United States v. Riggins

456 F.Supp.3d 138

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Dawud RIGGINS, Defendant.

Criminal No. 20-10 (CKK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed April 27, 2020

Sara Guccini Vanore, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge Pending before the Court is Defendant Dawud Riggins's Emergency Motion for Release Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, ECF No. 12 ("Def.’s Mot."). In light of statutory factors and the COVID-19 pandemic, including Mr. Riggins's asthma, he asks the Court to release him to home confinement under the High Intensity Supervision Program ("HISP"). The Government opposes his request. See Gov't's Opp'n to Def.’s Emergency Mot. for Release Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic ("Gov't Opp'n"), ECF No. 14. Upon consideration of the briefing, Mr. Riggins's medical records, and the entire record, and taking into consideration all the factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the Court will DENY Mr. Riggins's Motion.¹ This determination is without prejudice to reconsideration as events and circumstances change.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Indictment charges Mr. Riggins with one count of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Person Convicted of a Crime Punishable by Imprisonment for a Term Exceeding One Year in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).² On January 1, 2020 at approximately 12:20 AM, four officers in the Metropolitan Police Department's Gun Recovery Unit were on patrol and, after hearing gunshots in the area, pulled onto the 1500 block of V Street, S.E. They saw an individual, who was later identified as Mr. Riggins, standing in front of an apartment complex at 1522 V Street, S.E.

The officers exited the vehicle and saw Mr. Riggins grab his waistband. Mr. Riggins then turned to enter the building. As he was attempting to close the doors, one of the officers yelled "Stop!" Another officer pushed through the doors before Mr. Riggins could close them and saw Mr. Riggins running up the stairs. That officer stopped Mr. Riggins at the top of the stairs. Mr. Riggins positioned himself to lay face-down on the ground. He reached into his waistband with his right arm and pulled out a pistol. He did not drop the firearm when commanded by the officer to do so.

The officer recovered the gun from Mr. Riggins, who was then placed in handcuffs. The firearm was ultimately identified as a Springfield XD40 .40 caliber firearm; it was loaded with ten rounds of ammunition in an eleven-round capacity magazine. The officers believed Mr. Riggins to be under the influence of phencyclidine, or PCP, at the time of his arrest. A later report from the Pretrial Services Agency indicated that Mr. Riggins did test positive for PCP at the time of his arrest.

The grand jury returned the Indictment on January 8, 2020. Indictment, ECF No. 1. Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson denied Mr. Riggins's motion for release and granted the Government's motion to detain Mr. Riggins pending trial on January 14, 2020. Jan. 14, 2020 Min. Order. Mr. Riggins filed the instant motion on April 13, 2020. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 12.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. The Bail Reform Act

Pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, if a judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial." 18 U.S.C.§§ 3142(e)(1), (f)(2)(g). Even if defendant does not pose a flight risk, danger to the community alone is a sufficient reason to order pretrial detention. United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 754–55, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ; United States v. Simpkins , 826 F.2d 94, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

The Bail Reform Act requires courts to release defendants who are pending trial on personal recognizance or on an unsecured appearance bond "unless the judicial officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person in the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). When personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond is insufficient, courts may consider imposing an alternative condition, or combination of conditions, that will assure the defendant's appearance in court and the safety of the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (when imposing an alternative condition or combination of conditions, the court must select the "least restrictive" condition(s)). Defendants who are charged with certain specified offenses are subject to a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions can assure the defendant's appearance or ensure the safety of the community, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). The rebuttable presumption does not apply in the instant case, where Mr. Riggins was detained based upon the Government's motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1). See Jan. 10, 2020 Minute Order; Jan. 14, 2020 Minute Order.

"Regardless of whether the presumption applies, the government's ultimate burden is to prove that no conditions of release can assure that the defendant will appear and to assure the safety of the community." United States v. Stone , 608 F.3d 939, 946 (6th Cir. 2010) ; see United States v. Nickelson , 2018 WL 4964506, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2018) (citing United States v. Hir , 517 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Abad , 350 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 2003) ). To determine whether the government has carried its burden, the Court must consider the same statutory factors weighed by the magistrate judge in this case, including (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the defendant's history and characteristics; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or to the community, and the risk of flight, which would be posed by defendant's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

Finally, although the D.C. Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, courts in this district and in many circuits have indicated that the district judge reviews de novo a detention decision rendered by a magistrate judge. See, e.g. , United States v. Hassanshahi , 989 F. Supp. 2d 110, 113 (D.D.C. 2013) ; United States v. Koenig , 912 F.2d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases); United States v. Stewart , 19 F. App'x 46, 48 (4th Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Gonzales , 149 F.3d 1192 at *1 (10th Cir. 1998) ; United States v. Hazime , 762 F.2d 34, 36 (6th Cir. 1985). The Court will follow that procedure in this case.

B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and Eighth Amendment

In Brogsdale v. Barry , 926 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment bears upon the conditions of pretrial confinement. In that case, the D.C. Circuit overturned the district court's decision granting summary judgment to prisoners who sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the grounds that a riot and fire at the jail were the foreseeable consequences of unconstitutional overcrowding. While the D.C. Circuit noted there were recent renovations at the jail and expressed doubts about the strength of plaintiffs’ claims, it ultimately declined to reach the constitutional violation question, finding instead that the municipal officials who had been sued were protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity even if the conditions could be found to violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Id. at 1191–92. In its opinion, however, the D.C. Circuit recognized that the Fifth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees when it noted that "prison overcrowding may violate the Constitution where it is so egregious that it endangers the safety of inmates." Id. at 1188 (citing Morgan v. District of Columbia , 824 F.2d 1049, 1056–58 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ). The D.C. Circuit indicated further that the threshold for establishing a constitutional violation is "clearly lower" for pretrial detainees than for convicted prisoners. For the group not yet convicted, "the question is whether prison conditions ‘amount to punishment of the detainee.’ A condition may amount to punishment if it ‘is not reasonably related to a legitimate [institutional] goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless.’ " Id. at 1188 n.4 (citation omitted) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ).

A court in another district recently briefly addressed whether the due process clause bears upon conditions of confinement before ultimately holding that "as concerning as the COVID-19 pandemic is, resolving an appeal of an order of detention must in the first instance be an individualized assessment of the factors identified by the Bail Reform Act." United States v. Martin , 447 F.Supp.3d 399, 401–03 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2020). The Martin court observed that the due process clause of the Constitution "may well be implicated" by the conditions of confinement, for instance, "if defendants awaiting trial can demonstrate that they are being subjected to conditions of confinement that would subject them to exposure to serious (potentially fatal, if the detainee is elderly and with underlying medical complications) illness." Martin , 447 F.Supp.3d at 401–02 (citing Bell , 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ); see generally Youngberg v. Romeo , 457 U.S. 307, 322, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (explaining that because pre-trial detainees are presumed innocent, they are "entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish"). The Martin court distinguished further between application of the Due Process Clause for pretrial detainees and the Eighth Amendment for convicted...