United States v. Owens

996 F.3d 755

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Ian Aza Jerome OWENS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-2139

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: May 6, 2021

ON BRIEF: Sharon A. Turek, Pedro Celis, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant. Theodore J. Greeley, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Marquette, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before: DAUGHTREY, MOORE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges

MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which DAUGHTREY, J., joined. THAPAR, J. (pp. 764–66), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Ian Owens appeals the district court's order denying his motion for compassionate release because it concluded that the disparity between his lengthy sentence and the sentence that he would receive following the passage of the First Step Act was not an extraordinary and compelling reason to support compassionate release. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we REVERSE the district court's order and REMAND for reconsideration of Owens's motion for compassionate release consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2004, a jury convicted Owens of five counts of possessing or aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) ; one count of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 ; four counts of bank robbery by force or violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) ; and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l), in connection with a series of bank robberies. Appellant's Appendix ("App'x") at 60–63 (Jury Verdict). A single § 924(c) conviction for possessing a firearm during and in furtherance of a crime of violence carries a mandatory-minimum sentence of five years’ incarceration. At the time of Owens's sentencing, each subsequent § 924(c) conviction triggered a sentence of an additional twenty-five years of incarceration, even if the defendant's § 924(c) convictions all were part of a single indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).

At the outset, the government charged Owens with a single count of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (carrying a maximum sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment). App'x at 20 (Indictment). The government admits that if Owens had agreed to cooperate, it would have allowed him to plead guilty to this single count. R. 149 (Gov't Resp. to Mot. for Sentence Reduction at 17 n.8) (Page ID #200). After Owens rejected the government's initial offer, the government filed the first superseding indictment, which added three counts of bank robbery, one count of conspiracy, and three § 924(c) counts to the initial bank robbery count. App'x at 21–29 (First Superseding Indictment). The second superseding indictment added another conspiracy count, two felon-in-possession-of-a-weapon counts, and one carjacking count. App'x at 30–43 (Second Superseding Indictment). The government subsequently filed a third superseding indictment adding two more § 924(c) counts. App'x 44–59 (Third Superseding Indictment). Shortly before trial, the government proposed one last plea offer that would have required Owens to plead guilty to only two § 924(c) counts. Owens rejected this offer and proceeded to trial. The jury convicted Owens of all but one count, including the five § 924(c) counts. App'x 60–63 (Jury Verdict).

The district court sentenced Owens to 1260 months’ incarceration for the five § 924(c) convictions (five years’ incarceration for the first § 924(c) conviction and twenty-five years’ incarceration for each of the four remaining § 924(c) convictions) and 151 months’ incarceration for the remaining convictions. United States v. Owens , 426 F.3d 800, 809 (6th Cir. 2005). Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), which held that the Sentencing Guidelines were advisory, we remanded Owens's case for resentencing. Owens , 426 F.3d at 809. In all other respects we affirmed Owens's convictions and sentence. Id. On remand, the district court resentenced Owens to 120 months’ incarceration on the discretionary portion of his sentence and the mandatory 1260 months’ incarceration for the five § 924(c) convictions. R. 144 (Resent'g Hr'g Tr. at 10) (Page ID #123). Owens's resulting 115-year sentence is, in effect, a life sentence without the possibility of parole.

Owens's co-conspirators faced a much different fate. Darrell Jackson pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting armed bank robbery, and the district court sentenced him to twenty-one months’ incarceration. R. 158 (2004 Final PSR at 6) (Page ID #264). Another co-conspirator, Adika Sutton, pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery by force or violence, and the district court sentenced him to thirty-three months’ incarceration. Id. Lionel Sorrells pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery and one count of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, and the district court sentenced him to twenty-five years’ incarceration. Id. ; Judgment, United States v. Sorrells , No. 2:02-cr-80810 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2003), ECF No. 74 (Page ID #214). The final co-conspirator, Damon Lamar Johnson pleaded guilty to two counts of carjacking, two counts of bank robbery, and one count of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and the district court sentenced him to thirty-nine years’ incarceration. See Judgment, United States v. Johnson , No. 2:02-cr-80810 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2004), ECF No. 82 (Page ID #237); Judgment, United States v. Johnson , No. 2:03-cr-80676 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2004), ECF No. 4 (Page ID #30); see also R. 158 (2004 Final PSR at 6) (Page ID #264). Tamika Owens was prosecuted in state court and served less than ten years’ incarceration. R. 148-2 (Letter from former Judge Gleeson in Support of Mot. for Sentence Reduction at 3) (Page ID #172).

In February 2019, Owens filed a pro se motion asking the district court to "reconsider the current judgment in [his] case."¹ R. 138 (Pro Se Mot. at 1) (Page ID #81). Owens noted that he would not be subject to the same lengthy sentence if sentenced today because First Step Act § 403(a) amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) such that escalating mandatory-minimum sentences for a second or subsequent § 924(c) conviction applied only to a defendant who has a prior final § 924(c) conviction. Id. at 2–3 (Page ID #82–83). The district court appointed counsel for Owens and instructed counsel to "file a supplemental brief addressing the import, if any, of the First Step Act of 2018 on Defendant's sentence." R. 143 (Order Establishing Briefing Schedule) (Page ID #96). Owens then moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) after thirty days had elapsed from when he submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden of his facility. R. 148 (Br. in Support of Mot. for Sentence Reduction at 15) (Page ID #146). Owens's counsel argued that the First Step Act's changes to § 924(c), the fact that Owens received an effective life sentence largely as a penalty for choosing to go to trial, and Owens's remarkable rehabilitation constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. R. 148 at 15–16 (Page ID #146–47). Owens received a 105-year sentence for five counts of aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, when under the First Step Act, the district court would be required to sentence him to only twenty-five years’ incarceration. Id. at 16–18 (Page ID #147–49). Owens's counsel argued that his decision to reject the government's plea offers and proceed to trial resulted in the mandatory 105-year sentence for his § 924(c) convictions. Id. at 18–19 (Page ID #149–50). Finally, Owens's counsel emphasized Owens's remarkable record of rehabilitation. He completed the intensive Challenge Program and served as a mentor for the program for two years, has been consistently employed while incarcerated, and is housed in a medium-security prison, rather than a high-security prison, after BOP staff applied for a waiver on behalf of Owens. Id. at 19–21 (Page ID #150–52); see also R. 148-1 (Progress Rep. & Certificates) (Page ID #156–68).

The district court denied Owens's motion for compassionate release. R. 153 (Order Denying Mot. to Reduce Sentence) (Page ID #236–38). The district court concluded that the disparity between the sentence that Owens received and the sentence that he would receive today because of the First Step Act's amendments to § 924(c) was not an "extraordinary and compelling reason" to merit compassionate release. Id. at 2–3 (Page ID #237–38). "Congress expressly declined to make the changes to § 924(c) retroactive, and the Sixth Circuit has implicitly recognized as much." Id. at 2 (Page ID #237). Therefore, it would "circumvent congressional intent and guidance from the Circuit Court" to consider the First Step Act's changes to § 924(c) as an "extraordinary and compelling reason[ ]." Id. at 3 (Page ID #238). The district court did not consider Owens's evidence of rehabilitation or any other bases for a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons, nor did the district court consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The district court denied Owens's motion for compassionate release based only on the first factor and did not reach the other factors. Owens now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

"We review a district court's denial of compassionate release for abuse of discretion." United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098, 1112 (6th Cir. 2020). We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation, such as the meaning of "extraordinary and compelling reasons." United States v. Flowers , 963 F.3d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 2020).

Two provisions of the First Step Act are relevant to Owens's appeal. First, the First Step Act permitted defendants to bring motions for compassionate release in federal courts. Previously,...