THE COURT are Defendant Shane Olney's Motion to Dismiss this Action, for Want of Jurisdiction, or Alternatively, to Decline Jurisdiction in Favor of Yakama Tribal Court (ECF No. 877) and Motion to Dismiss Case (ECF No. 886). The matters were heard at a pretrial conference on September 8, 2015, in Yakima, Washington. Benjamin D. Seal appeared on behalf of the United States. J.J. Sandlin appeared on behalf of Defendant. The Court has reviewed the record and files therein, heard from counsel, and is fully informed.

BACKGROUND

On August 13, 2013, a grand jury issued an Indictment, charging Defendant Shane Olney with the following: (1) Count 1, conducting an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 ; (2) Count 2, conspiracy to violate the Animal Welfare Act in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 ; and (3) Counts 3, 8, 10, 13, 16, 18, 22, and 25, unlawful animal fighting venture in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1). According to the Indictment, Defendant Olney, along with other named defendants, participated in illegal cockfighting and an illegal gambling business involving betting on cockfighting. See ECF No. 1. The United States asserts that out of the thirty-six cockfighting derbies its confidential source witnessed, Defendant Olney hosted ten at his property located in Toppenish, Washington. ECF No. 882 at 2–3.

In the instant motion, Defendant moves to dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 877. Defendant is an enrolled member of the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation and contends the legality of his conduct—conduct committed on the Yakama Nation reservation —is a matter for the Yakama Tribal Court. As such, Defendant contends the United States does not have jurisdiction over this case. Alternatively, Defendant contends that even if the United States has jurisdiction, this Court should decline jurisdiction and defer to the Yakama Tribal Court.

DISCUSSION

"Indian tribes initially possessed exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by one tribal member against another in Indian country—even when the crime was murder." United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 946 (9th Cir.2007) (ellipses omitted); United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir.2005) ("The historical background of federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country can be traced to colonial times, when Indian territory was entirely the province of the tribes and the tribes were understood to possess jurisdiction over all persons and subjects present on Indian lands.").

However, the authority of Indian tribes to regulate their own affairs has eroded over time. As quasi-sovereign entities, Indian tribes "may regulate their own affairs except where Congress has modified or abrogated that power by treaty or statute." United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 498 (9th Cir.1994). "Courts have also recognized ... that regulation of criminal activity in Indian country is one area where competing federal interests may override tribal interests." Id. Today, by virtue of statutory and decisional law, federal court jurisdiction extends to violations of major crimes committed by an Indian against another Indian, as well as intra-Indian violations of federal criminal laws of general, nationwide applicability. Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 946 ; see Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1218–21 (discussing the historical evolution of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country).

A. Indian General Crimes Act and Indian Major Crimes Act

First, Defendant Olney asserts that neither the General Crimes Act nor the Major Crimes Act supports federal prosecution in this case. However, as these statutes have no bearing on the authority of the federal government to prosecute federal laws of nationwide applicability that make actions criminal wherever committed, see Begay, 42 F.3d at 498, this Court finds these arguments are without merit.

"To balance the sovereignty interest of Indian tribes and the United States' interest in punishing offenses committed in Indian country, Congress enacted two statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153." Id. The Federal Enclave Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, also known as the Indian General Crimes Act, "makes federal enclave criminal law—a concrete body of law governing areas within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States—generally applicable to crimes committed in ‘Indian country.’ " Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1218 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1152 ). Section 1152 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of crimes committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States ... shall extend to the Indian country." 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Put another way, so-called "federal enclave laws"—which apply in enclaves, such as national parks, military bases, and federal buildings—apply in Indian Country. Begay, 42 F.3d at 498. Section 1152 contains three exceptions: "offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian," offenses committed by an Indian who has been punished by the tribe, and cases secured by treaty to the exclusive jurisdiction of a tribe. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 ; see also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643, n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (noting the fourth judicially-created exception: "a non-Indian charged with committing crimes against non-Indians in Indian country is subject to prosecution under state law").

The Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, partially abrogated section 1152 by extending federal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country for the commission of "major" crimes, enumerated in the statute. Begay, 42 F.3d at 498. Section 1153 provides that

[a]ny Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, a felony assault under section 113, an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). "Enacted in 1885, [section 1153 ] guaranteed that Indians committing major crimes against other Indians would be treated with the same rigor as non-Indian offenders." Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1220.

Importantly, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that the Indian Major Crimes Act "deals only with the application of federal enclave law to Indians and has no bearing on federal laws of nationwide applicability that make actions criminal wherever committed." Begay, 42 F.3d at 498. That is, "federal criminal laws of general, nationwide applicability ... apply to Indians unless a treaty specifically exempts them." Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1220 ; see Begay, 42 F.3d at 498 (explicitly rejecting the Second Circuit decision, United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.1992), which held that only those federal criminal statutes of nationwide applicability that constitute "peculiarly Federal" crimes apply to Indians in Indian country). In so holding, the Circuit has repeatedly rejected the contention that Indians may not be federally charged for any criminal conduct beyond those crimes enumerated in section 1153. See, e.g., Begay, 42 F.3d at 498. "[T]he Major Crimes Act, deals only with the application of federal enclave law to Indians.... Similarly, § 1152 relates ‘only to federal enclave law’—law in which the situs of the offense is an element of the crime." Id. Accordingly, "federal criminal laws of nationwide applicability apply to Indians within Indian country just as they apply elsewhere." United States v. Anderson, 391 F.3d 1083, 1085–86 (9th Cir.2004).

This Court finds it has jurisdiction over this case. First, the Ninth Circuit has expressly found that the charge under Count 2 of the Indictment—conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 —is a federal statute of nationwide applicability that applies equally to everyone, including Indians in Indian country. See Begay, 42 F.3d at 500. Second, at least one other Circuit has noted that the charge under Count 1—conducting an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 —is a nationally applicable federal criminal statute for purposes of federal jurisdiction. See United States v. Gachot, 512 F.3d 1252, 1254–54 (10th Cir.2008). Because this charge is not affected by the federal enclave law nor have Indians been expressly or impliedly excluded from its reach, see Begay, 42 F.3d at 499, this Court agrees. Finally, because the remaining Counts within the Indictment charging Defendant with violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) —unlawful animal fighting venture—similarly do not include situs as an element of the offense or exclude Indians from their application, they apply to Defendant as a law of nationwide applicability. See Begay, 42 F.3d at 499. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction over Defendant Olney's case.

B. The Wheeler–Howard Act

Second, Defendant Olney asserts that the Yakama Tribal Court has rightful jurisdiction over this case pursuant to the Wheeler–Howard Act, or the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. ECF No. 877 at 7. In support, Defendant cites to section 16 of the Act, which enumerates specific powers of Indian tribes—"[i]n addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law"—including the powers ...