United States v. Ramos

88 F.4th 862

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Isaac Manuel RAMOS, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 23-6071

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

FILED December 15, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 5:22-CR-00180-JD-1)

Shira Kieval, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public Defender, with her on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant - Appellant.

Wilson D. McGarry, Assistant United States Attorney (Robert J. Troester, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff - Appellee.

Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Frederick Police Department ("FPD") Officer Jose Puentes arrested Isaac Ramos and impounded Ramos's truck. In anticipation of the truck's impoundment, Puentes conducted an inventory search. That search revealed the presence of a machine gun and ammunition. A federal grand jury issued a two-count indictment charging Ramos with unlawful possession of a machine gun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), and being a felon illegally in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Ramos moved to suppress the machine gun and ammunition, asserting the impoundment of his truck violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not consistent with standardized policy and not supported by a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Ramos entered a conditional guilty plea to the unlawful-possession-of-a-machine-gun charge. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). On appeal, Ramos claims the district court erred in refusing to suppress the machine gun as the product of an illegal search, reasserting the arguments he made in the district court.

This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reverses the denial of Ramos's suppression motion. We need not resolve whether the impoundment of Ramos's truck was consistent with FPD policy. Instead, it is sufficient to conclude impoundment was not supported by a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale. United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that to be valid under the community-caretaking doctrine, an impoundment must be both consistent with standardized policy and supported by a valid community-caretaking rationale). The matter is remanded to the district court to grant Ramos's suppression motion and to conduct any further necessary proceedings.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Legal Background

The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their . . . effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Vehicles are effects that fall within the Fourth Amendment's protection. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ("The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears."). "To be reasonable, a search generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant." United States v. Venezia, 995 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). "In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement." Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). One such exception, and the only exception at issue here, is a search conducted pursuant to a police officer's "community-caretaking function." Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1175. This exception allows law enforcement to impound an automobile and, in connection with the impoundment, inventory the vehicle's contents. Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1244-45. Such an impoundment, however, must be based on "something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity," such as "protecting public safety and promoting the efficient movement of traffic." Id. at 1245 (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Chavez, 985 F.3d 1234, 1243 (10th Cir. 2021) (holding that "public safety lies at the heart" of the community-caretaking doctrine). That is, a community-caretaking impoundment cannot be based on a suspicion or hope evidence of criminal activity will be found in the vehicle. The government has the burden of proving a vehicle impoundment satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1244.

The community-caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement operates differently depending on the nature of the property from which the vehicle is impounded. When the vehicle is located on public property, specifically including streets, roads, and ways, officers have far greater authority to impound. See Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1175; see also generally South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973); United States v. Trujillo, 993 F.3d 859 (10th Cir. 2021). When, on the other hand, police impound a car located on private property, and that car is neither "obstructing traffic or creating an imminent threat to public safety," a community-caretaking rationale "is less likely to exist." Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1176, 1178. In such situations, this court imposes "heightened requirements on police." Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1249. To be consistent with the Fourth Amendment, such an impoundment must be "justified by both a standardized policy and a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale." Id. at 1248.¹ A failure to satisfy either criterion is sufficient to establish that the impoundment, and related inventory search, is unconstitutional. Id. at 1243.

Ramos asserts on appeal that the impoundment of his truck fails both requirements set out in Sanders. This court need not resolve whether the impoundment was consistent with FPD policy because, in any event, it is not supported by a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale. See United States v. Braxton, 61 F.4th 830, 835 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2023) (resolving appeal solely on basis of Sanders's second prong and emphasizing that both Sanders requirements must be satisfied for a community-caretaking impoundment to pass Fourth Amendment muster). Law enforcement must take "objectively reasonable" action in its community-caretaking role and must do so pursuant to a non-pretextual "subjective motivation." Kendall, 14 F.4th at 1128; see generally United States v. Woodard, 5 F.4th 1148, 1155-59 (10th Cir. 2021). This court has identified "five non-exclusive factors" that are helpful to determining "whether an impoundment is justified by . . . a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale." Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1177. These factors include:

(1) whether the vehicle is on public or private property; (2) if on private property, whether the property owner has been consulted; (3) whether an alternative to impoundment exists (especially another person capable of driving the vehicle); (4) whether the vehicle is implicated in a crime; and (5) whether the vehicle's owner and/or driver have consented to the impoundment.

Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1250. Although this court weighs the Sanders factors de novo, "we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government." Woodard, 5 F.4th at 1155.

B. Factual Background²

At 11:51 p.m. on February 13, 2022, FPD Officer Puentes responded to a call about a public disturbance at the Hop & Sack Convenience Store. The Hop & Sack is located at the intersection of 14th Street and Gladstone Avenue; Gladstone Avenue is also State Highway 5. Puentes observed two men involved in a physical altercation in the parking lot. Puentes separated the combatants, recognizing both men, Ramos and Caleb Hogan, as his former classmates.³ As Puentes was pulling Ramos off to the side, Ramos turned and "lightly tapped" him on his right cheek. At that moment, Puentes placed Ramos under arrest for assault and battery on a police officer. Puentes placed Ramos in handcuffs and detained Ramos in the backseat of his patrol car. Puentes spoke with Hogan to get his side of the story. Puentes described Hogan as the victim because when Puentes arrived on the scene, he saw Hogan walk toward his vehicle as Ramos followed and then instigated the altercation.

FPD Assistant Chief Joe Rodriguez arrived on scene after Puentes detained Ramos and while Puentes was talking to Hogan. Puentes already had control of the scene and was visiting with witnesses when Rodriguez arrived. Rodriguez assisted Puentes with the investigation and consulted with Puentes about the charges and what to do that night.

Once Puentes had Ramos in custody, he considered towing or impounding Ramos's vehicle. Puentes described his decision as "protocol," meaning "as soon as I arrest someone, and no one is around, I'll impound their vehicle." By 11:59 p.m., Puentes decided he was going to impound the vehicle. His decision never changed and was based solely on the fact he had arrested Ramos.⁴

Ramos was driving a tow truck, which was parked on the east side of the Hop & Sack. The Hop & Sack closes at midnight and it was past midnight when Puentes asked Ramos if he needed anything out of his truck. Ramos responded he had everything he needed and indicated the truck belonged to his mother.⁵ When Puentes asked if Juanes was home, Ramos shook his head yes. Ramos asked if he could call Juanes to come pick up the truck. Puentes did not answer yes or no to Ramos's request because his plan was to first check the vehicle's registration. Puentes never called Juanes, despite admitting he could have obtained her phone number from Ramos. Puentes asked Rodriguez whether he should let Juanes come get the truck. Rodriguez deferred to Puentes, but suggested they first see whether the vehicle registration came back to Juanes. Puentes and Rodriguez were considering releasing the vehicle to Juanes, but needed...