United States v. Poulin

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DANIEL POULIN

1:08-cr-00050-JAW

1:12-cv-00114-JAW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

Dated: April 24, 2014

ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

It is difficult to know why Daniel Poulin and his attorney are so brimming with a sense of injustice. From his girlfriend's daughter's early to late teens, Mr. Poulin surreptitiously videotaped her while she was naked in a series of family bathrooms. Utterly obsessed for years with this young girl, Mr. Poulin ended up constructing a highly elaborate secret studio with multiple hidden pinhole cameras in the walls of the bathroom and he recorded countless hours of her most private moments. Initially unsophisticated, as time went on, he constructed an elaborate studio in the family bathroom with multiple cameras angled to capture her genitals. Toward the end, he installed a toilet camera and videotaped her going to the bathroom. Mr. Poulin's production of pornography was found out. His girlfriend discovered four discs on the ground outside their home, put the discs in a discplayer, and recognized her daughter as the naked female. Immediately after his activity was discovered, Mr. Poulin confessed to a number of friends that he had been taping her for years, that he was sick, and that he needed help. He assisted law enforcement in locating the pinhole cameras and consented to the seizure of a cache of digital media discs in his mother's attic. In light of this accumulatedevidence, it was virtually inevitable that Mr. Poulin would be charged, convicted, and sentenced for his criminal actions.

Mr. Poulin was indicted federally with the production of child pornography and was well represented by an exceptionally able Maine lawyer. He waived jury trial, and at the close of a four-day trial the Court found Mr. Poulin guilty as charged. Even though his guideline sentence was between 210 and 262 months, the Court sentenced Mr. Poulin to the statutory minimum of 180 months incarceration, the most lenient sentence it could legally impose. Mr. Poulin appealed the guilty verdict to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the First Circuit affirmed the conviction.

Despite overwhelming evidence that Mr. Poulin is actually guilty of this crime, confessed to much of it, was properly convicted, and received the most lenient sentence that the law allows, his attorney appears to believe that Mr. Poulin, not the young woman, is the victim of his own crime. His current defense lawyer has written increasingly hot memoranda, proclaiming his actual innocence, accusing the prosecutor of all manner of misconduct, charging law enforcement with manufacturing evidence, and blasting the Court for not agreeing with her. Her latest barrage includes an accusation that during the pendency of the original action, the Court improperly forced the defense to abandon legitimate complaints about egregious police and prosecutorial misconduct, refused to hold an evidentiary hearing on the Government's misconduct, and dismissed the motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct. She now charges that the Court is completelymischaracterizing her arguments, utterly mischaracterizing the record, completely ignoring the Government's horrendous pattern of bad faith manipulation of the circumstances, whitewashing her persuasive claims of a fraud on the Court, presenting a false rendition of the events in this case, and misunderstanding the applicable standards of review.

Although nonplussed by counsel's rhetorical indignation, the Court will address once again her angry assertions in a final effort to address her concerns. But Mr. Poulin and Attorney Williams should know that the Court recalls this case extremely well. It remembers the hours of video that Mr. Poulin took of this unsuspecting young woman. It recalls the victim's credible and persuasive testimony. It recollects the photographic evidence of the Poulin bathroom in Islesford, which Mr. Poulin constructed, and the multiple minute secret cameras placed in the rivets located strategically to gain revealing angles of this young girl's body. It recalls the toilet camera, the gynecological images, and the overwhelming evidence that this young woman was a minor when some of the most graphic pornographic images were made. The Court remains convinced beyond any shadow of a doubt that Mr. Poulin did precisely what the grand jury charged and that he has been properly incarcerated for his horrendous breach of trust, his multi-year invasion of this girl's privacy, and his deliberate, obsessive, and injurious criminal acts.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion "to alter or amend a judgment" is available under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). Such motions are sometimes referred to in shorthand as "motions for reconsideration." E.g., United States v. $23,000 in U.S. Currency, 356 F.3d 157, 165 n.9 (1st Cir. 2004). "However, a Rule 59(e) motion is not a vehicle to force the court to think twice; it is not an opportunity for the losing party simply to press his unsuccessful arguments a second time in the hope that, by repetition, the court will see them his way." Widi v. McNeil, 2:12-cv-00188-JAW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19778, *3 (D. Me. Feb. 18, 2014). Thus, the motion "is normally not a promising vehicle for revisiting a party's case and rearguing theories previously advanced and rejected." Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006).

Instead, the motion provides the court with an opportunity to correct "manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Lakshman v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 338 F. Supp. 2d 162, 164 (D. Me. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). "As an 'extraordinary remedy', a motion for reconsideration's utility is properly limited to: '(1) the availability of new evidence not previously available, (2) an intervening change in controlling law, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.'" Nw. Bypass Grp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 490 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187 (D.N.H. 2007) (quoting Villanueva-Mendez v. Nieves Vazquez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324 (D.P.R. 2005)).

II. BACKGROUND

The Court recited most of the salient historical facts in its January 27, 2014 Amended Order. See Am. Order on Mot. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, at 2-3 (ECF No. 295). However, to provide context, the Court recites the facts essential to this decision.

A. Mr. Poulin's Conviction

On March 12, 2008, a grand jury indicted Mr. Poulin on one count of production of child pornography. Indictment (ECF No. 1). Before trial, Mr. Poulin and his counsel, David Van Dyke, discovered a number of problems with evidence generated by the Maine State Police Computer Crimes Unit (MCCU). These problems, described in more detail below, centered on an intake form generated by the MCCU and certain reports authored by MCCU forensic examiner Inez Dudley. Mr. Poulin also alleged that Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Gail F. Malone, the federal prosecutor handling his case, made deliberate misstatements to Mr. Van Dyke and the Court during the period of pre-trial discovery, and supplied certain evidence to Mr. Van Dyke that she knew to be fabricated. After significant motion practice on this issue, including a motion to dismiss the indictment and a motion to suppress evidence, the Government agreed not to use any of the evidence generated by the MCCU at trial and the Court otherwise denied Mr. Poulin's motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct. Order on Mots. to Dismiss the Indictment on the Grounds of Prosecutorial / Investigative Misconduct (ECF No. 157) (Aug. 17, 2009). The Government honored its commitment not to use evidence from the MCCU.

At the close of a four-day bench trial from September 8 through September 14, 2009, this Court convicted Mr. Poulin of the charges against him. Courtroom Minutes: Trial Proceedings (ECF No. 184) (Sept. 14, 2009). On January 27, 2010, the Court sentenced Mr. Poulin to 180 months imprisonment, J. in a Criminal Case (ECF No. 190), the mandatory statutory minimum for his crime. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e).

The First Circuit affirmed Mr. Poulin's conviction on direct appeal. United States v. Poulin, 631 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2011).

B. Procedural Posture of this Habeas Petition

On April 6, 2012, Mr. Poulin filed a motion under 28 U.S.C § 2255 to vacate his sentence, with a supporting memorandum. Mot. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 224) (Habeas Pet.); Supporting Mem. for a Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (ECF No. 223) (Supporting Mem.).¹ The Government answered the habeas petition on October 17, 2012, and moved to dismiss it. Gov't's Mot. for Summ. Dismissal of Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (ECF No. 276) (Gov't's Mot. to Dismiss). Mr. Poulin replied to the Government's motion to dismiss on January 18, 2013. Pet'r's Reply to Gov't's Mot. for Summ. Dismissal (ECF No. 285) (Pet'r's Reply).

On April 16, 2013, the Magistrate Judge issued a Recommended Decision recommending that the Court deny Mr. Poulin's habeas petition. RecommendedDecision (ECF No. 288) (Rec. Dec.). Mr. Poulin objected to the Recommended Decision on May 18, 2013, Objection to the Magistrate's Recommended Decision (ECF No. 291), and the Government did not respond.

On January 15, 2014, the Court issued an Order denying Mr. Poulin's habeas petition, Order on Mot. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 293), and amended that order on January 27, 2014. Am. Order on Mot. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 295) (Order). The Court largely approved of the Recommended Decision, but wrote separately to add detail regarding the application of the error and prejudice prongs of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Mr. Poulin filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's denial of his habeas petition on January 29, 2014. Pet'r's Mot. for Recons. (ECF No. 296) (Mot. for Recons.). The Government opposed this motion on February 28, 2014. Gov't's Opp'n to Pet'r's Mot. for Recons....