United States v. Pringler, 12–10029.

765 F.3d 445

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Chanze Lamount PRINGLER, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 12–10029.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 26, 2014.

Brian W. Portugal, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Shane John Stolarczyk, Esq., Keller Stolarczyk P.L.L.C., Boerne, TX, for Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

EDWARD C. PRADO, Circuit Judge:

Following a jury trial, Defendant–Appellant Chanze Lamount Pringler (“Pringler”) was convicted of aiding and abetting sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and sentenced to 405 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. Pringler appeals his conviction and sentence, challenging: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the effectiveness of his trial counsel's performance; and (3) the calculation of his sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

B.L., ran away from foster care while her mother was in prison. She was sixteen-years-old at the time. While away from the foster care home and staying with acquaintances, B.L. met the defendant, Chanze Pringler. Two to three weeks after their first meeting, B.L. contacted Pringler looking for a place to stay for the night. Pringler rented a motel room for B.L., where she spent the night alone. The next morning, Pringler took her to stay at another motel with his girlfriend, Megan Norman (“Norman”). Pringler and B.L. soon began a sexual relationship.

Norman had been prostituting herself, working out of motel rooms and finding patrons by posting advertisements on the website backpage.com. Norman introduced B.L. to prostitution and began posting advertisements on backpage.com using B.L.'s picture. At first, Norman and B.L. saw patrons together, but eventually, B.L. saw patrons alone. One such encounter was captured in a video recorded by a camera in a laptop computer in the motel room where they were staying. The laptop computer belonged to Pringler, who had bought it for Norman to use. Pringler moved B.L. and Norman through at least three different hotels or motels during the course of the prostitution.

On March 16, 2011, an undercover agent responded to an online ad posted by Norman and arranged to have sex with Norman and B.L. When the officer arrived at the address that Norman gave the agent, he observed Pringler in the parking lot conducting surveillance. The officer entered the room and negotiated to have intercourse and oral sex with both females, after which Norman and B.L. were arrested. B.L. was transported to a juvenile facility but was released to a case worker because she was under the influence of marijuana. B.L. subsequently ran away.

On March 30, 2011, an undercover agent again responded to an online ad and arranged to have sex with Norman and B.L. at a hotel. When the “takedown team” arrived at the hotel, they observed Pringler's vehicle in the parking lot. A few minutes later, they saw Pringler exit the hotel, walk to his vehicle, and remain parked and on the telephone. The undercover officer entered the hotel room where Norman and B.L. were waiting. The females agreed to have sex for money, after which Norman and B.L. were arrested. Inside the room, officers seized, among other things, a laptop computer that belonged to Pringler and a receipt for the hotel room indicating that Pringler had paid for it. Pringler was subsequently arrested following a traffic stop. Among the items seized was a bill of sale for the hotel room where Norman and B.L. were arrested on March 30, 2011.

Pringler was indicted in federal court for aiding and abetting the sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Pringler pled not guilty to the charge and had a three-day jury trial after which he was found guilty. The probation officer recommended numerous sentencing enhancements for Pringler's sentence, including (1) a two-level increase on the basis that he unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) and (2) Pringler's crime involved the use of a computer to entice or solicit another person to engage in prohibitedsexual conduct with a minor. Pringler challenged these Guidelines calculations but the district court overruled his objections. The district court adopted the PSR and sentenced Pringler within the advisory guidelines range of 405 months' imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. Pringler filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. JURISDICTION

The district court had jurisdiction over this criminal case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) over the appeal of this final judgment and sentence.

III. DISCUSSION

Pringler brings three issues on appeal. He challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of aiding or abetting a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); (2) in the alternative, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to acquit at the close of the government's evidence, preventing him from receiving relief before our court; and (3) he challenges the district court's application of two sentencing enhancements under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. We address each in turn.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Pringler first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for aiding and abetting the sex trafficking of a minor.

Ordinarily we review a challenge to the sufficiency of a jury verdict by asking “ ‘whether a rational jury could have found each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 330 (5th Cir.2012) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 597 (5th Cir.1994)). The parties agree, though, that Pringler's trial counsel failed to move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's case. As a result, we review this unpreserved claim instead for plain error and reject the challenge “unless the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt or if the evidence is so tenuous that a conviction is shocking” or amounts to “a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 331 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The essential elements of sex trafficking of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) are

(1) that the defendant knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, obtained or maintained [the victim]; (2) that the recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining or maintaining of [the victim] was in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, and (3) that the defendant committed such act knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact ... that [the victim] was under the age of 18 years of age and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.

United States v. Garcia–Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir.2013) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). To hold a defendant liable for aiding and abetting an offense, the government must show that elements of the substantive offense occurred and that the defendant “associate[d] with the criminal activity, participate[d] in it, and acted to help it succeed.” United States v. Delagarza–Villarreal, 141 F.3d 133, 140 (5th Cir.1997).

Pringler claims on appeal that the government has not proven the elements necessary to establish aiding and abetting liability, because it has only shown his “mere presence” at the scene of the crime. He supports this argument by pointing to the fact that Norman and B.L. advertised themselves as “independent” prostitutes on websites.

We disagree. The record is not devoid of evidence to support the jury's verdict and show Pringler's integral role in the criminal venture. Pringler took the money that Norman and B.L. earned from their prostitution and used some of it to pay for hotel rooms where the women met their patrons. Pringler bought the laptop Norman and B.L. used to advertise their services. He drove Norman and B.L. to “outcall” appointments, and he took photographs of Norman, which he had planned for use in advertisements. Therefore, we hold that the record is not so insufficient that the conviction amounts to plain error.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In the alternative, Pringler argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move for acquittal on the aiding and abetting count.¹

To prevail on his ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must establish that (1) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of competence and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). “If proof of one element is lacking, the court need not examine the other.” Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 285 (5th Cir.1985). To establish prejudice, the defendant usually “must show that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” United States v. Anderson, 987 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir.1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052).

Pringler argues that, but for counsel's failure to move for acquittal, there was a reasonable probability that this court would grant relief under de novo review of his insufficiency of the evidence claim. See Rosalez–Orozco, 8 F.3d at 200. Under this review, our court still would review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. Id. Despite the more capacious review afforded on his ineffectiveness claim, Pringler raises no further arguments that the evidence was insufficient than the one mentioned above in Part A. Therefore, at most, Pringler only reiterates that there was insufficient evidence on aiding and abetting liability, not...