United States v. Robinson, CRIMINAL 1:07-cr-00032-MR-4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DARIAN KENDALL ROBINSON, Defendant.

CRIMINAL No. 1:07-cr-00032-MR-4

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division

August 23, 2021

ORDER

Martin Reidineer Chief United States District Judge

THIS MATTER is before the Court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration of the Defendant's Motion for Reduced Sentence under The First Step Act of 2018 [Doc. 334] in light of the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v Lancaster, 997 F.3d 171 (4^th Cir. 2021). [Doc. 346]. Also before the Court is the Defendant's Unopposed Motion for Expedited Reduction of Sentence under The First Step Act. [Doc. 347].

I. BACKGROUND

During 2006 and 2007, the Defendant Darian Kendall Robinson participated in a drug-trafficking organization that distributed crack cocaine in Cleveland County, North Carolina. [Doc. 152: PSR at ¶¶ 7-16]. In 2007, a federal grand jury indicted the Defendant and five others charging them with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. [Doc. 1 Indictment at 1-2]. The Government filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, notifying the Defendant and the Court that it intended to seek an enhanced penalty based on the Defendant's prior conviction for a felony drug offense. [Doc. 57: Information]. The Defendant entered into a written plea agreement with the Government, agreeing to plead guilty to the drug trafficking conspiracy offense and stipulating that at least 150 but less than 500 grams of crack cocaine were reasonably foreseeable to him. [Doc. 79: Plea Agreement at ¶¶ 1, 6(a)].

In preparation for sentencing, a Presentence Report (PSR) was prepared, detailing Robinson's role in the conspiracy as a distributor. Specifically, it was noted that in January 2007, the Defendant sold more than 190 grams of crack cocaine during the course of two controlled drug purchases by a confidential informant. [Doc. 152: PSR at ¶¶ 12-13]. Additionally, the Defendant's co-conspirators reported five transactions wherein they purchased an additional 630 grams of crack cocaine from the Defendant.^[1] [Id. at ¶ 15]. Based on these drug amounts, the PSR noted that the Defendant appeared to be responsible for more than 500 grams of crack cocaine, as these seven transactions alone account for 820 grams. [Id. at ¶ 16]. In keeping with the terms of the Plea Agreement, however, the probation officer calculated the Defendant's base offense level to be 32, based upon the parties' stipulation that the Defendant was responsible for at least 150 grams but less than 500 grams of crack cocaine. [Id.]. Based on his criminal history, the Defendant was determined to be a career offender, thus subjecting him to an advisory Guidelines range of between 262 and 327 months' imprisonment.^[2] [Doc. 152: PSR at ¶ 82]. In light of the § 851 enhancement, the Defendant also faced a statutory mandatory minimum term of 20 years in prison. [Id. at ¶ 81]. In 2008, this Court^[3] sentenced the Defendant to 276 months' imprisonment, within the advisory Guidelines range but between the low-end and the middle of the range. [Doc. 170: Judgment at 2; Doc. 335: Supp. PTO at 1].

In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, which increased the quantity of cocaine base required to trigger the enhanced penalties of Section 841. Specifically, Section 2 of the Act raised the (b)(1)(A) threshold from “50 grams” to “280 grams” and the (b)(1)(B) threshold from “5 grams” to “28 grams.” Section 3 eliminated the mandatory minimum for simple possession of cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Congress did not apply these changes retroactively to defendants sentenced before the Act's passage. Accordingly, the Defendant could not obtain relief under the Fair Sentencing Act. Likewise, the Defendant was ineligible for relief pursuant to the retroactive Guidelines amendments 706, 750 and 782 because of his career offender status.

On December 21, 2018, the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, was enacted. Section 404 of the Act gave retroactive effect to the changes made by Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The Defendant sought a reduction of his sentence pursuant to Section 404 the First Step Act to a sentence of time served.^[4] [Doc. 334]. The Government agreed that the Defendant was eligible for a reduction in his custodial sentence but requested that the Court deny his motion because his Guidelines range was determined by his status as a career offender, not the drug quantity for which he was held responsible. [Doc. 336].

The Fair Sentencing Act only increased the threshold quantities of crack cocaine for sentencing treatment under § 841(b)(1)(A) and (B). The Defendant was in the top category both before and after this amendment. As such, the Defendant's argument is not actually based on a retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act, but rather on a challenge to his career offender designation. The Defendant argues that he was not properly classified as a career offender in light of United States v. Norman, 935 F.3d 232 (4^th Cir. 2019) (holding that an § 846 conspiracy conviction was not a controlled substance offense within the meaning of the Guidelines and can no longer serve as a career offender predicate). In December 2020, this Court found that the Defendant was eligible for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act but concluded that the Defendant remained subject to the same Guidelines range based on the career offender enhancement. [Doc. 338]. Specifically, the Court rejected the Defendant's argument under Norman, noting that Norman had not been deemed to apply retroactively and thus, the Court was not required to recalculate his Guidelines range without the career offender enhancement. [Id. at 7]. The Court did so, in part, based on the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667 (4^th Cir. 2020) which held that any “Guidelines error deemed retroactive . . . must be corrected in a First Step Act resentencing.” Id. at 668 (emphasis added). Accordingly, while the Court reduced the Defendant's term of supervised release from ten years to eight years, it denied the Defendant's request for a reduction in his term of incarceration. [Id.].

The Defendant appealed. [Doc. 341]. The Fourth Circuit held the Defendant's appeal in abeyance pending its decision in United States v. Lancaster, No. 20-6571. The Fourth Circuit issued its decision in Lancaster on May 7, 2021, holding that the district court was required in a First Step proceeding to recalculate the Guidelines range in light of Norman. In Lancaster, the Fourth Circuit noted that even though a § 846 conspiracy conviction “was considered to be a controlled substance offense [at the time of Lancaster's sentencing], that is no longer the case.” United States v. Lancaster, 997 F.3d 171, 176 (4^th Cir. 2021). Without the controlled substances offense predicate, the career offender enhancement was no longer applicable and thus no longer determined the Guidelines range. Id.

On May 26, 2021, the Fourth Circuit granted the Defendant's motion for remand (which the Government did not oppose), vacated this Court's prior Order, and remanded for further proceedings in light of Lancaster. [Doc. 346]. The Fourth Circuit's mandate issued on June 1, 2021. [Doc. 348].

On June 2, 2021, the Defendant filed an unopposed motion for an expedited reduction of his sentence under the First Step Act to a sentence of time served. [Doc. 347].

II. DISCUSSION

Section 404 of the First Step Act authorizes district courts to “impose a reduced sentence” for certain “covered offense[s].” First Step Act, § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222. Section 404(a) of the Act defines a “covered offense” as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by Section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . that was committed before August 3, 2010.” Id. § 404(a). Section 404(b) then provides that the court “may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if Section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” Id. § 404(b). The First Step Act makes clear, however, that any such decision is a matter of the court's discretion. Id. § 404(b), (c).

When presented with a motion for relief under Section 404 of the First Step Act, a district court must determine whether the sentence qualifies for review on the merits. United States v. Gravatt, 953 F.3d 258, 262 (4^th Cir. 2020). Here, the Defendant undoubtedly qualifies for review: 1) he was sentenced for a violation of §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A) for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, which is an offense for which the statutory penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act; 2) his motion for a reduction in sentence is addressed to the court that imposed the sentence; and 3) the sentence has not been previously reduced under the First Step Act.

Having determined that the Defendant's sentence qualifies for review on the merits, the Court must now determine whether to exercise its discretion to impose a reduced sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed. First Step Act, § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222. “The stated policy governing the exercise of this discretion is to bring a sentence that is qualified for reduction ‘in line' with a sentence that the court would have imposed under the Fair Sentencing Act had it been in effect.” United States v. Lancaster, 997 F.3d 171, 175 (4^th Cir. 2021).

The Court must begin its analysis with the calculation of the...