United States v. Richardson

96 F.4th 659

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Nathaniel A. RICHARDSON, Jr., a/k/a Nathaniel Skeeter, a/k/a Skeet, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 22-6748

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Argued: December 6, 2023

Decided: March 20, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, Senior District Judge. (2:96-cr-00153-RAJ-1)

ARGUED: Frances H. Pratt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Joseph Attias, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, United States Attorney, Keith Loren Kimball, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, Daniel J. Honold, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Senior Judge Floyd wrote the opinion in which Judge Gregory and Judge Harris joined.

FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge:

It is "longstanding tradition" in American law that a sentencing judge sentences the "whole person" in front of her "as an individual." Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 486, 142 S.Ct. 2389, 213 L.Ed.2d 731, (2022) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996)). In line with this history, federal judges exercise "wide discretion . . . to craft appropriate sentences." Id. (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949)). This case involves the discretion of district courts to resentence defendants under the First Step Act of 2018.

Nathaniel Richardson appeals the district court's order denying in part and granting in part his motion for reduced sentence pursuant to the First Step Act. Richardson was sentenced in 1996 to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment on a continuing criminal conspiracy count and a federal crack cocaine offense. We vacate the district court's ruling and remand for further proceedings.

I.

A.

Richardson, along with six other co-defendants, was charged in a multicount indictment in 1996. Following an eight-day jury trial, Richardson was convicted of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Count 2); distribution and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 3); and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) (Counts 15 and 16). He was acquitted of using a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking conspiracy (Count 10).

To assist the district judge in sentencing Richardson, the probation officer prepared a presentence report ("PSR") and concluded that he was responsible for distributing at least 26.13 kilograms of cocaine base and at least 46.5 grams of heroin. JA 340. Based on that drug weight, he had a base offense level of 38 for Counts 1 and 3. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.¹ JA 367. Probation also attributed him two points for possessing a dangerous weapon in furtherance of the drug trafficking offense, a four-point enhancement for his leadership role in the conspiracy, and two two-point enhancements for obstructing justice. Richardson's adjusted offense level was 48. JA 367. For Count 2, his CCE count yielded the same offense level, due to the way U.S.S.G. § 2D1.5, the Guideline for CCE offenses, interacts with § 2D1.1.² The three drug-related counts and two money laundering counts grouped together for a total offense level of 48. JA 370.

Probation assigned 11 points for criminal history which placed him in Category V, resulting in a mandatory sentencing "range" of life imprisonment. JA 374. At the sentencing in January 1997, the district court addressed Richardson's objections. The district court sustained his objection to one of the two-point obstruction enhancements and acknowledged it had double counted a certain amount of crack cocaine. JA 367. Therefore, the adjusted offense level for Counts 1-3 decreased from 48 to 46 and the crack cocaine weight decreased from 26.13 to 26.01. JA 367. Further, the court dismissed Count 1 as a lesser-included offense of Count 2, the CCE conviction. JA 366. The court sentenced Richardson to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on Counts 2 and 3. JA 161. The court sentenced Richardson to 20 years' imprisonment (the statutory maximum) on the two money laundering counts, to run concurrently with the life terms from Counts 2 and 3. JA 161, 166.

B.

In January 2019, Richardson, initially proceeding pro se and then supplemented by a memorandum by appointed counsel, moved for a sentence reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.³ Counsel for Richardson argued he was convicted of a covered offense and the district court should therefore apply an advisory sentencing range of 360 months to life imprisonment. JA 182-83. Counsel stressed that Richardson had been in federal prison for nearly half of his life (he was 24 when he was convicted and now over 50 years old). Counsel also stressed his minor disciplinary record, classes, and programming while in prison. The government opposed Richardson's motion to reduce his sentence on the basis that Count 3, distribution of crack cocaine, was not a covered offense.⁴ The government also argued the court should deny relief in the exercise of its discretion based on Richardson's extensive prior criminal history, weak education and work records, and leadership role in the conspiracy. JA 201.

In July 2019, the district court denied the motion to reduce Richardson's sentence. JA 230. While the court agreed that Richardson qualified for relief under the First Step Act because his conviction for distributing crack cocaine in Count 3 was a covered offense, the court exercised its discretion to deny relief. JA 235. The court found that Richardson was the organizer of a conspiracy, and his offense involved "not just drugs, but a long series of violent acts, including assaulting people, shooting people, threatening them, and offering money to kill a witness." JA 235. The court noted that Richardson's pro se filings indicated he did not have a significant criminal history, which the court found untrue and "troubling." JA 235.⁵

Richardson, through counsel, moved for reconsideration. He claimed the conspiracy did not involve many violent acts. JA 244. Richardson admitted to his extensive criminal history but argued, as the district court acknowledged during his original sentencing, the sentence was driven by the amount of crack cocaine and resulting guideline range. JA 241. Further, he took issue with the court's reference to "offering money to kill a witness" because the court sustained an obstruction objection on that basis during sentencing. Richardson's counsel fell "on his sword" by acknowledging his original motion failed to "sufficiently highlight and address" Richardson's post-offense rehabilitation. JA 245 n.2. The court denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed the "ultimate holding" of the order that Richardson was eligible for a sentence reduction, but it would not exercise its discretion to grant a reduction. JA 290.

Richardson appealed the district court's denial of his motion for reconsideration of his § 404 motion. JA 293. This Court on appeal vacated the district court's ruling and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings in light of United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2021), decided while Richardson's appeal was pending. United States v. Richardson, 852 F. App'x 106 (4th Cir. 2021) (mem.) ("Richardson I"). Collington, which was overruled in part by Concepcion, held that a "district court's overall sentencing authority is constrained by the retroactively applicable statutory maximums." 995 F.3d at 357. On remand, the district court did not request additional briefing based on Collington, but issued an order on June 13, 2022, granting in part and denying in part Richardson's initial § 404 motion. JA 302-22. That June 13, 2022, order on remand is the subject of this appeal.

In its order, the district court found Richardson was not eligible for a reduction of the life term on Count 2, the CCE conviction, in light of United States v. Thomas, 32 F.4th 420, 430 (4th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (holding CCE is not a covered offense). JA 313-14. As to Count 3, the distribution of crack cocaine offense, the court concluded that Richardson was eligible for a reduction. The court determined his advisory guideline range was life imprisonment, restricted under the terms of this Court's remand to 480 months' incarceration on Count 3 because 480 months was the new statutory maximum. JA 318. The district court evaluated the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and found the nature and circumstances were serious and Richardson's criminal history extensive. Importantly, however, the district court, weighing the factors differently from the initial motion, noted that Richardson was 50 years old, had only two disciplinary infractions at the start of his prison term, and had not incurred any other violations for 25 years. JA 320. The court also noted that Richardson obtained his GED, took advantage of numerous educational and vocational programs, wrote an article titled "Activity Wars and Addictions," and served as a member of the prison's Inmate Reentry Council. JA 320. The district court thus reduced Richardson's prison term on Count 3 to 360 months—below the new statutory maximum. JA 322. Because it had determined Count 2, the CCE count, was not a covered offense, the court left the life term on...