United States v. Palmer

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. QUINCY PALMER, Defendant.

Crim. No. 22-00282 (GC)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

June 18, 2024

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Georgette Castner United States District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Quincy Palmer's second amended pre-trial omnibus motion. (ECF No. 32.) The Government opposed, and Defendant replied. (ECF Nos. 35 & 37.) The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1.^[1] For the reasons set forth below, and other good cause shown, Palmer's motion is DENIED IN PART, and the Court reserves its decision on the remaining issues that will be addressed prior to trial.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 3, 2021, Patrolman Joseph Sangiovanni of the Clinton Township Police Department initiated a traffic stop of a blue Chevrolet Trailblazer driving on Route 78 West (ECF No. 34-1 at 2.) A video captured by Sangiovanni's motor vehicle recorder (MVR) depicts the Chevrolet passing the patrol car, frequently applying its brakes, drifting outside of its lane several times, and nearly drifting into an adjacent vehicle. (Gov't Ex. 1 (MVR) at 00:10 to 00:45.) Sangiovanni also claims that one of the vehicle's headlights was out, although this is not captured on any video. (ECF No. 34-1 at 2.^[2]) Sangiovanni ran a search on the Chevrolet's registration on his computer and discovered that it had expired on July 15, 2021. (Id.) After Sangiovanni activated his vehicle's emergency lights and siren, the Chevrolet continued driving for about a minute before pulling over in the right shoulder lane. (Gov't Ex. 1 at 1:00 to 2:05.) Sangiovanni approached the driver (later identified as Palmer) and asked for his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. (Gov't Ex. 2, Sangiovanni Body-Worn Camera (BWC), at 2:00 to 3:25.) Palmer provided a New York learner's permit bearing the name “Dion Snype” and the vehicle's title, but no registration or proof of insurance. (Id.) Palmer advised that the vehicle was not registered because he had just purchased it. (Id.) The picture on the learner's permit did not depict Palmer, but another individual. (ECF No. 34-1 at 3.) The other documents showed that the vehicle had been purchased in 2020. (Id.) At Sangiovanni's direction, Palmer exited his vehicle and sat down on the nearby highway guardrail. (Gov't Ex. 2 at 11:10 to 11:25.) Shortly thereafter, two other officers arrived at the scene. (Id.)

When asked whether his name was “Dion,” Palmer stated “Yes.” (Id.) Palmer also again claimed to have purchased the vehicle “today.” (ECF No. 34-1 at 3.) Sangiovanni also claims to have witnessed “some type of object between his waistband and under his shirt on his left hip” because “his t-shirt did not fall flat and I could see some type of straight horizontal line where the shirt slightly sat on top of the item.” (Id. at 3-4.) Sangiovanni claims that Palmer's inconsistencies, nervous manner, and apparent object beneath his shirt caused Sangiovanni “concern,” but that he wanted to keep Palmer “calm.” (Id.)

Sangiovanni asked Palmer for consent to search his vehicle. (Gov't Ex. 2 at 12:50.) After initially providing consent, Palmer refused to sign a consent form. (Id. at 15:00.) Palmer began to grow agitated and appeared to be in distress. (Id.) Sangiovanni claims that based on Palmer's nervous manner, “moving his hands in a fast fidgety manner throughout the investigation,” his apparent untruthfulness, and the alleged object beneath his shirt, Sangiovanni felt that “based on the totality of circumstances up to this point,” he was in fear of his life and felt that he needed to “frisk this individual for weapons.” (ECF No. 34-1 at 4.) As the officers attempted to frisk Palmer, Palmer physically resisted. (Gov't Ex. 2 at 17:50.) During the ensuing struggle, Palmer fell over the guardrail he had been sitting on. (Id. at 18:30.) The two other officers on the scene, Patrolman Brian Dickson and Sergeant Andrew McCluskey, claim that during the struggle, they heard a metal item hit the ground. (ECF No. 34-1 at 6, 8.) Patrolman Dickson then saw a gun on the ground next to Palmer and moved the gun away from Palmer. (Id. at 8.) Palmer was handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle. (Id.)

The weapon was a .45 caliber Armscor semiautomatic pistol. (ECF No. 35 at 14.) The Government claims that according to a New Jersey State Police Office of Forensic Sciences laboratory report, the weapon is operable and was purportedly stolen in Reading, Pennsylvania. (Id.)

On November 19, 2021, Palmer was charged in a criminal complaint in the District of New Jersey for possessing the firearm “knowing that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (ECF No. 1.) On April 14, 2022, a grand jury indicted Palmer for possessing the firearm “knowing that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” in violation of § 922(g)(1). (ECF No. 13.) Pending before the Court is Palmer's second amended pre-trial omnibus motion, in which Palmer seeks a dismissal of the indictment, suppression of all statements and evidence produced as a result of an unlawful seizure, and various other forms of relief.

II.DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

Palmer moves to dismiss the indictment raising facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1). The Court addresses each challenge in turn.

1. Palmer's As-Applied Challenge to § 922(g)(1)

The Second Amendment provides that a “well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. But the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment is not “unlimited.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). The United States Supreme Court in Heller explained that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. at 626-27; McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (recognizing that the Second Amendment does not preclude such longstanding regulatory measures as prohibitions on the possession of firearms “by felons and the mentally ill”).

More recently, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protects law-abiding citizens' right to carry firearms in public for their self-defense. 597 U.S. 1, 9 (2022). In so holding, the Court refined the test that courts must apply when determining whether application of a firearm law is constitutional - that is, “when the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct” and the Government must then justify its firearm law by demonstrating “the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 17.

Under this framework, Palmer must first show that the Second Amendment applies to Palmer and his proposed conduct. Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96, 101 (3d Cir. 2023). If it applies, the burden of proof falls on the Government to show that §922(g)(1) as applied to Palmer is “consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 103 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24.)

First, the Government concedes that under Range, Palmer is one of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. (ECF No. 35 at 19.) See also United States v. Velazquez, Crim. No. 23-657, 2024 WL 49690, at *12 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2024).

Next, the Government argues that Palmer has not met his burden of showing that he possessed the weapon for a constitutionally protected purpose. (ECF No. 35 at 22.) See, e.g., Range, 69 F.4th at 103 (finding that the defendant's request to “possess a rifle to hunt and a shotgun to defend himself at home” falls under the constitutionally protected purposes defined in Heller). But the Court need not resolve this question because even if Palmer's conduct is covered by the Second Amendment, the Government has met its burden in showing that § 922(g)(1) as applied to Palmer is “consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.” See United States v. Boone, Crim. No. 22-233, 2024 WL 965146, at *5 (Mar. 6, 2024) (citing Porter v. United States, Crim. No. 22-6199, 2023 WL 6366273, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2023)).

Under Bruen, courts must “assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment's . . . historical understanding.” 597 U.S. at 26. Because the Second Amendment may “apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated,” to justify a restriction on firearm possession, the Government may “identify a well-established and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin.” Id. at 28-30; see also Range, 69 F.4th at 103.

Accordingly here the Court must determine whether the Government has identified historical analogues showing that the Nation historically disarmed defendants like Palmer. See Range, 69 F.4th at 103; Velazquez, 2024 WL 49690, at *13. And in its opposition brief, the Government points to “clear historical support for restricting the possession of firearms by persons who, like Palmer, repeatedly committed felony crimes,” citing colonial and early state laws that disarmed individuals who “posed a potential danger” to others. (ECF No. 35 at 31-33 (collecting cases).) Palmer is alleged to have previously been convicted of...