United States v. Pabon-Mandrell

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. [5] EDUARDO PABON-MANDRELL, Defendant.

CRIMINAL No. 07-121 (ADC)(HRV)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

December 22, 2023

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

HECTOR L. RAMOS-VEGA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se defendant Eduardo Pabon-Mandrell (hereinafter “defendant” or Mr. Pabon-Mandrell”) has filed a motion for reduction of sentence raising several grounds for relief. (Docket No. 3049). He moves the Court for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) asserting that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist warranting a reduction of his life sentence to time served. (Id.). Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”). The United States has filed an opposition to defendant's motion. (Docket No. 3066). The matter has been referred to me for report and recommendation. (Docket No. 3067).

For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that defendant's motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It should be GRANTED as to the request for sentence reduction under section 404 of the FSA. It should be denied without prejudice as to the request for compassionate release. In making this recommendation, I express no opinion as to what the resulting sentence should be if the presiding District Judge was at all inclined to adopt my recommendation.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March of 2007, a grand jury sitting in this district returned an indictment charging Mr. Pabon-Mandrell and others with a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances within 1,000 feet of a protected location, all in violation to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846 and 860. (Docket No. 1). The indictment alleged that the conspiracy involved in excess of one (1) kilogram of heroin, in excess of five (5) kilograms of cocaine, in excess 50 grams of cocaine base, and more than 100 kilograms of marijuana. (Id.). The indictment also charged that all co-conspirators were members of a gang called “las avispas” (“the wasps”) that operated drug distribution points within the municipality of Guayama, Puerto Rico. It was further alleged that some members of the drug distribution organization would possess firearms and would kill or attempt to kill other members of the same organization or persons belonging to rival gangs to protect and maintain control of the drug points. Herein defendant, Mr. Pabon-Mandrell, was alleged to be a leader and organizer within the conspiracy, particularly with respect to the La Plumita drug point in Borinquen Ward. He was also characterized as an enforcer for the drug organization.

Mr. Pabon-Mandrell exercised his right to trial. Prior to jury selection on the first day of trial, the government filed an “Information in Accordance with Title 21 United States Code § 851” submitting that defendant had three prior Puerto Rico drug convictions, identified as GSC2003G0748, GSC2003G0749 and GSC2005G0402, that had become final. (Docket No. 1026). According to the government, these prior convictions triggered the enhanced penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), resulting in a sentencing exposure of mandatory life imprisonment. (Id.). Following a 12-day trial, the jury found Mr. Pabon-Mandrell guilty of count one of the indictment. (Docket Nos. 1123, 1127). The jury made specific findings as to drug quantity, attributing to the defendant 50 grams or more of crack, one (1) kilogram or more of heroin, five (5) kilograms or more of powder cocaine and 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. (Docket No. 1123).

A sentencing hearing was held on June 6, 2008. The Court addressed challenges to the 21 U.S.C. § 851 information, ultimately finding that Mr. Pabon-Mandrell was subject to a mandatory life sentence. (Docket No. 1894). The Court calculated the advisory sentencing guidelines as follows: a base offense level of 40 was determined under U.S.S.G §§ 2D1.1 and 2D1.2. In setting the base offense level, the Court attributed to the defendant 4.5 kilograms or more of cocaine base^[1] and applied the protected location enhancement. (Id. at 69). The Court also added a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of firearms and a four-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 for his role in the offense. There being no other adjustments, the total adjusted offense level was 46. By operation of the guidelines, the level was reduced to 43. See U.S.S.G., Ch. 5 Sentencing Table, Cmt. Note 2. Based on a total offense level of 43 and a Criminal History Category of I, the advisory guideline sentencing range (“GSR”) was life, which was also the mandatory minimum sentence required by virtue of the § 851 information.

The Court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment. (Id. at 70-71; see also Judgment, Docket No. 1575). Should defendant be ever released, he is to serve a 10-year term of supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed both the conviction and sentence of Mr. Pabon-Mandrell. See United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 617 F.3d 581 (1st Cir. 2010). Defendant has unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. See Pabon-Mandrell v. United States, 91 F.Supp.3d 198 (D.P.R. 2015), certificate of appealability denied by No. 15-1654, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 27243 (1st Cir., Aug. 24, 2017).^[2]

On June 20, 2023, the defendant filed, pro se, the instant motion for sentence modification, invoking 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 3582(c)(2). (Docket No. 3049). The government opposed on October 27, 2023 (Docket No. 3064), as amended on December 8, 2023. (Docket No. 3066). The presiding District Judge has referred these matters to me for report and recommendation. (Docket No. 3067).

III. APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION

A. Compassionate Release

Defendant makes several arguments in support of eligibility and sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He claims that he has presented extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant said reduction. First, he avers that he was prejudiced and his rights substantially affected because the language of the sentencing guidelines does not include inchoate crimes. Second, defendant argues that the imposition of a mandatory term of life imprisonment under a three-strike scenario such as his leads to an absurd result that Congress could not have intended. Third, he claims that essential facts and elements of the offense of conviction were not submitted to the jury to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in violation to his Sixth Amendment right and of the rules announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). Fourth, defendant maintains that his difficult upbringing and post-sentence rehabilitation warrant a sentence reduction. As I shall discuss below, none of these arguments, individually, or in the aggregate, meet the compassionate release standard.

1. Legal Framework

The so-called compassionate release statute, allows a court acting on a defendant-filed motion-as long as such reduction is consistent “with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”-to

reduce the term of imprisonment (and... impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that-(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). This statute is one of the very few exceptions to the rule that once imposed, a term of imprisonment shall not be modified. United States v. Saccoccia, 10 F.4th 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2021).

To grant a compassionate release motion, the court must find that a defendant has established three things: (1) that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction; (2) that the reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; and (3) that relief is appropriate under the circumstances of the case after considering the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Quiros-Morales, 83 F.4th 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2023). Whether the reasons advanced by the defendant are extraordinary and compelling is “guided by the plain meaning of those terms.” United States v. Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th 561, 566 (1st Cir. 2021). “The plain meaning of ‘extraordinary' suggests that a qualifying reason must be a reason that is beyond the mine-run either in fact or in degree . . . . By the same token, the plain meaning of ‘compelling' suggests that a qualifying reason must be a reason that is both powerful and convincing.” Id. (citations omitted).

Prior to November 1 of this year, and because the Sentencing Commission had not issued any policy statements applicable to prisoner-initiated compassionate release motions, the First Circuit had held that district courts had discretion to “consider any complex of circumstances raised by a defendant, as forming an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting relief.” United States v Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 28 (1st Cir. 2022). The Court of Appeals concluded that non-retroactive changes in the law, such as the FSA's amendments to the mandatory minimum penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), could be considered in the determination of whether extraordinary and compelling reasons existed in a particular case. Id. at 24. Subsequently, in United States v. Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2022), it was clarified that pursuant to the holding in Ruvalcaba, district courts “may conduct a holistic review to determine whether the individualized circumstances [of the defendant], taken in...