United States v. Robinson

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JAMES ROBINSON, Defendant.

Criminal Action No. 1:20-cr-00214 (CJN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

July 1, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

James Robinson is charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See generally Indictment, ECF No. 5. He moves to suppress evidence of his arrest, officers' subsequent identifications of him, and the firearm and ammunition at issue in this case. See generally Def.'s Omnibus Mot. to Suppress ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 24. Because Robinson has not established a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights or that the officers' identifications were impermissibly suggestive, his Motion is denied.

I. Background

On September 29, 2020, Officer Kelly of the Metropolitan Police Department's Narcotics and Special Investigations Division Gun Recovery Unit ("GRU") observed an Instagram Live video broadcasted by user "bigcuddy_bigbob_cp13." Compl. SOMF at 1 ("SOMF"), ECF No. 1-1; Tr. 18:13-14, ECF No. 38. The individual depicted in the video was "a black male wearing a white crew neck sweatshirt, dreadlock style hair, designer sunglasses, a necklace, and blue jeans with a red stripe," with a black magazine floorplate tucked into the front of his jeans. SOMF at 1. Officer Kelly recognized the individual as James Robinson, who was known to frequent the Congress Heights neighborhood. Id. Officer Kelly notified other GRU officers and gave a "lookout" for an individual in "long dreads, . . . a white sweatshirt, [and] Cartier glasses." Tr. 21:11-12.

The GRU officers responded to Congress Heights in two unmarked cars, Tr. 18:21-19:4, but did not see Robinson and eventually left, id. 21:15-19. A short time later, Officer Kelly saw a second Instagram Live video again depicting Robinson in the Congress Heights area. SOMF at 1. The officers returned to the neighborhood and saw Robinson sitting in front of the apartment building located at 3409 13th Place Southeast. Id. Three officers (Kelly, Jacobs, and Davies) exited the first GRU car and approached Robinson, who fled into the apartment building while holding his waistband. Id. 22:13-23:12. Those officers ran in after him and heard Robinson run to the top floor. Tr. 30:2-7. Officer Davies—the first officer into the building—heard a door slam followed by a loud metal noise, id., and upon climbing the stairs, noticed the door handle to Apartment 302 lying on the floor, id. The officers knocked on the door to that apartment and announced themselves. Gov't Ex. 11.

At approximately the same time, two other officers (Hiller and Joseph) went around the other side of the apartment building to watch the back exit. Tr. 23:14-21. Officer Hiller observed Robinson open a window on the top floor, lean out the window, and throw a gun from it. Id. 24:23-24. As captured by body-worn camera footage introduced by the government, Officer Hiller told the other officers "he just threw it out the back, I see it, 1-800¹" and that he could identify the man as "the man that ran in[to the apartment building]." Gov't Exs. 10, 13. Officer Joseph testified that although he did not see Robinson throw the gun, he did observe an airborne object fall from a top floor window and into the bushes behind the building. Tr. 23:23-24:6. As Officer Joseph walked toward the bushes to investigate, he looked at the apartment building andobserved Robinson standing in the window from which the object had fallen. Id. 24:11-16. Officer Joseph testified that, at that time, Robinson closed the window and retreated into the apartment. Id.

The three officers inside the building heard Officer Hiller's observations over the radio and asked him to indicate in which apartment he had observed Robinson. Tr. 39:15-24. After Officer Hiller stated that it was the "top right" apartment, Officer Jacobs broke down the door to Apartment 302. Gov't Exs. 11, 12; Tr. 46:17-47:3. The officers arrested Robinson and temporarily detained two other individuals, including Juan Thurston (the leaseholder). Gov't Ex. 12; Tr. 202:7-9. A few minutes later, Officer Hiller entered the apartment, identified the window in which he had observed Robinson, and identified Robinson (who by that time was already in handcuffs) as the person who had thrown the firearm out the window. Gov't Ex. 9; Tr. 47:13-23. Officer Joseph also entered the apartment and identified Robinson (who was still in handcuffs) as the person he had seen in the window. Gov't Ex. 9; Tr. 44:12-45:1.

A loaded Glock 23 .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun and extended magazine were recovered from the bushes. Tr. 28:14-22. Robinson was indicted on one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See generally Indictment. He is detained pending trial. Detention Order at 3-4, ECF No. 3.

II. Robinson's Motion to Suppress

Robinson moves to suppress his arrest, "any subsequent physical evidence," and Officers Hiller and Joseph's in-court and out-of-court identifications. See generally Def.'s Mot.

A. Fourth Amendment Challenge

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.The prohibition against unreasonable seizures requires that all seizures, even ones involving "only a brief detention short of traditional arrest," be founded upon reasonable, objective justification. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). Robinson argues that his arrest and the officers' entry into Apartment 302 were unlawful because they were not based on probable cause and because the officers did not have a warrant. Def.'s Mot. at 5-8.

1. The Arrest

A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an officer, "by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). To determine whether a citizen's liberty has been restrained, the Court asks whether "a reasonable man, innocent of any crime," would have believed himself free to leave. United States v. Goddard, 491 F.3d 457, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (per curiam). If a person is seized by show of authority (instead of by physical force), the seizure does not occur until the subject has submitted to the assertion of authority. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).

Whether a seizure is reasonable depends on the type of seizure at issue. Officers need probable cause to make a warrantless arrest, see Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003), but are permitted to "'briefly detain a citizen' where they 'ha[ve] a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot,'" United States v. Delaney, 955 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).

But not all interactions between police officers and citizens amount to a "seizure," and these evidentiary requirements are triggered only when a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred. United States v. Gross, 784 F.3d 784, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In deciding whether a seizure has occurred, the Court of Appeals has looked to the factors listed by Justice Stewart in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion): "the threatening presence of severalofficers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." The Court also considers "the demeanor of the approaching officer," Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1982), "whether the officer . . . wore a uniform," and "the time and place of the encounter," United States v. Wood, 981 F.2d 536, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

A seizure does not occur simply because police officers approach an individual. For example, in Goddard, the Court of Appeals concluded that a seizure had not occurred even where four officers "jumped out" of their car and approached four men "with guns and handcuffs showing and wearing identifiable MPD jackets and badges." 491 F.3d at 461. This holding turned, in part, on the fact that the officers did not impede the defendant's movement. Id.

Here, Robinson was not subjected to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when Officers Kelly, Jacobs, and Davies initially approached him. Those officers drove up to the apartment building, exited the car, and started walking toward the front door. At that point, they had said nothing to Robinson; had given no indication that he was not free to leave; had not used physical force; and had not engaged in any "show of authority" sufficient to constitute a seizure (and Robinson's flight clearly did not submit to that authority). Robinson's argument that the police seized him at that time, and without probable cause, lacks merit.

A seizure did occur later, when the officers broke down the door to the apartment, ordered its occupants (including Robinson) to put their hands up and get on the ground, and Robinson submitted to those commands. Robinson argues that even then the officers did not have probable cause. Def.'s Suppl. at 8-10, ECF No. 40. Although the probable-cause standard cannot be precisely defined or quantified, see Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371, "[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt," id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States,338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). The test is an objective one: "probable cause exists if the totality of the circumstances, as viewed by a reasonable and prudent police officer in light of his training and experience, would lead that police officer to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed." United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1981). "Probable cause may be based on the 'collective knowledge of the police'" and does not require one officer...