United States v. Rodriguez

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ISMAEL RODRIGUEZ, Defendant.

Case No. 1:19-cr-00133-DCN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

July 29, 2020

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is the Government's Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 40) of the Court's July 9, 2020 Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Ismael Rodriguez's Motion to Suppress ("Suppression Order") (Dkt. 39). Having review the record and briefs, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding delay, and because the Court finds the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Court will decide the Motion without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES the Motion.

II. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are well known to the parties and are set forth in detail in the Court's Suppression Order. Relevant to the instant Motion for Reconsideration, the Suppression Order granted Rodriguez's Motion to Suppress to the extent he sought suppression of contraband located on his person.¹ The Court denied suppression of evidence located inside of Rodriguez's car. The Court issued the Suppression Order after the Motion to Suppress was fully briefed, and after an evidentiary hearing was held on May 27, 2020. Following the evidentiary hearing, counsel for the Government and for Rodriguez also submitted closing arguments via simultaneously filed briefs. Dkt. 37; Dkt. 38.

In its Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress ("Closing Brief") the Government argued evidence officers found in Rodriguez's pockets should be admitted under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Dkt. 37. The Government suggested officers would have inevitably transported Rodriguez to the police station for a drug recognition evaluation and, to do so, would have searched Rodriguez's person, even if officers hadn't discovered contraband on Rodriguez's person through their unlawful expansion of a search executed pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Id, at 3. The Government seeks reconsideration of the Court's rejection of this theory and suggests the Court either misconstrued or ignored the Government's inevitable discovery argument. Dkt. 40, at 2 n. 2; Dkt. 43, at 2. The Government requests that the Court consider whether a de facto arrest² for driving under the influence was inevitable and would have inevitably led to discovery of the items in Rodriguez's pockets. Dkt. 40, at 2.

Given the potential ambiguity in distinguishing between the investigation that actually occurred in this case and an investigation that purportedly would have occurred had officers not illegally searched Rodriguez's pockets, a brief timeline is necessary. As highlighted in the Suppression Order, it is undisputed that Corporal Douglas Kern lawfully stopped Rodriguez and initiated a Terry search due to Rodriguez's suspicious conduct. Dkt. 39, at 12. Similarly, it is undisputed that Officer William Koho went beyond the legitimate scope of Terry by reaching directly into Rodriguez's right front and back pockets. Id. Koho discovered a large roll of cash in Rodriguez's right front pocket, which he showed to Kern. Kern then obtained Rodriguez's consent to search his left pocket and pulled out a large bag of heroin. Upon viewing the heroin, Kern arrested Rodriguez for possession of a controlled substance. Dkt. 36, at 40:13-21

The Court determined Rodriguez's consent to search his left pocket was tainted by the illegal search of his right pocket and suppressed the heroin. Dkt. 39, at 15-16. However, after Rodriguez was arrested, officers later conducted a canine sniff of his vehicle and obtained a positive alert. Officers searched the car and discovered a stolen firearm and several pounds of methamphetamine. Although Rodriguez moved to suppress such evidence, the Court determined the canine sniff was not the fruit of the illegal search, and, even if it was, that the canine sniff would have been inevitably occurred absent the illegal search.³ Id. at 23-32.

The Government's inevitable discovery argument involves a different timeline. Under its theory, even if the heroin had been not discovered through the illegal expansion of Terry, Rodriguez's suspicious behavior gave Koho probable cause to transport Rodriguez to the police station for a full drug recognition evaluation. Dkt. 37, at 3. The Government argued that to transport him to the station, officers would have handcuffed Rodriguez, searched him, and placed him in the back of the patrol vehicle. Id. Importantly, the Government suggested officers would have searched Rodriguez incident to his de facto arrest for driving under the influence. Id. at 4. Although the Government contended officers would also have called for a canine unit and searched Rodriguez's vehicle, it argued the heroin would have been discovered through a search incident to Rodriguez's arrest for driving under the influence, and not through a search incident to arrest for possession of the contraband located in his car. Id.; see also Dkt. 39, at 33-34. Thus, under the Government's theory, Rodriguez would have been transported to the police station and his person searched before the canine sniff and search of his vehicle.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

While the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly address motions for reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit has held parties may seek reconsideration in the criminal context. United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1047 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000). In both civil and criminal cases, reconsideration is an "extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources." Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rodriguez-Vasquez, 4. F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2013).

Generally, reconsideration is appropriate if the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or if there is an intervening change in controlling law. Rodriguez-Vasquez, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 1156 (quoting School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty. Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). In addition, a district court has inherent authority to modify, alter, or revoke non-final orders. United States v. Villapudua-Perada, 896 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1990).⁴

IV. ANALYSIS

The Government contends that the Court ignored or misunderstood the Government's argument that Rodriguez would have been inevitably searched because officers had probable cause to transport him to the police station for a full drug recognition evaluation—a de facto arrest. The Government suggests that this is the type of unusual circumstance in which a court should reconsider or clarify its order. However, the Court both addressed and rejected the Government's inevitable discovery argument in its Suppression Order.

Because officers would not have had probable cause to transport Rodriguez to the police station for a drug recognition evaluation absent the discovery of heroin in his pocket or any further investigation, a de facto arrest would not have been lawful had it inevitably occurred shortly after Rodriguez was stopped. Thus, the Court held "[w]hile officers had reasonable suspicion—independent from the illegal search—to stop Rodriguez and to remove him to the back of Koho's police car while they ran a canine around his vehicle, they lacked probable cause to take him to the police station until they searched his vehicle after obtaining the positive canine alert." Dkt. 39, at 35. The Government suggests the Court only held that officers lacked probable cause to arrest Rodriguez for possessing controlled substances until they searched his vehicle, and not that they lacked probable cause to take Rodriguez to the police station for a full drug recognition evaluation. The Court's use of the phrase "they lacked probable cause to take him to the police station" was a direct reference to the Government's theory that to obtain further evidence of the crime of driving under the influence, "Officer Koho would have transported Defendant to the police station for a full drug recognition evaluation." Dkt. 37, at 3 (emphasis added).

The Court specifically stated that the Fourth Amendment does not permit the involuntary removal of a suspect to a police station and his detention there for investigative purposes absent probable cause or judicial authorization. Dkt. 39, at 34 (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815 (1985). The Court further held that while "officers had reasonable suspicion to order a canine sniff independent from the heroin, they lacked probable cause to arrest Rodriguez until after they searched his vehicle and located the contraband therein." Id. Such findings were an express holding that officers lacked probable cause to remove Rodriguez to the police station for a full drug recognition evaluation at the time the Government suggested they would have done so, i.e., before the canine sniff and before officers discovered the contraband in Rodriguez's car.

The Court explained that because the Government argued that "Rodriguez would have inevitably been taken to the police station and searched without probable cause, rather than that he would have been arrested and searched because officers would have obtained probable cause to arrest him through the search of his vehicle, the Court declines to further address the issue of whether officers would have inevitably discovered the heroin on Rodriguez's person in a search incident to arrest due to the contraband discovered in his vehicle." Dkt. 39, at 35 (emphasis in original). The Court perhaps could have more clearly stated that while the Government suggested in its Closing Brief that the officers had probable cause to take Rodriguez to the...