United States v. Patterson

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. GARFIELD PATTERSON.

No. 3:21-cr-103 (VAB)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

January 20, 2023

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

VICTOR A. BOLDEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Garfield Patterson is charged with reentry by a noncitizen who was previously removed from the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Indictment, ECF No. 1.

Mr Patterson has filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that § 1326 is unconstitutional under Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment, ECF No. 42 (“Mot.”).

For the following reasons, Mr. Patterson's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the allegations of the indictment, Mr. Patterson is a noncitizen who was convicted in February 2000 in Florida state court of cannabis trafficking and possession of an unlawfully issued driver's license. Indictment. Following these convictions, Mr. Patterson was allegedly deported to Jamaica. Id. Having previously been removed from the United States, Mr. Patterson was allegedly present in Middletown, Connecticut, in June 2019 without having first obtained the express consent of the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to reapply for admission into the United States. Id.

On June 15, 2021, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Mr Patterson with one count of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). Id.

On June 23, 2022, Mr. Patterson filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. Mot.

On October 12, 2022, the Government filed an opposition to Mr. Patterson's motion. Government's Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment, ECF No. 57 (“Opp'n”).

On October 27, 2022, Mr. Patterson filed a reply in support of his motion. Def.'s Reply to Government's Opp'n, ECF No. 84 (“Reply”).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) permits defendants to raise by pretrial motion “any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1); United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 278-79 (2d Cir. 2018). “In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court views the indictment as a whole and assumes its factual allegations to be true.” United States v. Litvak, No. 3:13-cr-19 (JCH), 2013 WL 5740891, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 21, 2013) (citing Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 n.16 (1952)).

“[A] federal indictment can be challenged on the ground that it fails to allege a crime within the terms of the applicable statute,” United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2012), and thus may be decided “solely upon issues of law,” United States v. Was, 684 F.Supp. 350, 351 (D. Conn. 1988), aff'd, 869 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1989). A court must dismiss an indictment that fails to state an offense. See United States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2000); Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). “But when such [an argument] raises dispositive evidentiary questions, a district court must defer resolving those questions until trial.” Sampson, 898 F.3d at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Subject to limited exceptions, § 1326 provides that any noncitizen who “has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed” from the United States and thereafter “enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States,” is subject to criminal penalties. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Section 1326 was enacted as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”). Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 276, 66 Stat. 163, 229. The statutory language included in the INA was based on a similar illegal reentry provision that was enacted in 1929 as part of the Undesirable Aliens Act (“UAA”) and then repealed by the INA. See Act of Mar. 4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1018, 45 Stat. 1551, 1551; 66 Stat. at 279 (repealing the UAA).

Mr. Patterson contends that the charge against him in this case must be dismissed because § 1326 was enacted for a racially discriminatory reason that violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He argues, under the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights, that Congress was motivated in part by a discriminatory purpose in enacting §1326 and that the statute has a disparate impact on Black noncitizens (and non-white noncitizens generally). Mot. at 2.

A. The Applicable Legal Standard

Mr. Patterson argues that the Arlington Heights standard applies instead of the rational basis scrutiny that usually applies to immigration statutes because (1) he alleges discrimination based on race rather than alienage; and (2) noncitizens already within the United States are entitled to greater protections than those at the border or outside the country. Id. at 7. He also contends that the judicial deference typically afforded to decisions by Congress and the Executive Branch regarding the admission of noncitizens does not apply to criminal statutes. Reply at 1-2.

The Government argues that the Court should apply rational basis scrutiny in light of Congress's plenary power over immigration. Opp'n at 7. Alternatively, the Government contends that the Court is not required to decide this issue because, even if Arlington Heights applies, Mr. Patterson has not proved that § 1326 was enacted based on a discriminatory motive or that it has a disparate impact. Id. at 6.

The Court agrees with the Government that it “need not address the parties' disagreement concerning the applicable standard of review” because Mr. Patterson's challenge to § 1326 “fails under the more demanding standard of Arlington Heights.” United States v. Maldonado-Guzman, No. 21-cr-448 (CM), 2022 WL 2704036, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2022) (rejecting a nearly identical challenge).

B. The Arlington Heights Challenge

The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has held that “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Section 1326 does not on its face discriminate based on race. But even when a statute is facially neutral, it may violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component if it was enacted with a discriminatory purpose. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66.

Because statutes are rarely motivated by a single concern and legislators are “properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations,” courts will generally “refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions.” Id. But when a plaintiff comes forward with “proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified.” Id. at 265-66.

In determining whether an invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor, the disparate impact of a statute-“whether it ‘bears more heavily on one race than another'”-may provide an “important starting point.” Id. at 266 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242). In most cases, however, “impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence.” Id. at 266.

Other categories of evidence that courts must consider include the “historical background” of the statute; the “specific sequence of events” leading up to its enactment; any “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence” or substantive departures from “the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker”; and the legislative history. Id. at 267.

If the plaintiff shows that an official action was “motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose,” the burden shifts to the Government to establish “that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.” Id. at 270 n.21.

Mr. Patterson begins with the 1929 Undesirable Aliens Act, arguing that it had a disparate impact on non-white immigrants and was motivated at least in part by a discriminatory purpose under the factors set forth in Arlington Heights. Mot. at 8. He further contends that the illegal reentry provision's subsequent reenactment in 1952 did not cure or erase the discriminatory intent underlying the 1929 Act. Id. at 22. Instead, he argues that the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020), and Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 140 S.Ct. 2246 (2020), “confirm that a discriminatory purpose that fueled a law's original enactment remains relevant in determining its constitutionality.” Mot. at 23.

In addition to this historical context, Mr. Patterson argues that contemporary evidence shows that the 1952 enactment of § 1326 was tainted by discriminatory motives. He relies primarily on the legislative history, including a 1950 report issued by the Senate Judiciary Committee comprehensively reviewing the U.S. immigration and naturalization system, id. at 25; a statement by President Truman accompanying his veto of the 1952 law, id. at 26-27; a letter written by Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford in support of the bill that uses the racial slur “wetback,” id. at 28; a criminal harboring bill, referred to by members of Congress as the “Wetback Bill,” that was passed several months before the INA, id. at 31-32; and the general context of white supremacy in America in 1952, id. at 34.

Mr Patterson concludes that this evidence establishes that § 1326 was enacted, at least in part, based on discriminatory motives, and that the burden shifts to the...