United States v. Padilla

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. SERGIO PADILLA, Defendant.

No. 1:06-cr-00059-JLT

United States District Court, E.D. California

April 21, 2022

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

(DOCS. 734, 740, 746)

Sergio Padilla moves the Court for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Docs. 734, 740.) Padilla along with the supplemental filing by his court-appointed attorney (Doc. 746), argues that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for relief due to the spread of the COVID-19 virus, as well as substantial changes to sentencing law in the last few years. Specifically, Padilla argues that with the passage of the First Step Act, his prior drug conviction no longer triggers the enhanced mandatory minimum that applied under the previous regime. The government opposes the motion. (Doc. 753). For the reasons explained below Padilla's motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On October 27, 2009, Padilla pled guilty to Counts One and Four of the indictment: Conspiracy to Distribute and to Possess with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846, and Conspiracy to Conduct Financial Transactions Involving the Proceeds of Specified Unlawful Activity and Aiding and Abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1965(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(h), 1957, and 2. (Doc. 516.) The government sought enhanced sentencing due to Padilla's prior felony drug offense, a 1990 conviction for possession for sale of a narcotic in Merced County, California. Although Padilla only served eight months in jail for this prior drug offense, it triggered an enhanced mandatory minimum of 20 years for the Count One in this case. (See Doc. 746-1.)

After considering the quantity of drugs involved, Padilla's leadership role in the drug trafficking organization, and his acceptance of responsibility, Padilla's total offense level was calculated as a level 39 with a criminal history category I. This resulted in a sentencing guideline range of 262-327 months for Count One. Probation recommended a downward variance to the 240-month mandatory minimum, (see Doc. 552 at 2-3), but Judge Oliver W. Wanger ultimately sentenced Padilla to 262 months for Count One and 240 months for Count Four, to run concurrently. (Doc. 564.)

Padilla's sentence on Count One was reduced via stipulation after Amendment 782 retroactively revised the Drug Quantity Table and chemical quantity tables across drug and chemical types by two offense levels. See Amendment 782; USSG, sup. App'x C, amend. 788 (2014); United States v. Navarro, 800 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2015). The amendment lowered Padilla's guidelines range from 262-327 months to 240-262 months, with the enhanced mandatory minimum of 240 months still in effect.^[1] Per the stipulation, Padilla's sentence on Count One was reduced to 240 months. (Doc. 711.)

Padilla is serving the remainder of his sentence at CI North Lake and is scheduled for release on February 27, 2023. Find an inmate, Federal Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited April 14, 2022). He has thus far been incarcerated for just over 16 years.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court generally “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.”

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010) (“‘[A] judgment of conviction that includes [a sentence of imprisonment] constitutes a final judgment' and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances.”). Those limited circumstances include compassionate release in extraordinary cases. See United States v. Holden, 452 F.Supp.3d 964, 968 (D. Or. 2020). Under the First Step Act of 2018 (“the FSA”) imprisoned defendants may bring their own motions for compassionate release in the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018). In this regard, the FSA specifically provides that a court may

upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf^[2] or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that -

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or

(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the [BOP] that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).

The policy statement with respect to compassionate release in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines sets out criteria and circumstances describing “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.13;^[3] see also United States v. Gonzalez, 451 F.Supp.3d 1194, 1197 (E.D. Wash. 2020) (noting that courts “universally” rely on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to define “extraordinary and compelling reasons, ” even though that policy statement was issued before Congress passed the FSA and authorized defendants to file compassionate release motions). However, the Ninth Circuit has held “that the current version of U.S.S.G. §1B1.13 is not an ‘applicable policy statement[ ]' for 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant.” United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2021). “In other words, the Sentencing Commission has not yet issued a policy statement ‘applicable' to § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant.” Id. The Ninth Circuit clarified that “[t]he Sentencing Commission's statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 may inform a district court's discretion for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant, but they are not binding.” Id. (citing United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020)).

In the past, when moving for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), courts recognized that the defendant bore the initial burden of demonstrating that a sentence reduction was warranted. See United States v. Sprague, 135 F.3d 1301, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1998). Although the Ninth Circuit has not specifically addressed the question of which party bears the burden in the context of a motion for compassionate brought pursuant to § 3582(c) as amended by the FSA, district courts have agreed that the burden remains with the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Mathews, No. 2:15-CR-00118-KJM, 2021 WL 3883735, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2021); United States v. Greenhut, No. 2:18-cr-00048-CAS, 2020 WL 509385, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020); United States v. Van Sickle, No. 18-cr-0250-JLR, 2020 WL 2219496, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 7, 2020).

ANALYSIS

To qualify for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a court must consider three requirements:

First, as a threshold matter, the statute requires defendants to exhaust administrative remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Second, a district court may grant compassionate release only if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and “that such reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. Third, the district court must also consider “the factors set forth in Section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” Id.

United States v. Rodriguez, 424 F.Supp.3d 674, 680 (C.D. Cal. 2019); see also United States v. Ramirez-Suarez, 16-CR-00124-LHK-4, 2020 WL 3869181, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2020); Parker, 461 F.Supp.3d at 973-74; United States v. Trent, No. 16-cr-00178-CRB-1, 2020 WL 1812242, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2020) (noting that as to the third factor, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) release must be “consistent with” the sentencing factors set forth in §3553(a)).

A. Administrative Exhaustion

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), an inmate may only file a motion for sentence reduction after the Bureau of Prisons denied his request or after 30 days have passed since BOP received his request. On February 24, 2021 and September 15, 2021, Padilla submitted requests for compassionate release to the Warden. (Docs. 746 at 3; 746-3.) The Warden denied both of Padilla's requests. Id. Thus, Padilla has satisfied the exhaustion requirement.

B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

Padilla argues that both the COVID-19 pandemic and revisions to sentencing law in 2018 establish “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for a sentence reduction and early release under § 3582.

1. COVID-19 Risk

Padilla's motion and supplement briefly discuss his multiple health conditions. (Doc. 746 at 10-11.) A defendant's medical conditions may constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons warranting compassionate release, as may his age and other related factors, family circumstances, or “other reasons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1 (A)-(D).^[4]

Medical conditions may be “extraordinary and compelling” where the defendant “is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory), ” though “[a] specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1 (A)(i). Non-exhaustive...