United States v. Raniere

1

United States of America, Appellee, v. Keith Raniere, also known as Vanguard, and Clare Bronfman, Defendants-Appellants, Allison Mack, Kathy Russell, Lauren Salzman, and Nancy Salzman, also known as Prefect, Defendants.^[*]

Nos. 20-3520-cr (L), 20-3789-cr

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

December 9, 2022

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 9^th day of December, two thousand twenty-two.

Appeal from judgments, entered October 7, 2020, and October 30 2020, by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Nicholas G. Garaufis, Judge).

FOR APPELLEE: TANYA HAJJAR, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY (KEVIN TROWEL, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, ON THE BRIEF), FOR BREON PEACE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, BROOKLYN, NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT RANIERE: JOSEPH M. TULLY, TULLY &WEISS ATTORNEYS AT LAW, MARTINEZ, CA (JENNIFER BONJEAN BONJEAN LAW GROUP, PLLC, NEW YORK, NY, ON THE BRIEF).

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BRONFMAN: RONALD S. SULLIVAN, JR., RONALD SULLIVAN LAW PLLC, WASHINGTON, DC (DANIEL R. KOFFMANN, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART, &SULLIVAN, LLP, NEW YORK, NY, ON THE BRIEF).

PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, JOSE A. CABRANES, RICHARD J SULLIVAN, CIRCUIT JUDGES.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the October 7, 2020 and October 30, 2020 judgments of the District Court be and hereby are AFFIRMED.

On March 13, 2019, a federal grand jury returned a Second Superseding Indictment ("Indictment") charging Defendant Keith Raniere with, inter alia, racketeering, sex trafficking, and a forced-labor conspiracy involving multiple victims. The Indictment also charged Defendant Clare Bronfman and others with a number of related crimes.

The Government alleged that Raniere was the founder of a self-styled executive coaching and self-help organization called NXIVM, and that Bronfman served on NXIVM's executive board. It further alleged that Raniere maintained a rotating group of female NXIVM members with whom he had sexual relationships. These women were barred from both having sexual relationships with anyone but Raniere and disclosing their relationship with Raniere to others.

As alleged, members of Raniere's "inner circle" would recruit vulnerable members of NXIVM to a secret society called "DOS," an acronym for "Dominus Obsequious Sororium," a phrase that roughly translates to "Lord/Master of the Obedient Female Companions." DOS was run as a pyramid organization, with Raniere on the top, followed by first-line "masters," and then "slaves." Apart from Raniere, all other DOS members were women. DOS "masters" would recruit "slaves" to the organization, who were required to deposit "collateral" to show their commitment to the organization in the form of, inter alia, sexually explicit photographs and videos depicting the slaves in compromising positions, letters accusing loved ones of wrongdoing, and credit card authorizations. DOS "masters" would give their "slaves" assignments, which included uncompensated labor like buying groceries, cleaning, and organizing. DOS "masters" would also give their "slaves" assignments to engage in sexual acts with Raniere. DOS "slaves" who failed to comply with their "masters'" assignments risked the release of their "collateral."

Following a six-week jury trial, Raniere was convicted on all counts submitted to the jury.^[1]He now raises various challenges to his convictions. Separately, Bronfman-who pleaded guilty to two counts prior to the commencement of Raniere's trial-brings a challenge to the procedural reasonableness of the District Court's imposition of an 81-month sentence for her crimes.

We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. Raniere's appeal as it concerns his convictions for sex trafficking, attempted sex trafficking, and sex trafficking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591-including both his challenges to the relevant jury instructions and his sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments- is addressed in an opinion entered this same day. We write separately here to address Raniere's remaining claims as well as Bronfman's appeal, and address each in turn.

I. RANIERE'S APPEAL

A. Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Challenges

Raniere first argues that insufficient evidence was presented to the jury to sustain his convictions for various counts. Where, as here, claims of insufficiency are preserved below, we review those claims de novo. United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2021). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence at trial "face[s] a heavy burden because we must sustain the jury's verdict if, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government's favor and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (cleaned up). "A court may enter a judgment of acquittal only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting United States v. Atilla, 966 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2020)).

We address Raniere's numerous sufficiency claims below.

a. Forced Labor and Forced Labor Conspiracy, in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (Count 3 and Racketeering Act 10B)

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on the forced labor conspiracy charge (Count 3) and the racketeering act of forced labor of Nicole (Act 10B),^[2] Raniere argues (1) that the "acts of service" that Nicole conducted for Allison Mack were "isolated personal favors and kind gestures" that do not rise to the definition of "labor or services" used in the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1589; and (2) that Nicole had "knowingly consented to these types of activities as part of her membership in DOS." Raniere's Br. 33. We find neither argument convincing.

As to the first argument-that Nicole's "acts of service" do not rise to the level of "labor or services" as that term is used in Section 1589-we begin by looking to the "ordinary meaning" of the statutory phrase "labor or services." United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 2010). Labor includes the "expenditure of physical or mental effort especially when fatiguing, difficult, or compulsory." Id. at 44 n.10 (quoting Merriam-Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (2002)). Here, evidence presented to the jury showed that DOS "slaves" were coerced into providing uncompensated work by the threat of the release of their "collateral." In particular, the Government offered evidence at trial that Nicole provided uncompensated work for Mack, including transcribing tapes and reviewing articles. [Gov. App'x 786.] Thus, we conclude that "the plain meaning of the forced labor statute unambiguously applies to [Raniere's] conduct." Id. at 45.

The second argument-that Nicole had consented to the labor-is also unconvincing. "The fact that [Nicole's] enslavement arose from her initial participation in consensual [DOS] activities does not require" us to infer, much less conclude, that Nicole consented to all of the labor she subsequently undertook. See id. At trial, the Government presented evidence that Nicole was required to produce "collateral," including in the form of sexually explicit videos of herself, letters in which she falsely accused her father of sexual abuse, and credit card authorization forms, which she feared would be released if she failed to comply with Mack's directives. [Gov. App'x 738-40.] Upon review of the record, we conclude that the jury was presented with ample evidence showing that Nicole's labor was nonconsensual. There is therefore no basis for overturning the forced labor or forced labor conspiracy convictions.

b. Sexual Exploitation of a Child, in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Racketeering Acts 2 and 3)

Raniere argues that the Government failed to prove the racketeering acts of child exploitation of Camila (Racketeering Acts 2 and 3), principally pointing to the fact that Camila did not testify at trial. Raniere argues that, at most, his possession of explicit photographs dated November 2, 2005 and November 24, 2005 shows that he was guilty of mere possession of child pornography. He argues that no evidence was presented specifically showing that he "employ[ed], use[d], persuade[d], induce[d], entice[d], or coerce[d]" Camila to engage in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251. See Raniere's Br. 36-37.

We do not agree. Even without Camila's testimony, the jury was presented with ample evidence showing that Raniere began sexually abusing Camila in September 2005. See e.g., Gov. App'x 710-1-10-4, 1171, 1268 (emails and text messages between Camila and Raniere referring to the beginning of their sexual relationship as around September 2005); Gov. App'x 416-17 (testimony from Daniela that she had spoken to Raniere about his sexual relationship with Camila at some point before...