United States v. Reeves

United States of America v. Mario Reeves.

No. 14-cv-1588

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

April 11, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Joan B. Gottschall United States District Judge

After a one-week trial, a jury convicted Mario Reeves and one of his co-defendants of charges stemming from their participation in a heroin distribution operation. See Superseding Indictment, Cr. ECF No. 336; Verdict Form, Cr. ECF No 593.^[1] In 2011, this court sentenced Reeves to serve a 25-year prison term. J. 3., Cr. ECF No. 760. The 20-year mandatory minimum that applied to Reeves had two components. First, the quantity of heroin for which the jury held Reeves accountable (1 kilogram or more) triggered a 10-year mandatory minimum under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).^[2] See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(i), 846. Second Reeves's mandatory minimum doubled to 20 years because the government alleged by information (Cr. ECF No. 397), and the court found at sentencing, that his 2004 convictions in Illinois state court for possession and delivery of cocaine qualified as “felony drug offenses” under the CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(E)(ii). Reeves's amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to correct his sentence is before the court. Reeves argues that his 2004 Illinois convictions no longer qualify as felony drug offenses after Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016). Reeves seeks resentencing based on a 10-year mandatory minimum. The government responds that Reeves's Mathis claim is untimely, and Reeves invokes the doctrine of equitable tolling in reply. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), (3).

I. Background

Thirteen defendants were indicted in this case in connection with a heroin distribution operation known as the “Poison Line.” See Superseding Indictment 1-2, Cr. ECF No. 336; Indictment 1, Cr. ECF No. 306; United States v. Reeves, 695 F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2012). All defendants except Reeves and Marshawn Wright entered guilty pleas. The jury convicted Reeves on all counts in which he was named. Verdict Form, Cr. ECF No. 593.

Count 1 charged all defendants with conspiring to possess one kilogram or more of heroin with intent to distribute on specific dates in 2006-07. Superseding Indictment 1-6, Cr. ECF No. 336. Counts 3 and 5 alleged that Reeves and others possessed heroin (no quantity stated) with intent to distribute on specific dates in 2007. Id. at 8, 10. The remaining counts in which Reeves was named, not at issue here, alleged violations of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) on various dates. See id. at 14-15, 17-19. These offenses are commonly referred to as “phone counts” because they involve the use of a communication facility, often a phone, to further a federal drug offense. See, e.g., United States v. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 905 (7th Cir. 2015); 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). The phone counts carried a maximum sentence of eight years. See § 843(d)(1).

“Section 851 requires the government to give notice of a request for a sentencing enhancement for certain predicate criminal offenses.” Reeves, 695 F.3d at 638. The government filed a pretrial § 851 information indicating that it intended to rely on two offenses to which Reeves pleaded guilty in Cook County Circuit Court on September 14, 2004: (i) possession of a controlled substance in violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 570/402(c) (2002); and (ii) manufacturing/delivering cocaine in violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 570/401(d) (2004). Information 1, Cr. ECF No. 397. Both offenses served as predicates for Reeves's § 851 enhancement. See Sent. Tr. 120-27, Cr. ECF No. 780 (hearing held May 2, 2011); Corrected Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) 18, Cr. ECF No. 772.

A. Sentencing and Appeal

This court adopted the findings of Reeves's Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) as modified at the sentencing hearing. See J. & Stmt. of Reasons 10, Cr. ECF No. 760; Corrected PSR. Reeves's range of imprisonment under the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines was 30 years to life based on a total offense level of 43 and a criminal history category of IV. J. & Stmt. of Reasons 10. Thus, Reeves's 25-year sentence exceeded the statute's 20-year mandatory minimum but represented a downward departure from the advisory guidelines range. See J. & Stmt. of Reasons 14-15 (setting forth the court's reasons for the downward departure); Sent. Tr. 277, Cr. ECF No. 781 (hearing held May 20, 2011).

On appeal, Reeves advanced an argument rejected by this court at sentencing (see Suppl. Resp. to § 851 Information at 3-4, Cr. ECF No. 681). He “claimed that the attorney representing him during his 2004 guilty plea in state court did not inform him that a guilty plea could be used against him later to trigger a statutory sentencing enhancement in federal court.” Reeves, 695 F.3d at 639; see Sent. Tr. 125-27. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Reeves, 695 F.3d at 639-41, cert. denied 568 U.S. 1239 (2013). The Seventh Circuit ruled that Reeves's appeal was controlled by Lewis v. United States, 902 F.2d 576, 577 (7th Cir. 1990), and held that “it was not unreasonable . . . for Reeves' attorney in the 2004 proceedings to fail to advise his client that a guilty plea could result in a later sentencing enhancement for a future crime.” 695 F.3d at 640-41.

B. Section 2255 Motion

Reeves filed his original § 2255 motion and supporting memorandum without a lawyer in 2014. Civ. ECF Nos. 1 and 3. He asserted Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on the performance of his lawyers at the plea bargaining, trial, and appellate stages. See Civ. ECF No. 1 at 4-5; Mem. Supp. Orig. § 2255 Mot. at 5-25, Civ. ECF No. 3. As discussed below, Reeves avers that he hired a lawyer to investigate and supplement his § 2255 motion in 2015, but the lawyer abandoned him.

On April 19, 2019, attorney Thomas Hallock filed a notice of appearance for Reeves. Civ. ECF No. 10. Nothing else was filed until this court ordered the parties to brief certain issues on January 15, 2020. See Briefing Order, Civ. ECF No. 12. This court found that, construed liberally, Reeves's pro se § 2255 motion and memorandum raised a freestanding due process claim under Napue v. United States, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). The court provided the parties with an opportunity to brief the Napue claim, as well as the proper prejudice standard for Reeves's ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on Napue. See Id. at 2-3. The government was also requested to explain the evidentiary basis for two statements made in its original response brief. See Id. at 3-4.

Through Hallock, Reeves responded to the briefing order by filing, on January 17, 2020, an unopposed motion entitled “Motion for Leave to Supplement and Amend” his § 2255 motion. Civ. ECF No. 13 at 1. Reeves sought 90 days in which “to supplement or amend” his § 2255 motion. Id. at 2. Hallock did not specify what amendments he intended to make, though he represented that he expected “any supplemental filings to principally align with the Court's [briefing] Order entered on January 15, 2020.” See Id. The court granted the motion and set a deadline of April 17, 2020, to file “any amended or supplemental petition.” Minute entry, Civ. ECF No. 16 (Jan. 17, 2020).

The COVID-19 pandemic caused widespread disruption in the ensuing months. Three general orders regarding the pandemic were entered on the docket of this case. See First, Second, & Third Am. N.D.Ill. Gen. Order Nos. 20-0012, Civ. ECF Nos. 17, 18, and 20. These orders, which were entered in all civil cases in this district, extended “all deadlines, whether set by the court, the Rules of Civil Procedure, or the Local Rules” by a combined total of 77 days.^[3]See First Am. Gen. Order No. 20-0012 ¶ 1; Second & Third Am. Gen Order Nos. 20-0012 ¶ 2. Without opposition from the government, Reeves obtained two additional extensions of 28 days each beyond the COVID-19-ordered extensions based on representations that, due to prison lockdowns imposed in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, “counsel's communication with his client ha[d] been delayed and impeded, as ha[d] counsel's ability to obtain potentially material documents.” See, e.g., Civ. ECF Nos. 22 ¶ 5 and 25. Again without opposition, Hallock obtained a final 14-day extension to allow his client to review his draft amended § 2255 motion. Civ. ECF No. 29 at 1. In none of these motions did Hallock indicate the nature of the amended claim(s) he intended to raise. See Civ. ECF Nos. 22, 26, and 29.

Reeves filed his “Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255” on August 31, 2020. Civ. ECF No. 31. The amended motion consisted of a memorandum of law and 16 pages of legal argument limited to a single claim-that Reeves is entitled to resentencing under Mathis. See id. at 1-16. The amended motion did not discuss the grounds asserted in Reeves's pro se § 2255 motion or the court's briefing order. See id.

In its response to Reeves's amended § 2255 motion, the government began by addressing the matters raised in the briefing order and elaborating upon its argument for dismissing the grounds set forth in Reeves's original § 2255 motion. See Civ. ECF No. 36 at 4-19. The government also contended that Reeves's claim based on Mathis is untimely, as it was not filed within one year of that June 23, 2016, decision, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) and (3), and that Reeves's amended § 2255 motion does not relate back to the filing date of his original motion under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Id. at 19-25. In reply, Reeves focused exclusively on his Mathis claim. See Civ. ECF No. 37. Based on an affidavit and an exhibit attached to his reply, Reeves argued that the one-year...