United States v. Pinder

641 F.Supp.3d 1206

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Taylor Nelson PINDER, Defendant.

Case No. 2:21-cr-00218-HCN-DAO

United States District Court, D. Utah

Signed November 18, 2022

Victoria K. McFarland, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Cy H. Castle, U.S. Attorney's Office, Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff.

Patricia Geary Glenn, Park City, UT, for Defendant.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Howard C. Nielson, Jr., United States District Judge

Defendant Taylor Nelson Pinder moves to suppress evidence found during a warrantless search of a car he was driving. The court denies Mr. Pinder's motion.

I.

At about midnight on April 30, 2021, Deputy Colton Brimhall observed a Nissan Altima traveling on U.S. Highway 40 near Heber City, Utah. See Dkt. No. 70 at 25:1-27:1. Deputy Brimhall testified that the car was speeding and that its rear license plate was not illuminated as required by Utah law. See id. at 27:18-29:6. Deputy Brimhall then initiated a traffic stop. See id. at 29:7-10. Mr. Pinder was driving the vehicle, which was registered to Robin Ainsworth, the mother of Sierra Hatch, who was seated in the passenger seat at the time of the stop. See Dkt. No. 71 at 212:10-20. It is undisputed that Mr. Pinder had permission from Ms. Ainsworth to drive the vehicle. When asked for his driver's license, Mr. Pinder produced a Utah license that Deputy Brimhall determined belonged to another individual. See Dkt. No. 70 at 33:4-34:14, 82:16-24; Gov. Ex. 5.

After Mr. Pinder admitted his identity and his federal supervision status, Deputy Brimhall determined that Mr. Pinder's driver's license was revoked and that Mr. Pinder was on federal supervised release for a firearms offense. See Dkt. No. 70 at 39:13-20, 46:17-18, 84:13-19; Gov. Ex. 2.2. Deputy Brimhall and his supervisor, Sergeant Dan Wardle, who had arrived at the scene, called Agent Cameron Sinner, the U.S. probation officer assigned to Mr. Pinder, notifying him of the traffic stop and Mr. Pinder's production of another individual's driver's license. See Dkt. No. 70 at 40:3-7; Dkt. No. 71 at 182:11-16. The officers discussed the possibility of a federal detainer based on Mr. Pinder's violations of the terms of his supervised release. See Dkt. No. 71 at 182:17-183:9. They also discussed the possibility of a search of the vehicle pursuant to the conditions of Mr. Pinder's supervision. See id. at 183:14-20.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Pinder was placed under arrest and secured in the back of Deputy Brimhall's patrol car. See Dkt. No. 70 at 98:18-99:2; Gov. Ex. 2. Deputy Brimhall then conducted a search of the portion of the vehicle near the driver's seat. See Dkt. No. 71 at 157:4-12. In the driver's side door compartment, Deputy Brimhall located a vape pen that appeared to contain THC and a few bullets. See Dkt. No. 70 at 45:17-46:4, 46:11-13. He also found "half of a bong" under the driver's seat. Id. at 46:24-46:5.

Deputy Brimhall then proceeded to search the rest of the vehicle. See id. at 47:6-8. On the floor of the back seat, Deputy Brimhall discovered a black backpack containing unused needles, 9 mm ammunition, a loaded Glock 9 mm firearm, and a cardboard box containing drug paraphernalia and heroin. See id. at 51:8-52:20, 53:5-15. The backpack also contained a lunch bag secured with a combination lock. See id. at 53:16-22. After Mr. Pinder and Ms. Hatch both denied ownership of the lunch bag or knowledge of the combination, Deputy Brimhall cut open the bag and discovered various illegal narcotics. See id. at 54:21-55:18.

On May 12, 2021, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Pinder with three offenses: (1) Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (2) Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and (3) Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See Dkt. No. 1.

Mr. Pinder moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the vehicle. See Dkt. No. 34. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Pinder's motion beginning on February 28, 2022, and concluding on March 14, 2022. See Dkt. Nos. 70, 71. The parties then submitted briefing, and the court held argument on the motion on June 24, 2022. See Dkt. No. 87.

II.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. To resolve Mr. Pinder's motion, the court must address the constitutionality under this Amendment of four searches or seizures: (1) the initial traffic stop; (2) Mr. Pinder's arrest; (3) the search of the portion of the vehicle near the driver's seat; and (4) the search of the remainder of the vehicle, including the backpack and lunch bag found on the back seat floor.

A.

The court starts with the initial traffic stop. Under Tenth Circuit precedent, "a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring." United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). The court's "sole inquiry is whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist violated 'any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations' of the jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)).

Here, Deputy Brimhall testified that he estimated, based on his experience and observation, that the vehicle was traveling above the posted speed limit, see Dkt. No. 70 at 113:17-114:2, which varied between 55 and 65 miles per hour, see id. at 26:7-15. He further testified that his radar indicated that the vehicle was traveling 70 miles an hour, or slightly faster, though he did not record and could not recall the precise speed. See id. at 28:12-22, 113:7-11. Finally, Deputy Brimhall testified that he observed that the vehicle's rear license plate was not illuminated. See id. at 27:24-29:6.

Under Utah Code § 41-6a-601, traveling in excess of the posted speed limit constitutes a traffic violation. And Utah Code § 41-6a-1604(2)(c) requires that drivers "illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate." If Deputy Brimhall's testimony is credited, he thus had "reasonable articulable suspicion" that both a traffic violation and an equipment violation were occurring.

Based on its review of the evidence and its observation of Deputy Brimhall's demeanor while testifying, the court credits his testimony that he observed these violations. It is true that Deputy Brimhall did not specifically note the speeding violation in his incident report or probable cause statement. But video footage from Deputy Brimhall's body camera contains contemporaneous statements by Deputy Brimhall to Mr. Pinder, Ms. Hatch, and Sergeant Wardle that he had observed the vehicle traveling in excess of the posted speed limit. See Gov. Ex. 2.

The court likewise credits Deputy Brimhall's testimony that he observed the vehicle traveling without its rear license plate illuminated. See Dkt. No. 70 at 27:24-29:6. To be sure, the court cannot determine from the video footage whether or not the license plate was illuminated because the headlights of Deputy Brimhall's car are shining on the plate. See Gov. Ex. 1. But Deputy Brimhall's testimony is corroborated by his incident report, his testimony, and his contemporaneous statements to Mr. Pinder and Ms. Hatch that were captured by his body camera. See Dkt. No. 70 at 30:6-31:21; Gov. Ex. 2; D. Ex. 23. Deputy Brimhall also initially told Sergeant Wardle that he had stopped the vehicle for speeding and having no "taillights"—he did not mention the unilluminated license plate. See Gov. Ex. 2.2. At the evidentiary hearing, however, Deputy Brimhall testified that he misspoke during this conversation with Sergeant Wardle and "meant license plate lights"—not "taillights." Dkt. No. 70 at 38:7-13, 87:18-21. This testimony is similarly corroborated by the incident report and Deputy Brimhall's statements to Mr. Pinder and Ms. Hatch on the night of the stop. See Gov. Ex. 2; D. Ex. 23. Finally, when Deputy Brimhall told Mr. Pinder and Ms. Hatch the reasons for the stop, Mr. Pinder did exclaim: "My license plates lights are really out? I swore I just fixed them." Gov. Ex. 2.1. But even if Mr. Pinder had fixed (or attempted to fix) the rear license plate lights recently, it does not follow that they were operational at the time of the traffic stop.

Because Deputy Brimhall had "reasonable articulable suspicion" that both a traffic violation and an equipment violation were occurring, the court concludes that the initial traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

B.

The court next addresses Mr. Pinder's arrest. Because arrests are seizures of persons within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, that Amendment requires that arrests be reasonable under the circumstances. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). "A warrantless arrest is reasonable if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a crime in the officer's presence." D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (citing Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001)).

Under Utah Code § 76-8-507(2),

[a] person commits a class A misdemeanor if, with the intent of leading a peace officer to believe that the person is another actual person, he gives the name, date of birth, or address of another person to a peace officer acting in the lawful discharge of the peace officer's duty.

And Utah Code § 77-7-2(2) authorizes a law enforcement officer to arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person...