United States v. Polley

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. SANDRA MICHELLE POLLEY Defendant.

No. 17-cr-2758-JAH

United States District Court, S.D. California

May 16, 2022

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

HON JOHN A. HOUSTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is Defendant Sandra Michelle Polley's (“Defendant” or “Ms. Polley”) motion to reduce her sentence of imprisonment on the basis of (1) the risk posed to Defendant by the coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”) in light of her medical conditions and (2) her need to serve as her elderly grandmother's caretaker. (ECF No. 41; ECF No. 47). Defendant seeks compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A). Id. The motion is fully briefed. Having carefully considered the motion, exhibits, and responses, and for the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant was convicted of one count of importation of methamphetamine, after which the Court sentenced her to one-hundred (100) months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. (ECF Nos. 15, 18, 35, 36). To date, Defendant has served between fifty-one (51) and fifty-two (52) months.

On November 17, 2020, Defendant filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3852(c)(1)(A). (ECF No. 41). On February 16, 2021, Defendant filed a supplemental motion in support of her request for compassionate release. (ECF No. 47). The United States (the “Government”) filed a response in opposition to Defendant's motion, (ECF No. 54), to which Defendant replied, (ECF No. 56). The parties also submitted additional documents regarding Defendant's medical records.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A court generally may not correct or modify a prison sentence once it has been imposed, unless expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States v. Penna, 319 F.3d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendant seeks modification of their sentence under the compassionate release provision of 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The amendment to §3582(c)(1)(A) provides prisoners with two direct routes to court: (1) file a motion after fully exhausting administrative appeals of the BOP's decision not to file a motion, or (2) file a motion after “the lapse of 30 days from the receipt ... of such a request” by the warden of the defendant's facility, “whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. §3852(c)(1)(A).

After the Defendant has exhausted their administrative remedies, “a court may modify or reduce the defendant's term of imprisonment ‘after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §3553(a)]' if the Court finds, as relevant here, that ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction' and ‘such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.'” United States v. Rupak, 2022 WL 65171, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2022) (citing 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i)).^[1] “As the movant, the defendant bears the burden to establish that he or she is eligible for a sentence reduction.” Rupak, 2022 WL 65171, at *3 (citing United States v. Holden, 452 F.Supp.3d 964, 969 (D. Or. 2020)).

IV. DISCUSSION

In analyzing whether Defendant is entitled to compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A), the Court will determine whether the following three requirements are satisfied. First, Defendant must show she has exhausted administrative remedies. Second, Defendant must demonstrate that extraordinary and compelling reasons “warrant... a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Third, Defendant must establish that the 18 U.S.C. §3553 (a) sentencing factors “are consistent with” granting a motion for compassionate release. United States v. Trent, 2020 WL 11812242, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2020). If these requirements are met, the Court then considers whether the Defendant is a danger to others and the community.

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

A court may reduce a term of imprisonment on a motion from a defendant “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier.” See 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A).

Here, Defendant filed an administrative request for compassionate release with the Warden on June 4, 2020 (ECF No. 47 at Exh. A) which was denied on June 24, 2020. (Id.). Defendant then appealed the denial on June 29, 2020. (Id.). Her appeal was denied on July 7, 2020. (Id.). Defendant then appealed to the Central office, and that appeal was denied also. (Id.). Defendant's counsel also made an administrative request for compassionate release to the Warden on Defendant's behalf on January 6, 2021. (ECF No. 47 at Exh. B). The Government agrees that Defendant has exhausted her administrative remedies. (ECF No. 54 at 9 n.10). Based on the foregoing, including the Government's concession, ^[2] the Court finds that Defendant has sufficiently exhausted her administrative remedies.

B. Defendant Has Demonstrated Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons Warranting Reduction

A court may reduce a defendant's sentence if it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. §3582 (c)(1)(A). Though the Sentencing Commission's original policy statements are not binding, ^[3] they are informative^[4] and provide illustrative examples of extraordinary and compelling reasons, such as a “serious physical or medical condition”, “serious functional or cognitive impairment”, or “deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process”, any of which should “substantially diminish[h] the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.” Rupak, 2022 WL 65171 at *3 (citation omitted).

Defendant principally argues that (1) her health conditions, which allegedly results in heighted COVID-19-related risk; and (2) her need to care for her elderly grandmother constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting reduction. (ECF No. 47 at 7). The Government agrees that some, but not all, of Defendant's health conditions constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason but argues that Defendant's need to serve as a caretaker to her elderly grandmother is not a sufficiently extraordinary and compelling reason. (ECF No. 54).

A. Defendant's Medical Conditions Constitute Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons Warranting Reduction

Defendant first argues that she has several “underlying medical conditions that heighten her risk with respect to COVID-19, including morbid obesity, heart disease, and hypertension” and that these conditions, both individually and in the aggregate, “increases her risk of experiencing severe effects from COVID-19[.]” (ECF No. 47 at 7). The Government concedes that Defendant's morbid obesity constitutes an extraordinary and compelling circumstance but argues that Defendant's remaining conditions fall short of extraordinary and compelling and are being treated by the BOP. (ECF No. 54 at 11-14).

Taking Defendant's conditions in turn, first, as of January 6, 2021, Defendant was 283.7 pounds with a BMI of 41.9, which meets the definition of morbid obesity. (ECF No. 47 at Exh. J; ECF No. 47 at 8). Defendant notes that obesity is “among the risk factors listed by the CDC for people of any age with underlying medical conditions who are at increased risk of severe illness form COVID-19.”^[5] Defendant also references a then-recent study on obesity and COVID-19, which “concluded that obesity is a strong, independent risk factor for severe illness from COVID-19 for men under the age of 60.”^[6] The Government concedes that Defendant's morbid obesity may constitute an extraordinary and compelling circumstance warranting reduction.

While the Court declines to make a blanket ruling that morbid obesity necessarily establishes extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting release, the Court finds that here, particularly in light of the Government's concession, Defendant has sufficiently demonstrated that her morbid obesity, in conjunction with her other medical conditions, rises to the level of an extraordinary and compelling circumstance.

Next, Defendant contends that her heart disease increases her risk from COVID-19. (ECF No. 47 at 10). Specifically, Defendant refers to her enlarged right ventricle, discovered after symptoms like chest pain and shortness of breath necessitated testing. (Id.). According to Defendant, her enlarged ventricle is otherwise called “cardiomegaly”, ^[7]which “is a type of cardiomyopathy.”^[8] Defendant's enlarged ventricle “is a symptom of the heart muscles not working properly” which “can lead to heart failure or cardiac arrest”, ^[9]and the “CDC has designated heart conditions as a top tier risk factor that make an individual more vulnerable to the most serious effects of COVID-19.”^[10]

The Government characterizes Defendant's condition as “a mildly enlarged right ventricle” and attempts to distinguish it from the heart conditions which have been recognized by the CDC as increasing the risk of severe illness from COVID-19. (ECF No. 54 at 13). The Government also notes that Defendant's “echocardiogram (EKG) showed a normal ejection fraction . . . meaning that her heart pumped out an expected proportion of its contents.” (ECF No. 54 at 13).

Though the Government attempts to distinguish Defendant's heart condition from the heart conditions identified by the CDC as increasing...