United States v. Rodriguez

548 F.Supp.3d 1126

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Isaac Raymond RODRIGUEZ, Defendant.

21-cr-0394 RB

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Filed July 12, 2021

Luis A. Martinez, U.S. Attorney's Office, Las Cruces, NM, for Plaintiff.

Gregory Garvey, Public Defender, Federal Public Defender Las Cruces Office, Las Cruces, NM, for Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

ROBERT C. BRACK, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and Statements. (Doc. 25.) Having reviewed the briefs and documentary evidence, hearing testimony, and being otherwise fully advised, the Court will deny the motion.

I. Procedural Posture and Background

The Indictment charges Defendant with transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). (Doc. 19.) On April 6, 2021, Defendant "move[d] to suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of the unlawful stop of his vehicle on October 7, 2020, on Highway 80 north of Rodeo, New Mexico" on the basis that a reasonable officer would not have suspected the vehicle of being involved in criminal activity. (Doc. 25 at 1, 5.) The Government argues that, given the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the agent to stop Defendant's vehicle on suspicion of criminal activity. (See Doc. 28.) The Court held a hearing on July 7, 2021. (Doc. 41.)

II. Factual Findings

Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that when factual issues are involved in deciding a motion, the Court must state its essential findings on the record. See Fed. R. Crim. P 12(d). The Court makes the following factual findings based on the evidence in the record and evidence adduced at the hearings. At the July 7, 2021 hearing, the Court heard testimony from United States Border Patrol Agent Demetrios Campbell.¹

On October 7, 2020, at approximately 8:50 P.M., Agent Campbell was patrolling Highway 80, north of Rodeo, New Mexico. (Docs. 1 at 1; 28 at 2; Unofficial Tr. of July 7, 2021 Hr'g (Tr.) at 14.) While driving southbound, he received a "Be On the Look Out" ("BOLO") for a gray SUV suspected of trafficking contraband or undocumented aliens across the international border. (Doc. 1 at 1.) At approximately 8:55 P.M., Agent Campbell observed an SUV driving northbound on Highway 80.² (Id. ) As the vehicle appeared to match the BOLO and was the only vehicle Agent Campbell had seen in 30 minutes, he decided to follow it. (Id. at 2.) While following the vehicle, he observed that it was a Jeep Grand Cherokee with an Arizona license plate. (Id. ) It was covered in dust, had dark tinted windows, and a closer look revealed that there was a single handprint visible on the back windshield. (Id. ) Upon gathering this information, Agent Campbell requested the registration information of the vehicle and discovered that the vehicle was a gold Jeep Grand Cherokee registered to a resident of Duncan, Arizona. (Id. at 2; Tr. at 18, 25.) After following the vehicle for some time, the SUV began to cross the center line, which caused Agent Campbell to think the driver was watching him closely. (Doc. 28 at 11; Tr. at 16.) Considering all these factors, Agent Campbell suspected the driver of smuggling either contraband or illegal aliens. (Doc. 28 at 11; Tr. at 24.) He then activated his emergency lights and siren and pulled the vehicle over. (Tr. at 19.)

As Agent Campbell approached the vehicle, he shined his light into the vehicle and saw two subjects laying prostrate in the rear cargo area, three subjects sitting upright in the back seat, and a driver and passenger in the front two seats. (Doc. 28 at 4; Tr. at 21, 24.) Agent Campbell noticed that the passengers were "crammed into" the vehicle "without concern for their safety. They were not wearing seatbelts. The passengers in the cargo area were laying down ... [without] pillows or luggage of any kind to show that they were ... on a road trip of some sort." (Tr. at 24.) Agent Campbell asked the driver if he was a U.S. Citizen. (Id. at 22.) The driver replied, "Yes," with an American accent. (Id. ) He asked the front passenger the same question and received the same answer but with a foreign accent. (Id. ) Agent Campbell then approached the passenger's open window and smelled strong body odor and desert vegetation, "which is a scent unique to people ... that have been walking through the desert, such as with alien smuggling attempts." (Id. ) The rear passengers did not speak English, but readily admitted in Spanish that they were not U.S. Citizens and did not possess the appropriate documentation to be in the United States legally. (Id. ) Following these confessions, the front passenger admitted that he was also an undocumented alien. (Id. )

At this point, Agent Campbell suspected that the driver, later identified as Rodriguez, was transporting aliens for profit. (Doc. 1 at 2.) At approximately 9:00 P.M., Agent Campbell arrested Rodriguez for transporting the six subjects in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). (See id. ) Agent Campbell read Rodriguez his Miranda rights in English, and then all subjects and the vehicle were transported to the Lordsburg Border Patrol Station for additional investigation. (Id. ) At the Station, agents conducted a post-Miranda interview with Rodriguez. (Id. ) Prior to questioning, Rodriguez was advised of his rights, and he acknowledged that he understood them and was willing to answer questions without the presence of an attorney.

(Id. ) Rodriguez subsequently admitted that he was hired to do the job by a friend and expected to receive a payment of approximately $1,500 to $1,600. (Id. )

III. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Suppress

In deciding this Motion to Suppress Evidence and Statements the Court "must assess the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to give to the evidence presented ...." United States v. Goebel , 959 F.3d 1259, 1265 (10th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Any "inferences the district court draws from that evidence and testimony are entirely within its discretion." Id. (citations omitted).

"To successfully suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful detention, a defendant must first establish that the detention did violate his Fourth Amendment rights." United States v. Nava-Ramirez , 210 F.3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Once a defendant establishes that violation, "[t]he defendant then bears the burden of demonstrating ‘a factual nexus between the illegality and the challenged evidence.’ " Id. (quotation omitted). "Only if the defendant has made these two showings must the government prove that the evidence sought to be suppressed is not ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ either by demonstrating the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, was discovered through independent means, or was so attenuated from the illegality as to dissipate the taint of the unlawful conduct." Id. (citations omitted). The Court notes that "the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (citation omitted).

B. Reasonable Suspicion

The Fourth Amendment safeguards "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "[I]ts protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest." United States v. Quintana-Garcia , 343 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ). Officers may, however, "stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has reasonable suspicion ... that criminal activity ‘may be afoot ....’ " United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). "Reasonable suspicion" is a "minimal level of objective justification[,]" which is "something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’ " Id. (quotations and quotation marks omitted). Reasonable suspicion does "not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." Arvizu , 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744 (citing Sokolow , 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581 ). Rather, reasonable suspicion is a "minimal level of objective justification which the officers can articulate ...." United States v. Valles , 292 F.3d 678, 680 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). Notably, "[a] factor may contribute to reasonable suspicion even if it ‘is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel.’ " Id. (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9, 109 S.Ct. 1581 ).

"Border Patrol Agents on roving patrol [may] ... ‘stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion’ that the occupants are involved in criminal activity." United States v. Cheromiah , 455 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Cantu , 87 F.3d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir. 1996) ). The Supreme Court has explained that "[a]ny number of factors may be taken into account in deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a car in the border area[,]" United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), and it has provided a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that may give rise to reasonable suspicion:

(1) [the] characteristics of the area in which the vehicle is encountered; (2) the proximity of the area to the border; (3) the usual patterns of traffic on the particular road; (4) the previous experience of the agent with alien traffic; (

...