United States v. Parks

676 F.Supp.3d 1287

UNITED STATES of America, v. Willie Vernon PARKS, Defendant.

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 1:13-CR-22-AT-1

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

Signed March 8, 2021

Jenny R. Turner, Office of United States Attorney, Atlanta, GA, for United States of America.

Dennis Craig O'Brien, Office of Dennis C. O'Brien, Marietta, GA, for Defendant.

ORDER

Amy Totenberg, United States District Judge

This case comes before the Court on Defendant Willie Vernon Parks' Amended Motion for Compassionate Release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by Section 603 of the First Step Act [Doc. 60]. The Government has filed a Response in Opposition [Doc. 66], and Mr. Parks filed his Reply [Doc. 67]. Having reviewed the record and applicable legal authority, the Court enters the following Order.

I. Background

In May 2011, Mr. Parks was arrested for operating a drug stash house in which agents found two kilograms of heroin and six firearms. (PSR ¶¶ 74, 92-97.) Later, Mr. Parks pled guilty to a conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and a separate firearm trafficking charge for conspiring to buy firearms through straw purchases. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 77-84.) Mr. Parks was ultimately sentenced to serve 180 months to be followed by 5 years of supervised release, based on mandatory minimums. (Doc. 56.)

At present, Mr. Parks has been in federal prison for nearly a decade; his projected release date is March 27, 2024, in just over 3 years.¹ He has served approximately 75 percent of his sentence, based on his anticipated date of release with good time. Currently housed in Yazoo City Low in Mississippi, which is a part of a larger complex including with Yazoo City Medium and Yazoo City USP, Mr. Parks is incarcerated in the lowest-security facility on the Yazoo City campus.

Mr. Parks now moves for compassionate release, arguing that his drastic obesity (of a Body Mass Index ("BMI") of approximately 55), hypertension, enlarged heart, and race render him acutely vulnerable to severe illness from COVID-19. (See generally, Defendant's Amended Motion for Compassionate Release, Doc. 60; Defendant's Reply, Doc 67.) Further, Mr. Parks contends that he is no danger to the public and that the § 3553 sentencing factors weigh in favor of release, in light of his age (46), significant time already served (75% of his sentence), rehabilitation, and lack of violence in his admittedly long criminal history. (Reply at 20-21, 25-28.) The Government acknowledges that Mr. Parks' severe obesity constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason that may support compassionate release (Gov. Response, Doc. 66 at 9) but argues that the Court should still deny his petition because he poses a danger to the community and because the § 3553 factors do not justify a sentence reduction. (Id. at 11.)²

If released, Mr. Parks plans to live with his wife in McDonough, Georgia. He has received an offer of employment with a local barbershop, the owner of which is aware of Mr. Parks' situation and has confirmed to defense counsel that she has a job available for Mr. Parks. The Probation Office has confirmed the suitability of Mr. Parks' proposed living arrangement with his wife and family.

II. Legal Standard

Before the enactment of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 ("First Step Act"), compassionate release was only available if the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") filed a motion requesting it. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (2002); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 ("Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may reduce the term of imprisonment."). Now, however, the First Step Act enables a defendant to file a motion for compassionate release directly with the sentencing court, provided she has "fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on [his] behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of [his] facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018).³

Where the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, the First Step Act authorizes a court to modify a term of imprisonment "after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, if it finds that—(i) extraordinary and compelling circumstances warrant a reduction . . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id. The Sentencing Commission's policy is found in § 1B1.13 of the Guidelines and that section's accompanying Application Notes. This policy statement provides that a court may reduce a term of imprisonment "if, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they are applicable, the court determines that (1)(A) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; . . . (2) the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); and (3) the reduction is consistent with this policy statement." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Application Note 1 to this section lists three circumstances that would qualify as "extraordinary and compelling:" (1) medical condition; (2) advanced age; and (3) family circumstances. Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. Application Note 1 also includes a residual clause whereby the Director of the BOP may determine "there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons" set out above. Id.

The Sentencing Commission has not updated this policy statement since the passage of the First Step Act. Section 1B1.13 therefore does not reflect the change in the procedural requirements for compassionate release. See United States v. Ebbers, 432 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Courts across the country—including this Court—still rely on § 1B.1.13 for guidance as to the "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that may warrant a sentence reduction. See United States v. Drummond, No. 1:97-cr-0019, Doc. 118 at 5 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2019) (viewing § 1B.1.13 as "non-binding guidance"); see also United States v. Solis, No. 16-015-CG-MU, 2019 WL 2518452, at *2-3 (S.D. Ala. June 18, 2019).

However, the Court is not limited to the technical requirements set forth in § 1B1.13 in assessing whether a defendant's application for compassionate release provides "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See, e.g., United States v. Maria Ullings, No. 1:10-cr-406-MLB, Doc. 34 at 6 (N.D. Ga. May 12, 2020) (citing United States v. Perez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 288, 293-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)); United States v. Beck, 425 F. Supp. 3d 573, 579 (M.D.N.C. 2019) ("While the old policy statement provides helpful guidance, it does not constrain the Court's independent assessment of whether 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' warrant a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)."); United States v. Beard, No. 1:16-CR-285-SCJ, Doc. 176 at 6-7, 10 (N.D. Ga. June 25, 2020); United States v. Hill, No. 1:05-CR-0081-LMM, Doc. 45 at 4 (N.D. Ga. June 10, 2020); United States v. Noble, No. 1:09-CR-315-MHC, Doc. 58 at 3-6 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2020); United States v. Evans, No. 1:07-CR-119-CAP-1, Doc. 219 at 5 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2020) ("Stated otherwise, the court finds it is 'authorized to consider the enumerated circumstances, as well as circumstances other than, or in combination with, the enumerated circumstances.' ") (citing United States v. Kowalewki, No. 2:13-CR-45-RWS, Doc. 251 at 10 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 30, 2020)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

Mr. Parks relies first and foremost on his exceptionally severe obesity as an extraordinary and compelling reason meriting early release. (Reply at 3-7.) The Government accepts that Mr. Parks' obesity constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason that may support release (Gov. Response at 9); this issue is therefore not in contention. Yet, the rarity and extremity of Mr. Parks' obesity — and the dire danger it poses to him were he to contract COVID-19 — demands further detail.

Mr. Parks has a BMI of 55. Less than six percent of adults in the country have a BMI above 40, and those with a BMI of 55 or higher die an average of 13.7 years earlier than most.⁴ The Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") defines obesity as a BMI over 30, and has provided guidance that "[h]aving obesity, defined as a body mass index (BMI) between 30 kg/㎡ and <40 kg/㎡ or severe obesity (BMI of 40 kg/㎡ or above), increases your risk of severe illness from COVID-19."⁵ According to the CDC, people with severe obesity (like Mr. Parks) are 4.5 times more likely to be hospitalized for COVID-19 than those who are not obese.⁶

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Id. Additional research highlights just how serious a risk obesity is in connection with COVID-19. A study from the University of North Carolina explains that "[f]rom COVID-19 risk to recovery, the odds are stacked against those with obesity," finding that individuals who have a BMI over 30 are a greatly increased risk for hospitalization (113%), more likely to be admitted to the intensive care unit (74%), and had a higher risk of death (48%) from COVID-19.⁷ Another major study in the United States found that more than 60 percent of people whose illnesses were severe enough to require hospitalization were obese.⁸ Dr. Leora Horwitz, the director of the Center for Healthcare Innovation and Delivery Science at NYU Langone, and a senior author of a study identifying obesity as a prominent risk factor in COVID-19 hospitalizations, explains that "[o]besity is more important for hospitalization than whether you have high blood pressure or diabetes . . . and it's more important than coronary disease or cancer or kidney disease, or even pulmonary disease."⁹ This increased risk stems from the...