United States v. Reynoso

38 F.4th 1083

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

v.Manuel D. REYNOSO, Appellant

No. 19-3045

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued December 2, 2020

Decided July 1, 2022

Nathan S. Mammen, appointed by the court, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Stephen C. DeSalvo, appointed by the court. William H. Burgess, appointed by the court, entered an appearance.

David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Elizabeth Trosman and John P. Mannarino, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Srinivasan, Chief Judge, Rao, Circuit Judge, and Sentelle, Senior Circuit Judge.

Srinivasan, Chief Judge:

A jury convicted Manuel Reynoso on a gun-possession charge and two drug charges. On appeal, Reynoso challenges his convictions on several grounds.

His most substantial claim concerns the gun-possession charge. Federal law bars certain categories of people, including those previously convicted of a felony (i.e., a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment), from possessing a firearm.

Under the prevailing interpretation of the felon-in-possession statute at the time of Reynoso's trial, the government had to prove that he knowingly possessed a gun and that he had a prior conviction carrying the requisite maximum sentence, but not that he knew his prior conviction allowed for that sentence. The jury in Reynoso's case thus had no reason to consider whether he was aware that his prior convictions were punishable by more than a year in prison.

On the same day the district court sentenced Reynoso, however, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594 (2019). Rehaif established that the felon-in-possession statute requires the government to show not only that the defendant knew he possessed a gun but also that he knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year of imprisonment. Reynoso now contends that his felon-in-possession conviction must be overturned due to the government's failure to make the additional showing Rehaif requires. Because Reynoso did not raise that argument in the district court, we review his claim for only plain error.

After we heard oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court granted review in another case to consider when a person may be entitled to plain-error relief on appeal in a case involving a Rehaif error. See Greer v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 210 L.Ed.2d 121 (2021). Because the Supreme Court's decision in Greer would dictate the proper handling of appeals like this one, we held this case in abeyance pending the Court's decision. After the Court decided Greer , we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing Greer ’s implications for our disposition of this case.

Greer held that Rehaif errors at trial normally will not qualify as plain errors of a kind warranting relief in appeals from felon-in-possession convictions. The Court reasoned that "[i]f a person is a felon, he ordinarily knows he is a felon," such that requiring proof that he knew of his felon status usually would not have affected the outcome of his trial. Id. at 2097. In accordance with Greer , we conclude that the district court's Rehaif error in this case did not amount to plain error. We also reject Reynoso's other challenges to his convictions, and we thus affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Before discussing Reynoso's possession of contraband, we begin with his possession of a BMW. Although Reynoso's girlfriend owned the car, he was its primary driver and thought of it as his own. In early May 2018, Reynoso drove the BMW from the District of Columbia to West Virginia, where a rapper he represented as a music promoter was filming a video. Valle Rodriguez, an associate of another artist in the video, drove Reynoso's car between the sites where they filmed the video. When they finished shooting the final scene, Reynoso retrieved the keys and drove his car back to D.C.

In a later interview with law-enforcement agents, Rodriguez would explain that, while he was in the BMW, he placed a Glock .40-caliber semi-automatic pistol under the driver's seat and an extended magazine under the front passenger's seat. According to Rodriguez, he left the gun in the car without telling Reynoso.

Approximately one week later, a little after 1:00 a.m. on May 16, 2018, a Secret Service officer pulled over the BMW on Seventeenth Street NW near Constitution Avenue in the District of Columbia. Reynoso had been driving with his headlights off. When the officer approached the car, he smelled marijuana. He saw Reynoso in the driver's seat, with one passenger in the front and one in the back. The officer asked about the smell. Reynoso denied that anyone in the car had been smoking but immediately showed the officer a rolled dollar bill containing a marijuana bud. He indicated that was the only marijuana in the car.

Additional Secret Service officers arrived and began removing the two passengers. Reynoso stepped out of the car without being asked. Then he fled, sprinting toward the National Mall. Eventually, officers apprehended Reynoso near the Tidal Basin. He was carrying $2,890 in cash, two cellphones, a set of keys, and a small amount of methamphetamine.

Back at the car, a technician from the Secret Service's crime scene unit arrived to perform a search of the vehicle. When she looked at the floor mat under the driver's seat, she noticed it "was not fully flat." Feb. 12, 2019 Trial Tr. 210:5–6, J.A. 613. She lifted the mat, revealing a black Glock semi-automatic pistol with an extended magazine containing twenty rounds of .40-caliber ammunition.

The government charged Reynoso with possession of a firearm by a person who had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and with simple possession of methamphetamine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). In support of the felon-in-possession charge, the government presented evidence of two prior convictions.

First, in 2011, Reynoso pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, to distribution or possession with intent to distribute ecstasy and marijuana. The maximum punishment for each count was imprisonment for ten years or more. Reynoso was sentenced to two five-year terms, to run consecutively, but with all but ten months suspended.

Second, in February 2018, just three months before the events giving rise to the present prosecution, Reynoso pleaded guilty in Maryland to possession with intent to distribute marijuana and possession of a firearm "with a conviction of an enumerated or a disqualifying crime." Gov. Ex. 48, J.A. 100–01. The facts of that case mirror those of this one. A police officer found Reynoso in the driver's seat of a parked BMW and smelled the strong odor of marijuana. A search of the car recovered 133 grams of marijuana and a loaded Glock semi-automatic pistol.

At trial in this case, Reynoso testified that he had "no idea" there was "any sort of firearm or ammunition" beneath the BMW's floor mat. Feb. 13, 2019 Trial Tr. 58:23–24, J.A. 741. He explained that Rodriguez had hidden the gun under the seat without his knowledge. Pursuant to a stipulation, the jury was informed that Rodriguez told law enforcement he had placed his gun under the driver's seat of Reynoso's BMW and an extended magazine under the passenger seat. And, pursuant to another stipulation, Reynoso acknowledged he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of incarceration.

At the conclusion of the five-day trial, the jury found Reynoso guilty on each count. The district court sentenced him to seven years and three months of imprisonment on the gun-possession charge and one year on each of the drug-possession charges (with all three sentences to run concurrently).

Reynoso timely appealed. Among other claims, he argues that his gun-possession conviction should be reversed under Rehaif because the district court failed to instruct the jury that knowledge of felon status is an element of the crime. After we heard argument, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Greer to decide when a district court's error under Rehaif would constitute plain error requiring reversal.

We held the proceedings in this case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision, and then received supplemental briefing addressing the implications of Greer for this appeal.

II.

A.

Reynoso's first challenge relates solely to his felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g). He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's conclusion that he possessed the gun found under the floor mat of the BMW.

Our review is highly deferential to the jury's decision. "When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " United States v. Boyd , 803 F.3d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ). We draw no distinctions between direct and circumstantial evidence, and we give "full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact." United States v. Clark , 184 F.3d 858, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

"Criminal possession of a firearm may be either actual or constructive." United States v. Alexander , 331 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Actual possession requires "direct physical control." Henderson v. United States , 575 U.S. 622, 626, 135 S.Ct. 1780, 191 L.Ed.2d 874 (2015). Because the gun in this case was found under the driver's floor mat, this case presents a question of constructive possession. And for constructive possession, the...