United States v. Pierce

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff, v. ALONZO LEE PIERCE, JR. Defendant.

CRIMINAL No. 4:20-cr-00718-SAL-17

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division

January 5, 2023

OPINION & ORDER

THE HONORABLE SHERRI A. LYDON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This matter comes before the court pursuant to Defendant Alonzo Lee Pierce, Jr.'s (Defendant) pro se Motion for Relief from Judgment, ECF No. 1301, Motion for Compassionate Release, ECF No. 1285, and Motion to Appoint Counsel ECF No 1284. The government replied to the Motions, ECF Nos. 1311 and 1331, opposing Defendant's requests for compassionate release and relief from judgment. The court has considered the facts and law in relation to each of Defendant's motion, and the matter is now ripe for ruling.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

In November 2020, a federal grand jury charged Defendant and twenty-five co-defendants in a twenty-nine count Indictment for their involvement in an illicit drug trafficking scheme in and around Horry County, South Carolina. [See ECF No. 3.] On March 25, 2021, Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess and distribute twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base (also known as “crack cocaine”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B). [See ECF Nos. 738 796.] As part of his plea agreement, the government agreed to move the court for a downward departure or reduction of sentence pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 5K1.1, U.S.C. § 3553(e), or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), which would not be binding on the court. [ECF No. 738 ¶ 9.] Defendant also agreed to waive his right to contest the conviction or sentence in any direct appeal or other post-conviction action, including any proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Id. ¶ 14.] However, the waiver did not apply to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or future changes in the law that affect Defendant's sentence. [Id.]

Under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(B), and 846, Defendant faced a statutory term of imprisonment between five and forty years. Under the 2018 Guidelines Manual, the United States Probation Office calculated Defendant's advisory guidelines range as 84 to 105 months based on a total offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of IV. [ECF No 1003 at 4-5.] The Probation Office factored in a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm which was based on the statement of a confidential source. Id. Defendant filed an objection to the enhancement, asserting that “[t]he information . . . only reports that Mr. Pierce was seen with a gun” and that the information was “unclear,” “[in]credible,” and “insufficient” to sustain the enhancement in Defendant's guidelines. [ECF No. 867 at 10-11.]

In its Sentencing Memorandum, the government informed the court that the parties resolved Defendant's objection to the enhancement. [ECF No. 1003 at 4.] The government also petitioned the court for an unopposed one-level downward variance. Id. And the government petitioned the court under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for another three-level departure, resulting in an adjusted guidelines range of 57 to 71 months and no mandatory minimum.^[1] [ECF No. 1003 at 45.] The court accepted the government's motions for downward variance and sentenced Defendant to a 57-month term of imprisonment. [See ECF No. 1057.] Defendant is serving his sentence at Fort Dix FCI. [ECF No. 1285 at 11.]

About seven months after his sentencing, Defendant filed Motions for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 1284], Compassionate Release [ECF No. 1285], and Relief from Judgment [ECF No. 1301]. Defendant subsequently submitted a Letter Re: Drug Benefits to supplement his Motion for Relief from Judgment. [ECF No. 1310.] The government filed responses in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Motion for Compassionate Release. [ECF Nos. 1311, 1331.]

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment

Defendant brings his Motion for Relief from Judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) or 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asking the court to amend his Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). [ECF No. 1301 at 4.] Defendant requests that the court redact “any [] information” in his PSR that precludes “credit and time off as reward for successful completion of the [Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP)].” [Id. at 1.] Specifically, Defendant seeks the redaction of the two-level firearm enhancement applied to his advisory guidelines calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) from his PSR because it “would make [him] eligible for early release.” [Id. at 2-3; ECF No. 1310 at 1.] Defendant states that this court and the government “do not object to, and indeed likely intend,” that Defendant receive “all benefits” from successfully completing the RDAP program. [ECF No. 1301 at 2.] Defendant further contends that the court not only recommended him to the RDAP program but “also” recommended that he “receive all benefits from the drug program.” [ECF No. 1310 at 1.]

Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the government opposes Defendant's Motion on several grounds. First, the government argues that Rule 60 does not apply here. [ECF No. 1311 at 1.] Second, the government asserts that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is unavailable because Defendant waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence and his present request falls outside the scope of claims he negotiated to reserve. [Id. at 1-2.] Third, the government refutes Defendant's claim that his case warrants a change to his PSR for any “early release” benefit connected with the successful completion of the RDAP program. [Id. at 2.]

The court concludes that neither Rule 60(b)(6) nor 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides Defendant mechanisms for relief, and Defendant does not have a viable claim that entitles him to any change to his PSR or release status.

A. Neither Rule 60(b)(6) nor 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides a procedural avenue for relief.

Defendant is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) or 28 U.S.C. § 2255.^[2] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that on motion and upon just terms, the court may relieve a party from a final judgment for five enumerated reasons or for “any other reason that justifies relief.”^[3]Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Yet, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) may be granted only in “extraordinary circumstances” and is limited to circumstances when the reason for relief from judgment falls outside the scope of enumerated reasons provided in Rule 60(b)(1)-(5). Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011). In addition, because Rule 60(b)(6) is a civil rule, it is generally an inappropriate means to assert a collateral attack on a criminal conviction or sentence. See United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 207 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2015) (describing an example of a “true Rule 60(b) motion” as one “that challenges some defect in the integrity of [a] federal habeas proceeding[]”); see also United States v. Mosavi, 138 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 60(b) simply does not provide for relief from judgment in a criminal case.”). The court views this Motion as a collateral challenge to Defendant's sentence because Defendant seeks relief from his sentence. Therefore, this court will construe Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the court may vacate, set aside, or correct a criminal defendant's sentence upon a finding that “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” However, in his plea agreement, Defendant waived his right to challenge his conviction or sentence except to claim ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or future changes in the law that would affect his sentence. [See ECF No. 738 ¶ 14.]

Courts will accept a waiver precluding a defendant from appealing a specific issue “if the record establishes that the waiver is valid and that the issue being appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005)). “An appellate waiver is valid if the defendant's agreement to the waiver was knowing and intelligent.” Thornsbury, 670 F.3d at 537. “Generally, if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the [plea] colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid,” id., “even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it,” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (emphasis in original). Here, Defendant does not contend that he unknowingly or unintelligently waived the collateral attack waiver in his plea agreement or that the court did not ensure that Defendant understood the terms of his plea-including the appeal waiver-during his plea colloquy. He also does not claim that his claims exceed the scope of the waiver. Consequently, the appeal waiver in Defendant's plea agreement bars Defendant's request for relief from judgment.

B. Defendant's request for relief lacks merit.

Defendant's request for the court to amend his PSR lacks merit because he is, in fact, ineligible for any early release benefit in connection with the RDAP program. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) provides that prisoners who complete the RDAP program may be eligible for a sentence reduction of up to one year. However, Congress delegated the authority to the Federal...