United States v. Rinaldi

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. MICHAEL RINALDI, Defendant.

3:18-CR-279

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

July 27, 2020

(JUDGE MARIANI)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Presently before the Court is Defendant Michael Rinaldi's "Motion to Suppress" (Doc. 243).

On August 21, 2018, a federal Grand Jury charged Defendants Michael Rinaldi, Dwayne Romail Brown, and Andrew Henry with one count of Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. (See Doc. 37). That same day, the federal grand jury also returned an indictment charging Defendants Michael Rinaldi, Steven Powell, Jessica Caldwell, and George Kokenyei with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. (See 3:18-cr-280, Doc. 1).

On January 16, 2019, at the request of Defendant Rinaldi, the Court held a hearing in accordance with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) and United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2002), wherein it conducted a colloquy with Defendant Rinaldi, in the presence of his CJA appointed counsel Joseph Blazosek, to determine whether Defendant Rinaldi understood the responsibilities and consequences of self-representation, was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving his right to counsel, and would be permitted to represent herself. Following this colloquy, the Court determined that Mr. Rinaldi had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right to counsel and understood the ramifications and consequences of proceeding pro se and therefore granted Mr. Rinaldi's request to represent himself in criminal actions 3:18-cr-279 and 3:18-cr-280. The Court thereafter appointed Attorney Blazosek as stand-by counsel at the request of Defendant.

On January 21, 2020, the Government filed a First Superseding Indictment in the above-captioned action, charging Michael Rinaldi with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances, specifically cocaine, cocaine base, heroin, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count I) and with Distribution and Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (Count II). (See Doc. 220).

On January 31, 2020, this Court issued two Orders scheduling trial in the above-captioned action. A jury trial on Count I of the Superseding Indictment was scheduled to commence on February 11, 2020 (Doc. 240), and a jury trial on Count II of the Superseding Indictment was scheduled to commence on March 2, 2020 (Doc. 241).

However, on February 3, 2020, Defendant Rinaldi filed a "Motion to Suppress", moving to suppress "any and all evidence obtained as a result of the search" of a Black Lexus (Doc. 243) and a "Motion to Dismiss" requesting that the Court dismiss the indictment against him on a number of bases and that the Court also construe this motion as a Motion for a Bill of Particulars (Doc. 245). As a result of Defendant's filing of these motions one week prior to the commencement of trial on Count I, the Court found that "upon consideration of [the motions], the issues raised therein, and the time necessary to brief the motions and fully evaluate the parties' arguments", trial on both Counts must be cancelled and would be re-scheduled following the disposition of Defendant's motions. (Doc. 248). The Court excluded the time between February 3, 2020 and the date on which Defendant's pre-trial motions were decided from Speedy Trial calculations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).

On February 13, 2020, Defendant filed a second "Motion to Dismiss" (Doc. 259), asserting that "the indictment should be dismissed with prejudice for a violation of his speedy trial rights." The Court denied this motion on June 18, 2020 (Docs. 298, 299). That same day, the Court re-scheduled the jury trial on Counts I and II of the First Superseding Indictment to begin on August 3, 2020. (Doc. 300).

The Court addresses in this Memorandum Opinion Defendant's Motion to Suppress (Doc. 243) and, for the following reasons, will deny this motion.

II. ANALYSIS

Rinaldi's "Motion to Suppress" (Doc. 243) moves to "suppress any and all evidence obtained as a result of the search of one Black Lexus bearing PA Registration Number KCR5918" and, more specifically "moves to suppress what is alleged to be 1 kilogram of cocaine." (Doc. 243, at 1). As a basis for this motion, Rinaldi asserts that the search warrant "issued in relation to this vehicle was supported by evidence derived from an untimely sealed wiretap recording." (Doc. 243, at 1). Defendant argues that, in the absence of these wiretaps and the information therein, probable cause would no longer exist for the warrant to search of the vehicle. (Doc. 243, at 2).¹

Although titled as a motion to suppress, Rinaldi's motion is, in reality, an untimely motion for reconsideration.

Here, on December 18, 2019, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant Rinaldi's motion to suppress wiretap evidence. (See Docs. 209, 210). The Court granted Defendant's motion to suppress wiretaps of himself and co-defendant Steven Powell due to the Government's failure to timely seal those wiretaps, but the Court explained that (1) "[e]vidence connected through a chain of causation to one or both wiretaps tainted by improper sealing will not be suppressed on the basis of the Court's finding that the wiretaps at issue were untimely sealed"; and (2) "[t]he suppressed wiretaps may be admissible at trial for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant should he choose to testify. . . ." (Doc. 210, at ¶¶ 2-3) (emphasis in original). The Court thus held that only the wiretaps themselves, as well as "evidence such as the 'transcripts, duplicate tapes, work copies and testimonial summaries' of the intercepted conversations will be suppressed due to the Government's untimely sealing of the wiretaps." (Doc. 209, at 4647; Doc. 210, at ¶ 1).

In response to this Court's memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion to suppress the wiretaps, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, challenging this Court's determination that the suppressed wiretaps may be permissible for the limited purpose of impeaching Defendant should he choose to testify. (See Doc. 218). Defendant did not seek reconsideration of any other portion of the Court's opinion. Nonetheless, almost three months after the Court's issuance of its opinion addressing suppression of the wiretaps, Defendant now moves to have this Court suppress the contents of a vehicle on the basis of this Court's holding that certain wiretaps were untimely sealed, an issue which was specifically decided by the Court's holding that "[e]vidence connected through a chain of causation to one or both wiretaps tainted by improper sealing will not be suppressed on the basis of the Court's finding that the wiretaps at issue were untimely sealed", and the reasoning underlying this decision. Otherwise stated, the issue of whether evidence obtained as the result of a wiretap which was untimely sealed, but valid at the time of its issuance and execution, should be suppressed was specifically addressed in the Court's prior memorandum opinion.

"The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Specifically, a motion for reconsideration is generally permitted only if (1) there is an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) new evidence becomes available that was not previously available at the time the Court issued its decision; or (3) to correct clear errors of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Moreover, "motions for reconsideration should not be used to put forward arguments which the movant . . . could have made but neglected to make before judgment." United States v. Jasin, 292 F.Supp.2d 670, 677 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Reich v. Compton, 834 F.Supp.2d 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1993) rev'd in part and aff'd in part on other grounds, 57 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1995)). Nor should they "be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant." Donegan v. Livingston, 877 F.Supp.2d 212, 226 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F.Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002)).

Here, Defendant's "motion to suppress", i.e. motion for reconsideration, is grossly untimely and therefore may be denied solely on that basis. In addition, Defendant has entirely failed to demonstrate (1) an intervening change in the controlling law between December 18, 2019, when this Court issued its opinion and order ruling that "[e]vidence connected through a chain of causation to one or both wiretaps tainted by improper sealing will not be suppressed on the basis of the Court's finding that the wiretaps at issue were untimely sealed", and February 3, 2020, when Defendant filed his motion requesting the Court suppress evidence on the basis of the untimely sealing of the wiretaps; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not previously available at the time the Court issued its decision; or (3) the need to correct clear errors of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Rinaldi's failure to carry his burden as to any of these factors also leads this Court to a determination that Defendant's motion must be denied.

Further demonstrating that Rinaldi's motion to suppress is, in fact, a motion for reconsideration, Rinaldi relies on this Court's explanations in its prior memorandum opinion in support of his position as to why the evidence...