United States v. Ralston

88 F.4th 776

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. John Lee RALSTON, Defendant - Appellant

No. 22-3352

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

Submitted: September 22, 2023

Filed: December 14, 2023

Appeal from United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant and appeared on the brief was Heather Quick, AFPD, of Cedar Rapids, IA.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Emily K. Nydle, AUSA, of Cedar Rapids, IA. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellee brief; Devra Hake, AUSA, of Cedar Rapids, IA.

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, MELLOY and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.

ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.

Following a search of his residence, John Lee Ralston was charged with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2). The district court, concluding the Leon good-faith exception applied, denied Ralston's motion to suppress. Ralston entered a conditional guilty plea, was sentenced to a term of 37 months' imprisonment, and now appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress. We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 2021, Ralston was living in rural Jones County, Iowa, on property that his mother had also been living at before she was moved into a care facility. The 9.32-acre parcel of land ("the property") contains two residences bisected by Bear Creek Road. A mobile home is located on the north side of the road and a single-family residence sits on the south side. Law enforcement officers believed Colton Varty was residing in—or at least "frequenting"—the mobile home and Ralston, who had been paroled from prison in November 2020, was living in the single-family home ("Ralston's residence").

Investigators identified Varty as a suspect in multiple burglaries occurring between December 16 and December 25, 2020. After obtaining and receiving information indicating Varty could be storing stolen items on the property, law enforcement applied for a search warrant for the property. The affidavit contained extensive information regarding Varty's alleged involvement in burglaries of unoccupied buildings and construction trailers. The supporting affidavit outlined in detail the information leading law enforcement to "suspect and have probable cause to believe, Varty has committed multiple crimes of [this] nature in proximity to Ralston's residence."

The warrant authorized the search of Ralston's residence, the mobile home where Varty was frequenting/residing, a machine shed, and two separate storage sheds with a physical address of 1221 Bear Creek Road, as well as a blue Jeep Liberty Sport owned by Varty. It authorized officers to seize a number of different things, including items commonly used in thefts or distribution of stolen property, indicia of occupancy, tools burglars use to gain access to locked structures or storage containers, property that had been reported as stolen, shoes believed to have been worn during the thefts, and tire tracks/treads for comparison.

The dispute before us pertains to the search of Ralston's residence located on the south side of the property. Ralston contends the warrant did not demonstrate a nexus between him and Varty to establish probable cause that evidence would be located inside his house. In analyzing Ralston's argument, the magistrate judge found: (1) the affidavit supporting the search warrant described the places to be searched in overbroad terms; (2) the information in the affidavit connecting Varty to the south side of the property was minimal; and (3) the supporting affidavit contained no information connecting Varty to Ralston's residence. In addition to finding a want of probable cause, the magistrate judge found the good-faith exception did not apply. The government, pointing to the proximity of the two residences, the suitability of the property for criminal activity, and Ralston's criminal history, objected to the magistrate judge's findings and conclusion that the warrant did not establish a nexus between evidence of Varty's burglaries and Ralston's residence. The district court was unpersuaded by the government's objections regarding the probable cause determination, but ultimately denied the motion to suppress, reversing the magistrate judge's determination that the good-faith exception did not apply.

As noted by the district court, the affidavit lacked information indicating Ralston was involved in any of the break-ins or thefts. It instead disclosed the officers' "suspicion" that Ralston could be involved in fencing stolen property. While witnesses reported seeing a vehicle comparable to Varty's in and around the location of the burglaries, Ralston was never alleged to have been seen in the vehicle or at the sites. When law enforcement officers observed Varty's vehicle, it was parked primarily on the north side of the road nearest the mobile home. On a single occasion, an investigator observed Varty on the south side of the property walking towards a parked vehicle that appeared to be like the one Varty was in when he was arrested several weeks prior. On this same day, law enforcement also observed a UTV that they believed had been stolen in Cedar County. This was the only fact the district court could find in the affidavit that attempted to connect Ralston with Varty's well-documented criminal activity. The district court characterized "this lone detail" regarding the UTV as insufficient to establish probable cause to search Ralston's residence. Although the district court agreed with the magistrate judge that the warrant lacked probable cause, the district court denied Ralston's motion to suppress on the ground that the Leon good-faith exception applied. Ralston appeals the denial of his motion to suppress.

II. DISCUSSION

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its Fourth Amendment determination de novo. United States v. Mitchell, 55 F.4th 620, 622 (8th Cir. 2022). On appeal, the government briefed only the good-faith exception. Having abandoned the issue of whether the search warrant lacked probable cause, see Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 739 (8th Cir. 2004) (deeming issues not briefed on appeal abandoned), we turn to the Leon good-faith exception.

The Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule should not be applied to bar the admission of "evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate," even if that search warrant is later determined to be invalid. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900, 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In assessing whether an officer relied in good faith on the validity of a warrant, a reviewing court considers the totality of the circumstances, including any information known to the officer but not included in the affidavit. United States v. Marion, 238 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2001). An officer's reliance on a search warrant is objectively unreasonable in four instances:

(1) when the affidavit or testimony in support of the warrant included a false statement made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for its truth, thus misleading the issuing judge; (2) when the judge 'wholly abandoned his judicial role' in issuing the warrant; (3) when the affidavit in support of the warrant was 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable'; and (4) when the warrant is 'so facially deficient' that the executing officer could not reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.

United States v. Grant, 490 F.3d 627, 632-33 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405). At issue here is the third instance—that is, whether the supporting affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer would have relied upon a warrant that was issued based on it.

A review of the affidavit reveals that the law enforcement's primary basis for believing Ralston was involved in Varty's criminal activity was the proximity of their residences located across a road on a rural 9.32-acre parcel of land. Yet, there is an...