United States v. Pledger

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LORENZO PLEDGER, Defendant.

No. 2:12-CR-23-D

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Northern Division

November 1, 2022

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On April 4, 2022, Lorenzo Pledger ("Pledger" or "defendant") moved pro se for compassionate relief under the First Step Act ("First Step Act"), Pub L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5238-41 (2018) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3582) (D.E. 118]. On April 7, 2022, the court appointed Pledger counsel (D.E 119]. On June 14,2022, Pledger moved pro se for, a "full ruling on [his] motion for compassionate release" [D.E 122]. On July 14, 2022, the government responded in opposition [D.E. 127]. As explained below, the court denies Pledger's motion for compassionate release and dismisses Pledger's motion for a ruling on his motion for compassionate release.

I.

On June 4,2013, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Pledger pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute a quantity of cocaine. See [D.E. 1,44,45,83]. On February 19, 2014, the court held Pledger's sentencing hearing. See Sent Tr. [DE. 84]. At the hearing, the court adopted the facts set forth in the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") [D.E. 53] and resolved Pledger's objections. See Sent. Tr. at 5-41; Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A)-(B). The court calculated Pledger's total offense level to be 29, his criminal history category to be VI, and his advisory guideline range to be 151 to 188 months' imprisonment See Sent. Tr. at 40-41. The court then granted the government's motion for upward departure under U.S.S.G. §4A1.3 and determined that a total offense level of 32 was warranted, resulting in an advisory guideline range of 210 to 262 months, capped at the 240-month statutory maximum. Id. at 41-58. The court then granted the government's downward departure motion, thoroughly considered all relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and sentenced Pledger to 216 months' imprisonment. See Id. at 58-70. The court also announced that it would impose the same sentence as an alternative variant sentence if it miscalculated the advisory guideline range or improperly departed under the guidelines. See Id. at 69-70.

Pledger appealed. On February 6,2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Pledger's sentence. See United States v. Pledger. 595 Fed.Appx. 229,230-33 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).

On August 19,2016, Pledger moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, and Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. See [D.E. 92]. On December 12, 2016, Pledger moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See [D.E. 95]. The court denied both motions. See [D.E. 103]; United States v. Woods. 675 Fed.Appx. 347 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Avent 633 Fed.Appx. 176 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished).

On April 4, 2022, Pledger moved for compassionate relief. See [D.E. 118]. The government opposes the motion. See [D.E. 127].

II.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court may reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment if (1) "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction" or (2) "the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison," and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") has determined the defendant is not a danger to another person or the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see United States v. Hargrove. 30 F.4th 189,194 (4th Cir. 2022); United States v. High. 997 F.3d 181,185-86 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Kibble. 992 F.3d 326,330 -. (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied. 142 S.Ct. 383 (2021); United States v. McCoy. 981 F.3d 271, 275-77 (4th Cir. 2020). A section 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction must comport with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194.

Before filing a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a defendant must "fully exhaust[] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This requirement is nonjurisdictional, and the government waives a defense based on section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirements if the government does not timely raise it. See United States v. Muhammad. 16 F.4th 126,129-30 (4th Cir. 2021).

When considering a defendant's compassionate release motion, the court determines whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist and whether, in the court's discretion, those circumstances warrant relief in light of relevant factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements. See Hargrove. 30 F.4th at 194-95; High, 997 F.3d at 186; Kibble. 992 F.3d at 330-32. In evaluating the section 3553(a) factors, the court considers, inter alia, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, a defendant's post-sentencing conduct, the need to deter criminal behavior, the need to promote respect for the law, and the need to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Chavez-Meza v. United States. 138 S.Ct. 1959,1966-68 (2018); Pepper v. United States. 562 U.S. 476, 480-81 (2011); High. 997 F.3d at 186; Kibble. 992 F.3d at 331-32; United States v. McDonald. 986 F.3d 402,412 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Martin. 916 F.3d 389,398 (4th Cir. 2019). Although a court considers a defendant's post-sentencing conduct, rehabilitation alone is not an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); U.S.S.G. § 1B 1.13 cmt n.3; McCoy. 981 F.3d at 286 n.9.

No Sentencing Commission policy statement currently applies to a defendant's compassionate release motion. See Hargrove. 30 F.4th at 194; High. 997 F.3d at 186; Kibble. 992 F.3d at 330-31; McCoy. 981 F.3d at 281-82. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is a policy statement that applies to compassionate release motions filed by the BOP Director. Nonetheless, section IB 1.13 "remains helpful guidance even when motions are filed by defendants." McCoy, 981 F.3d at 282 n.7; see Hargrove. 30 F.4that 194. Application Note 1 of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 lists several extraordinary and compelling circumstances, including (A) a defendant's serious medical condition, (B) a defendant's age, when coupled with serious physical or mental deterioration due to age and having served 10 years or 75 percent of his or her sentence, (C) certain family circumstances in which a defendant's minor children or incapacitated spouse or registered partner would otherwise have no caregiver, or (D) any other extraordinary and compelling reason. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt n.1(A). "[A]n extraordinary and compelling reason need not have been unforeseen at the time of sentencing in order to warrant" a sentence reduction. Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.2.

To the extent Pledger seeks to raise claims that he should have raised on direct appeal or under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, such as claims related to any potential sentencing error, the court rejects the arguments but assumes without deciding that they qualify as extraordinary and compelling circumstances. See[D.E. 118] 1.3.4-6: United States v. McCoy. 981 F.3d271.287 (4th Cir. 2020) ("[T]he very purpose of [section] 3582(c)(1)(A) is to provide a 'safety valve' that allows for sentence reductions when there is not a specific statute that already affords relief"); United States v. Handerhan, 789 Fed.Appx. 924, 926 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished) ("[Section] 3582(c)(1)(A) provides a mechanism to seek a reduction in the term of a sentence, not to challenge its validity."); United States v. Shull. No. 1:04-cr-18,2022 WL 179141, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 19, 2022) (unpublished); United States v. Ferguson. No. 3:04cr13-01,2021 WL 1701918, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 29,2021) (unpublished) ("The compassionate release statute allows the court to consider extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release, but it does not replace the established mechanism for challenging the validity of a sentence. Nor does it allow the defendant to make arguments that were, or could have been, raised in direct appeal or collateral review.").

Pledger applied to his warden for compassionate release twice. See [D.E. 127-1] 3 and [D.E. 118-3]. On September 19,202l,in bis first request, Pledger requested compassionate release based on COVID-19 and his medical conditions. See [D.E. 127-1] 3. The warden denied his request See [D.E. 118-2] 13. On January 18, 2022, in his second request, Pledger requested compassionate release "based on the COVID-19 pandemic, [his] underlying health conditions[,] and [his] illegal career offender status." See [D.E. 118-3]. Pledger's motion for compassionate release and supporting documents do not present evidence that the warden responded to his second request, but 30 days have elapsed since Pledgers' second request. See [D.E. 118,118-1,118-2,118-3,118-4, 122]. The government invoked section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirements, but in doing so, the government cites only Pledger's first application for compassionate release. See [D.E. 127-1] 3. Because Pledger raised all his current arguments in his second request for compassionate release and 30 days have elapsed, Pledger has met the exhaustion requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Thus, the court addresses Pledgers's motion on the merits. See Muhammad, 16 F.4th at 130.

Pledger seeks compassionate release pursuant to section 3582(c)(1)(A) and cites the COVID-19 pandemic, the condition in...