United States v. Reese

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. DEON REESE, Defendant.

No. 2:19-cr-257-NR

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

September 27, 2021

MEMORANDUM ORDER

J Nicholas Ranjan, United States District Judge

Deon Reese moves to suppress certain evidence against him that the government acquired via three separate search warrants. ECF 94. The three search warrants, respectively, authorized the government's search and seizure of (1) a cellphone and its data, (2) a Facebook account and its data, and (3) documents that Mr. Reese purportedly handwrote. Mr. Reese argues that these search warrants are invalid, and that suppression is warranted. After carefully considering the parties' briefs, arguments, and the relevant law, the Court denies the motion to suppress for the reasons below.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

where he lost consciousness. Id. Officers found him and transported him to the hospital. Id.

Three weeks later, while the victim was recovering in the hospital and at his father's residence, the victim's family members went to his house to collect some items. Id. In the bedroom, the family members found an unidentified cellphone. Id. The victim knew that the cellphone did not belong to him. Id. As a result, the detective investigating the shooting surmised that one of the assailants may have dropped the phone during the attack, and therefore obtained a search warrant to search and seize the cellphone data. Id. at PDF pp. 1-3. The resulting search of the cellphone identified the cellphone's owner as Mr. Reese. ECF 99-2, PDF p. 3. The search also established that the cellphone's number was linked to a Facebook Profile named “Keon Reese.” Id. The detective consequently obtained a search warrant to search and seize the data and content for this Facebook account. Id. at PDF pp. 1-3.

Mr Reese was eventually arrested and incarcerated based on this investigation. While incarcerated, he purportedly handwrote a letter to a third party, seeking to influence the testimony of the victim and a potential witness. ECF 99-3. After discovering the letter, detectives launched an investigation to determine whether Mr. Reese wrote this letter-the investigation included obtaining a search warrant for other handwritten documents that Mr. Reese wrote, for comparison (ECF 99-4), as well as seeking previously handwritten documents through separate avenues (e.g., ECF 99-6; ECF 99-8). Several government reports were eventually written, concluding that Mr. Reese likely wrote the letter at issue. See ECF 99-7 (stating that, while “not a conclusive opinion, ” there is a “strong probability” that Mr. Reese wrote the letter); ECF 99-11 (stating that, after obtaining and comparing additional handwritten documents from Mr. Reese, Mr. Reese “did write” the letter).

Mr Reese moves to suppress the evidence derived from these three search warrants-that is, the cellphone warrant, the Facebook warrant, and the handwritten-documents warrant. ECF 94. The government opposes the motion. ECF 99. The parties have fully briefed the motion and the matter is ready for disposition.^[1]

DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS

I. The cellphone warrant was valid.

Mr. Reese first seeks to suppress evidence of the cellphone data that the government acquired after obtaining the warrant to search the cellphone found at the crime scene. Mr. Reese argues there was no probable cause justifying the search warrant, and the warrant did not describe the information to be seized with sufficient particularity. ECF 94, pp. 1-3. Both arguments fall short.^[2]

A. Probable cause existed for the warrant.

To begin with, the Court finds that there was sufficient probable cause for the warrant.

In reviewing whether the magistrate judge correctly found probable cause to issue the warrant, the reviewing court must “simply . ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (cleaned up); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915 (1984) (“Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.” (cleaned up)).

This Court, as the reviewing court, thus has a “limited” role-the Court “is not to conduct a de novo review” of the magistrate judge's determination of probable cause. United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1055 (3d Cir. 1993). Indeed, though “[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, ... the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according ‘great deference' to a magistrate's determination.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 (citations omitted). Therefore, while the reviewing court shouldn't “simply rubber stamp a magistrate's conclusions, ” the deference to the magistrate judge's determination means that “the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases . should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” Jones, 994 F.2d at 1055 (cleaned up); see also id. at 1057 (“[O]ur role is not to make our own assessment as to whether probable cause existed. Rather, we are constrained to determine only whether the affidavit provides a sufficient basis for the decision the magistrate judge actually made.”).

Further, in determining whether the magistrate judge had a “substantial basis” to find probable cause, the Court is mindful that the magistrate judge's determination of probable cause is based on a “practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”^[3] Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; see also United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 296 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The [warrant's] supporting affidavit must be read in its entirety and in a commonsense and nontechnical manner. ... Furthermore, [the] magistrate may give considerable weight to the conclusions of experienced law enforcement officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found and is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense.” (cleaned up)).

Applying a deferential and commonsense review to the warrant application and accompanying affidavit here, ^[4] the Court finds that the magistrate judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to authorize the search warrant. As stated in the affidavit (ECF 99-1, PDF p. 3), the need for the search warrant arose after a person was shot inside his home. The affidavit asserts that two masked men broke into the victim's house, and shot him in his bedroom. After the assailants fled, the victim immediately went outside and lost consciousness; he was transported to the hospital after officers found him on his porch. Three weeks later, while the victim was still recovering away from his home, his family members found an unidentified cellphone in his bedroom-where the attack occurred-that did not belong to the victim. The commonsense conclusion, and the one the victim reached, was that one of the attackers dropped the phone during the attack. Based on his training and experience, the detective applying for the warrant believed that this unidentified cellphone, found at the crime scene, would contain (1) evidence of the crime (especially because there were two assailants who presumably communicated with each other before the attack), and (2) evidence as to the identify of at least one of the attackers.

Based on the totality of the circumstances and reasonable inferences, the officer's experience and training, and a commonsense review of the affidavit, the Court finds that there is a substantial basis for the magistrate judge's determination of probable cause.^[5]

B. The warrant was sufficiently particularized.

Mr. Reese also argues that the cellphone warrant did not identify the information to be seized with reasonable particularity. See U.S. Const., amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue ... [without] particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). Specifically, he asserts that the warrant improperly authorized the collection of “all electronic data” with no time parameters for the search.^[6] ECF 94, p. 3. The Court disagrees.

“Particularity has three components: First, a warrant must identify the specific offense for which the police have established probable cause. Second, a warrant must describe the place to be searched. Third, the warrant must specify the items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes.” United States v. Perez, 712 Fed.Appx. 136, 138-39 (cleaned up). It's the third component at issue here.

While courts “have struggled to adapt Fourth Amendment search doctrines designed for physical spaces to digital contexts ” id. at 139, courts generally recognize that search warrants may authorize broad searches of electronic data on cellphones and computers, without violating the particularity requirement. Indeed, many courts have acknowledged that “because criminals can-and often do-hide, mislabel, or manipulate files to conceal criminal activity, a broad, expansive search of the hard drive may be required.” United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 237 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Bass, 785 F.3d 1043, 1049 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Federal courts, however, have rejected most particularity challenges to warrants authorizing the seizure and search of entire personal or business computers, because criminals can-and often do-hide, mislabel, or manipulate files to conceal criminal activity such that a...