United States v. Ramamoorthy

949 F.3d 955

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Prabhu RAMAMOORTHY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-1033

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: February 7, 2020

ON BRIEF: Shannon M. Smith, Molly S. Blythe, SMITH BLYTHE PC, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellant. Amanda Jawad, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before: BATCHELDER, LARSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Prabhu Ramamoorthy of sexual abuse after a woman sitting next to him on a flight woke up to find him either inserting or trying to insert his fingers into her vagina. Ramamoorthy appeals his conviction, claiming (1) that his right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated because his indictment was duplicitous, (2) that the statements he made to airport police should have been suppressed because he was never informed of his Miranda rights, and (3) that the statements he made to the FBI after arrest should have been suppressed because he did not validly waive his Miranda rights. Because his claims are meritless, we AFFIRM.

I.

Ramamoorthy, an Indian citizen and H-1B visa holder living in the United States, took a redeye flight leaving Las Vegas on January 2, 2018 and landing in Detroit in the early hours of January 3. He sat between his wife and another woman, Laura.¹ According to Laura, she initially slept on the flight, but suddenly awoke to find her pants unbuttoned and unzipped and Ramamoorthy shoving his fingers in and out of her vagina. She texted her boyfriend that "the guy next to me had his hands down my pants and in my vagina." She then left her seat, went to the back galley, and told the flight attendants what had happened.

Upon landing, the flight crew escorted Laura off the plane first and then Ramamoorthy. Sergeant Alvarado and Corporal Hunter of the airport police met Ramamoorthy in the jetway as he came off the plane. Sergeant Alvarado asked Ramamoorthy, "What’s going on today?" In response, and without further questioning, Ramamoorthy immediately began talking about Laura, claiming that she fell asleep on him and that he did not know where he had put his hands. He also said he was very tired on the flight because he had taken some Tylenol. Sergeant Alvarado then led him into the airport terminal, where they continued to talk in an area open to the public.

Another officer, Officer Chalmers, whose body camera footage is also in the record, then came to the scene and asked Ramamoorthy some questions about what had happened on the flight, to which he gave similar answers. At the end of their conversation, Ramamoorthy made a written statement of his recollection. In the statement, he repeated that Laura had slept on him, that he had been in a "deep sleep," and that he did not remember where he had put his hands.

The officers then arrested Ramamoorthy and took him to the airport police station, where two FBI agents interviewed him for a little over an hour. Before asking Ramamoorthy any questions about the flight, the agents provided him with a written Miranda waiver form. Ramamoorthy signed the form after reading his rights aloud and discussing them with the agents for about ten minutes. Ramamoorthy then admitted that he had tried to put his fingers inside Laura’s pants.

A grand jury charged Ramamoorthy with one count of sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2). The indictment accused Ramamoorthy of both attempted and completed sexual abuse, which carry the same punishment. See id. § 2242.

Before trial, Ramamoorthy moved to suppress the statements he had made to the FBI, claiming that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights because he did not speak English fluently and did not understand that his statements to the agents would be admissible in court. He did not seek to suppress the statements he made to the airport police in the jetway and terminal. The district court held a suppression hearing and denied Ramamoorthy’s motion. The court found that Ramamoorthy was an "articulate, natural English speaker" and that the agents had "no contemporaneous reason to believe" that Ramamoorthy did not understand the consequences of waiving his rights.

At trial, the government relied on testimony from Laura, the flight attendants, the airport police officers, and one of the FBI agents, as well as video footage of Ramamoorthy’s conversations with the police officers and FBI agents. Prior to deliberations, the district court read a series of instructions to the jury. One instruction explained that completed sexual abuse and attempted sexual abuse were two ways of committing the crime of sexual abuse. It then continued, "In order to return a guilty verdict, all twelve of you must agree that at least one of these has been proved; however, all of you need not agree that the same one has been proved." The verdict form asked the jurors whether they found Ramamoorthy guilty "[w]ith respect to the charge in Count One of the indictment, which charges the defendant with Sexual Abuse."

After deliberations began, the jury submitted a written question to the court: "Are there two charges under consideration, i.e., one, Sexual Abuse, two, attempted Sexual Abuse??? The verdict form only includes Sexual Abuse. Please clarify. Thank you." The court called the jurors back into the courtroom and reread its instruction. The jury again retired and shortly thereafter returned with a guilty verdict. The district court sentenced Ramamoorthy to 108 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. He timely appealed.

II.

Ramamoorthy argues that his indictment was duplicitous—that is, it "set[ ] forth separate and distinct crimes in one count." United States v. Kakos , 483 F.3d 441, 443 (6th Cir. 2007). He contends that sexual abuse and attempted sexual abuse are two different crimes; therefore, both should not have been charged in Count I. But Ramamoorthy does not directly challenge the indictment’s alleged duplicity on appeal; nor did he raise any such objection before trial, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(i). Instead, he grounds his appeal in the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict. He claims that the jury instructions and verdict form perpetuated the indictment’s duplicity, thus permitting the jury to convict without agreeing on whether his crime was attempted or completed sexual abuse. As Ramamoorthy concedes, however, he did not object to the jury instructions or verdict form at trial either. So we review only for plain error. Kakos , 483 F.3d at 445.

We may reverse for plain error "only in exceptional circumstances and only where the error is so plain that the trial judge ... [was] derelict in countenancing it." United States v. Fuller-Ragland , 931 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Carroll , 26 F.3d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir. 1994) ). To prevail, Ramamoorthy must identify "an ‘(1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected [his] substantial rights and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’ " United States v. Crawford , 943 F.3d 297, 308 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Vonner , 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). "Meeting all four prongs is difficult, as it should be." United States v. Jackson , 918 F.3d 467, 482 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) ).

The Sixth Amendment prevents a federal jury from convicting "in a criminal case unless it unanimously concludes that the Government has proven each element of the charged offense." United States v. Hendrickson , 822 F.3d 812, 822 (6th Cir. 2016). Because a duplicitous indictment charges multiple crimes in one count, it creates the risk "that a defendant may be deprived of his right to a unanimous jury verdict," because "a jury might return a guilty verdict on the single count submitted to them without all twelve jurors agreeing that the defendant committed either of the offenses charged within that count." Kakos , 483 F.3d at 443. "Where a defendant fails to object to an indictment before trial," however, "the case proceeds under the presumption that the court’s instructions to the jury will clear up any ambiguity created by the duplicitous indictment." Id. at 444. Ramamoorthy contends that, in his case, that assumption failed, violating his Sixth Amendment rights. But his claim fails at its premise. There was no duplicity because, at least as charged here, sexual abuse and its attempt are not separate crimes.

Ramamoorthy contends that attempted and completed sexual abuse are distinct because, in his view, sexual abuse is a general-intent offense while attempt is a specific-intent offense. Accordingly, he argues, each crime contains an element that the other lacks—completed sexual abuse would require proof of actual penetration, whereas attempt would require proof of specific intent. See United States v. Davis , 306 F.3d 398, 416 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that courts typically conclude that "offenses are separate" for duplicity purposes "if each requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not" (citation omitted)). Thus, he concludes, there is no guarantee that the jury found that the government had proved every element of either offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

To commit a general-intent crime, a defendant must only "intend to do the act that the law proscribes." United States v. Gonyea , 140 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Phillips , 19 F.3d 1565, 1576–77 (11th Cir. 1994) ). To commit a specific-intent crime, a defendant must "do more than knowingly act in violation of the law." Id. He "must also act with the purpose of violating the law." Id. "In other words, ‘a general intent crime requires the knowing commission of an act that the law makes a crime. A specific intent crime requires additional bad purpose.’ " United...