Case Law United States v. Ramirez-Castillo

United States v. Ramirez-Castillo

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OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ARGUED:Cameron Jane Blazer, Savage Law Firm, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Nicholas Bianchi, Office of the United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge THACKER wrote the opinion, in which Judge GREGORY and Judge WYNN joined.

THACKER, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we review the propriety of a prison sentence imposed subsequent to a jury trial in which the jury made two specific factual findings but never returned a guilty verdict. Saul Ramirez–Castillo (Appellant) challenges his conviction and sentence for possession of a prohibited object by a federal inmate. On December 14, 2011, Appellant was charged in a single-count indictment with “knowingly possess[ing] prohibited objects, that is, two homemade weapons,” while an inmate at a Federal Correctional Institute in Estill, South Carolina (“FCI Estill”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1791(a)(2), (b)(3), and (c). A jury trial was held on September 25, 2012. At the conclusion of the evidence, the district court charged the jury with determining: (1) whether the first object at issue was a “weapon”; and (2) whether the second object at issue was possessed by Appellant. The jury answered “yes” to each question, but was never asked to determine whether Appellant was “guilty” or “not guilty” of the charged offense. Although the jury never returned a guilty verdict, the parties proceeded to sentencing on February 21, 2013. Appellant was sentenced to 33 months' imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his prior undischarged term of imprisonment of 66 months.

Because we conclude the district court violated Appellant's right to have a jury determine his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we vacate Appellant's conviction and sentence, and we remand the case to the district court.

I.
A.

On November 5, 2011, while Appellant was serving a 66–month sentence for illegal re-entry after deportation at FCI Estill, prison officials conducted two searches that gave rise to the charges in this case. The first search was a pat-down of Appellant's person, during which a prison official found an object, described as [a] homemade shank, approximately five inches long, with a sharp point,” J.A. 33 (“Exhibit 1”),1 inside of Appellant's pocket. After discovering Exhibit 1, prison officials conducted a search of Appellant's jail cell and locker. Inside Appellant's locker, prison officials found a nine-and-a-half-inch piece of metal, sharpened to a point on one end (“Exhibit 2”). Appellant's locker also contained four pairs of shoes, as well as several of Appellant's personal items.

Appellant did not waive his right to a trial by jury, and trial commenced on September 25, 2012. Testifying in his own defense, Appellant admitted to making and possessing Exhibit 1, claiming that he used it as a tool to alter or fix ill-fitting shoes. Further, Appellant identified several pairs of shoes that were recovered from his locker and stated that he had either sewn patches or attached new soles to those shoes. Appellant also testified that he never used Exhibit 1 as a weapon and that he never planned to use it as a weapon. On cross-examination, however, Appellant acknowledged that if he were attacked and his life was in danger, he would use Exhibit 1 to defend himself against such an attack. With respect to Exhibit 2, Appellant acknowledged that, based on its appearance, Exhibit 2 could seriously hurt someone. However, Appellant testified that he had never seen Exhibit 2 before the search nor had he used it for any reason. On cross-examination, Appellant also stated that his locker had a combination lock on it, that no one else had the combination, and that he was the only one who had access to the locker.

B.

Several times during the trial, Appellant's counsel and Government counsel discussed possible jury instructions and verdict forms with the district court. Just before the close of the Government's case, Appellant's counsel summarized for the district court the issues that she believed were contested: “As to the first thing [Exhibit 1], the issue is whether the thing is a weapon. As to the second thing [Exhibit 2], the issue is whether the thing was possessed.” J.A. 73. Thus, Appellant's counsel stated, “it may behoove us, notwithstanding the fact that they were indicted in a single count together, to prepare a special verdict form that allows the jury to walk through [the Exhibits] item by item.” Id. Government counsel suggested preparing a verdict form that separately listed Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 and asked the jury to find Appellant “guilty” or “not guilty” as to each Exhibit. Id. at 74. The district court, however, indicated that it did not “know that that's any different from telling the jury that in order to find [Appellant] guilty, ... they've got to find he had possession of one of these [Exhibits] that they considered to be a weapon.” Id. The district court then asked Appellant's counsel, [d]oes that suit you ...?” Id. at 75. Appellant's counsel replied, [t]hat would be just fine, Your Honor.” Id.

During a subsequent discussion about the verdict form, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Ms. Blazer [Appellant's Counsel], as I understand that from [Appellant]'s, really [Appellant]'s own testimony, in so far as possession to Exhibit 1, he admits that?

MS. BLAZER: Yes.

THE COURT: And so far as the Exhibit 2, [Appellant] admits that that satisfies as a weapon?

MS. BLAZER: That ... is a reasonable conclusion for the jury to draw, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do I—I was thinking about charging the jury as to [Exhibit] 1 that they had to determine whether it was a weapon—

MS. BLAZER: Yes.

THE COURT: —and nothing else.

MS. BLAZER: As to Exhibit 1, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And as to [Exhibit] 2, they have to determine whether he possessed it.

MS. BLAZER: Yes, Your Honor, I agree completely.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. United States Attorney, you agree with this?

MR. BIANCHI [Government Counsel]: I do, Your Honor. I think it's undisputed on Exhibit 2 at this point.

J.A. 114–15. Appellant's counsel also noted, “just out of an abundance of caution,” that “implicit in number 1 and number 2 on this verdict form is that if the answer to either number 1 or number 2 is yes, then the jury would be finding [Appellant] guilty,” but that [i]f the answer to both is no, the jury must find him not guilty.” Id. at 115. The district court agreed that if the jury answered “no” to both questions, the court would find, “as a matter of law,” that Appellant was not guilty. See id. at 115–16. Appellant's counsel agreed, describing the verdict form as the jury's “verdict as a finding of fact.” Id. at 116. Despite this “implicit” understanding by the district court and the parties, nowhere did the proposed verdict form require the jury to determine whether Appellant was “guilty” or “not guilty.” At the conclusion of this exchange, Government counsel acknowledged that he was satisfied with a verdict form of this nature.

Ultimately, the district court drafted a verdict form that posed only the following two questions:

(1) Do you, the jury, unanimously find that Government's Exhibit One is a weapon?

(2) Do you, the jury, unanimously find that [Appellant] possessed Government's Exhibit Two?

J.A. 136. In its oral jury instructions, the district court explained that for Appellant to be found guilty, the jury was required to find the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that [Appellant] was an inmate of the federal correctional facility.

Two, that [Appellant] possessed the prohibited object, specifically a weapon.

Three, that he did so without the knowledge and consent of the warden or superintendent of the facility.

And four, that he did so knowingly and willfully.

Id. at 122–23.

The district court then proceeded to explain the verdict form to the jury. The court began by noting that the parties had agreed Appellant possessed Exhibit 1, so the “issue as to Exhibit Number 1 is whether it's a weapon as I've defined a weapon.” J.A. 127. The district court continued, “the issue ... as to Exhibit Number 2, is did [Appellant] possess that. Everyone agreed that that's a weapon.” Id.2 After the court finished its instructions, the jury began deliberating.

Later that day, the jury reached a decision regarding the two questions asked of it, which was read in open court. As to the first question on the verdict form, the jury answered “yes,” unanimously finding that Exhibit 1 was a weapon. As to the second question, the jury also answered “yes,” unanimously finding that Appellant possessed Exhibit 2. The district court then thanked the jury for its service, and the jury was excused without making any other findings.

C.

Appellant's Presentence Report calculated his total offense level at 13, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline § 2P1.2(a)(2). In addition, 14 criminal history points placed Appellant in criminal history category VI. Based on a total offense level of 13 and a criminal history category of VI, the Sentencing Guideline range for imprisonment was 33 to 41 months, consecutive to any other term. On February 21, 2013, after holding a sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a sentence of 33 months' imprisonment, to be served consecutively to Appellant's sentence for illegal reentry. On February 25, 2013, the district court issued a judgment order, which indicated that Appellant was “adjudicated guilty” of possessing contraband in prison, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1791(a)(2), (b)(3), and (c). J.A. 158....

5 cases
Document | Connecticut Supreme Court – 2017
State v. McClain
"...the concept of implied waiver, in that counsel's acquiescence cannot constitute a waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez–Castillo , 748 F.3d 205, 212 (4th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Harris , 695 F.3d 1125, 1130 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Brown , 352 F.3d 654, 663 and n...."
Document | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia – 2020
Merritt v. United States
"...Thus, any error was harmless because it did not "affect[ ] the outcome of the district court proceedings." United States v. Ramirez-Castillo , 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Olano , 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 ). The Rehaif error was harmless because it did not deprive Petiti..."
Document | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina – 2020
United States v. Lindberg
"...follow his instructions." Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 513, 115 S.Ct. 2310 ; see Johnson, 71 F.3d at 142 ; see also United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 2014). In other words, the Constitution is not a tool for neutralizing unfavorable decisions of law. The Eleventh Circuit..."
Document | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit – 2015
United States v. Foote
"...serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Ramirez–Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 217 (4th Cir.2014) (“The Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, which includes, ‘as its most important element, the right to have t..."
Document | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit – 2020
United States v. Lockhart
"...held that such "structural errors" "necessarily affect substantial rights, satisfying Olano ’s third prong." United States v. Ramirez-Castillo , 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. David , 83 F.3d 638, 647 (4th Cir. 1996) ). This Court has not yet determined whether a..."

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1 books and journal articles
Document | Vol. 85 Núm. 4, September 2020 – 2020
A Comprehensive Consideration of the Structural-Error Doctrine.
"...F.3d 131, 153 (3rd Cir. 2002). (289.) United States v. David, 83 F.3d 638, 647 (4th Cir.1996). (290.) United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. (291.) See United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005). (292.) United States v. Yamashiro, 788 F.3d 1231, 1236..."

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1 books and journal articles
Document | Vol. 85 Núm. 4, September 2020 – 2020
A Comprehensive Consideration of the Structural-Error Doctrine.
"...F.3d 131, 153 (3rd Cir. 2002). (289.) United States v. David, 83 F.3d 638, 647 (4th Cir.1996). (290.) United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. (291.) See United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005). (292.) United States v. Yamashiro, 788 F.3d 1231, 1236..."

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5 cases
Document | Connecticut Supreme Court – 2017
State v. McClain
"...the concept of implied waiver, in that counsel's acquiescence cannot constitute a waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez–Castillo , 748 F.3d 205, 212 (4th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Harris , 695 F.3d 1125, 1130 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Brown , 352 F.3d 654, 663 and n...."
Document | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia – 2020
Merritt v. United States
"...Thus, any error was harmless because it did not "affect[ ] the outcome of the district court proceedings." United States v. Ramirez-Castillo , 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Olano , 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 ). The Rehaif error was harmless because it did not deprive Petiti..."
Document | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina – 2020
United States v. Lindberg
"...follow his instructions." Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 513, 115 S.Ct. 2310 ; see Johnson, 71 F.3d at 142 ; see also United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 2014). In other words, the Constitution is not a tool for neutralizing unfavorable decisions of law. The Eleventh Circuit..."
Document | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit – 2015
United States v. Foote
"...serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Ramirez–Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 217 (4th Cir.2014) (“The Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, which includes, ‘as its most important element, the right to have t..."
Document | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit – 2020
United States v. Lockhart
"...held that such "structural errors" "necessarily affect substantial rights, satisfying Olano ’s third prong." United States v. Ramirez-Castillo , 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. David , 83 F.3d 638, 647 (4th Cir. 1996) ). This Court has not yet determined whether a..."

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  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

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