United States v. Rains

ORDER AND OPINION

NELSON S. ROMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendant Shawn Rains (“Rains” or “Defendant") is charged in a three-count Indictment with: (1) Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; (2) Mail Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2; and (3) Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). (ECF No. 2, “Indictment.”) On October 20, 2023, following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on all three Counts.

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with the factual and procedural background of this case, but it restates the below background for context.

Jury selection for Defendant's trial began on October 11, 2023. On October 19, 2023, the Government rested its case, at which point Defendant made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which the Court denied. (Trial Tr. 755:8758:23.) On October 20, 2023, a jury convicted Defendant on all three Counts. (Tr. 932:14-933:4.) On December 11, 2023, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 (the “Motion”). (“Mot.,” ECF No. 99.) On January 5, 2024, the Government filed an opposition to Defendant's motion (the “Opposition”). (“Gov't Opp.,” ECF No. 104.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 33, “the court may vacate any judgment and order a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. Courts typically grant Rule 33 motions “only in extraordinary circumstances.” United States v. Moore, 54 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 1995); accord United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 48 (2d Cir. 1997). “The defendant bears the burden of proving that [he or she] is entitled to a new trial.” United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458, 475 (2d Cir. 2009).

While Rule 33 “confers broad discretion upon a trial court,” the Court's granting of the motion must be predicated upon the need to avoid a perceived miscarriage of justice. United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413 (2d Cir. 1992). The Court must “examine the entire case, take into account all facts and circumstances, and make an objective evaluation.” United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2001). Still, it is axiomatic that the Court “must defer to the jury's resolution of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 616 (2d Cir. 1982).

Only in exceptional circumstances may the Court intrude upon the jury function of credibility assessments. See United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331, 348-49 (2d Cir. 2005). For example, where testimony constitutes perjury, see Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1413-14, or is “patently incredible or defies physical realities,” the Court may reject such evidence despite the jury's evaluation, see Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 133 (quoting Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1414). Nevertheless, a court's “rejection of trial testimony, by itself does not automatically permit Rule 33 relief.” Id.; see also Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1413-14 (“Even in a case where perjury clearly has been identified, however, we have indicated our reluctance to approve the granting of a new trial unless we can say that the jury probably would have acquitted in the absence of the false testimony.”). The “ultimate test” for the Court's consideration is “whether letting a guilty verdict stand would be a manifest injustice [such that] . . . an innocent person may have been convicted.” Ferguson, 246 F.3d at

133 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Aponte-Vega, 230 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (explaining that new trial “is merited only if . . . the evidence is such that it would probably lead to an acquittal”) (internal quotations omitted)).

DISCUSSION

I. “Conscious Avoidance” Jury Charge

Defendant avers the Court erred in instructing the jury that they could rely on a theory of “conscious avoidance” to find Defendant guilty on Counts One and Three. Specifically, Defendant argues the Court's instruction was “logically irreconcilable” with the specific intent requirement under Count 2, mail fraud. (Mot. at 4-5.) In response, the Government argues Defendant's position-which would prohibit the Government from relying on the “conscious avoidance” charge when charging both conspiracy and a...