United States v. Rohani

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOSHAN ROHANI, Defendant.

No. 3:22-cr-00238-IM

United States District Court, D. Oregon

November 26, 2024

Gary Y. Sussman and Mira Chernick, Assistant United States Attorneys, and Natalie K. Wight, United States Attorney, 1000 SW Third Avenue, Suite 600, Portland, OR 97204.

Anna Belesiotis and Ryan Costello, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, 101 SW Main Street, Suite 1700, Portland, OR 97204. Attorneys for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Karin J. Immergut United States District Judge.

The Government has charged Defendant Joshan Rohani with one count each of possessing, accessing, and distributing child pornography, as well as three counts of transporting child pornography. The charges arose after the Government identified internet protocol (IP) address logs, an email account, and payment information that linked Defendant to an account in an online chatroom dedicated to sharing child pornography files. The Government executed a search warrant at Defendant's residence and seized fifty-two devices including an iPhone and an iPad. Law enforcement identified contraband on several devices, but could not examine the iPad, which was passcode-protected, or the iPhone, which would not power on. The Government retained the iPad and iPhone for over a year. Eventually, with the assistance of a digital forensics expert who had not previously been involved in the investigation the Government was able to repair the iPhone and power it on. The Government then applied for, and received, a new search warrant. Pursuant to this authority, agents searched the iPhone and-thanks to intervening developments in digital forensics tools-the iPad.

Defendant now moves to suppress the fruits of the search of the iPhone and iPad, arguing that the Government's efforts to repair the iPhone constituted an unconstitutional search, and that its prolonged retention of the iPhone and iPad constitutes an unconstitutional seizure. Motion to Suppress (“Mot.”), ECF 106. This Court denies the request for an evidentiary hearing both as untimely and because Defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Franks v Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied.

STANDARDS

Under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Unless an exception or good faith applies, the exclusionary rule prevents unlawfully obtained evidence from being introduced at trial against the person whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1968).

BACKGROUND

In May 2022, Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent Rachel Kessler applied for a search warrant to search Defendant and his residence and seize his digital devices. See Application for Warrant, ECF 32-1; Warrant, ECF 32-4. The details of the search are set out in this Court's order denying Defendant's first two motions to suppress. ECF 58. As relevant to this motion, federal agents searched Defendant's residence on May 24, 2022, and seized fifty-two digital devices, id. at 6, including an iPhone 6 and an iPad.

The warrant authorized law enforcement to “perform an initial search” of any digital devices seized pursuant to the warrant “within a reasonable amount of time not to exceed 120 days from the date of execution of the warrant.” ECF 32-4 at 9. If the Government needed additional time to determine whether a digital device was responsive to the warrant, the Government was permitted to “seek an extension of the time period from the Court within the original 120-day period.” Id. at 10. The warrant required law enforcement to “complete the search of the digital device . . . within 180 days.” Id.

Although agents accessed several of Defendant's devices, they were unable to search the iPhone 6 or the iPad within that period. The iPhone was inoperable and would not power on, while the iPad was passcode-protected. Mot., ECF 106, Ex. C at 12. The initial 120-day period elapsed on September 12, 2022. Id. at 13. The Government retained possession of the devices, id., but did not attempt to examine them. Mot., ECF 106, Ex. B at 4. Instead, the Government moved for a 180-day extension, which was granted on January 13, 2023. ECF 38-6. That order provided that the Government “shall have 180 days from the date of this Order to complete the searches and forensic analyses of the digital devices.” Id. That 180-day period expired on July 12, 2023.

At that time, law enforcement had still been unable to search the iPad and the iPhone 6. The Government retained possession of the devices and, on September 12, 2024, sent the iPhone 6 to a partner forensic laboratory. Mot., ECF 106, Ex. C at 13. Detective Sheldon Clay, an HSI Task Force Officer at that laboratory was able to repair the iPhone 6 by replacing its circuit board and re-flashing the device's firmware. Mot., ECF 106, Ex. D at 2. At that time, Detective Clay also determined that new forensic software was likely able to bypass the iPad's passcode. Id. The next day, the Government sought and obtained a new search warrant to search the iPhone and iPad. Id. Pursuant to that warrant, Detective Clay successfully extracted files from both devices. Id. at 2-3. Defendant now moves to suppress those files as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. Mot., ECF 106.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that when law enforcement reconstructed the iPhone 6 in an effort to power it on, they engaged in a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He also argues that the Government's prolonged retention of the devices violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable seizures. This Court addresses these arguments in turn. First, this Court concludes that efforts to rebuild the phone to enable it to be searched were not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Second, this Court concludes that the Government did not unreasonably delay in searching the devices. Even if there was an unlawful search or seizure, the Government's good faith would preclude application of the exclusionary rule. This Court accordingly denies Defendant's motion to suppress, and, because Defendant did not make the requisite showing, his request for an evidentiary hearing.

A. Search of the iPhone

Defendant argues that law enforcement unlawfully searched his phone by disassembling it, reconstructing it, and installing new firmware before obtaining a warrant to search the phone.

Defendant analogizes this case to United States v. Sam, an unpublished case from the Western District of Washington in which that court concluded that officers “physically intruded on,” and thus searched a phone, when they powered it on to take a photo of the lock screen. No. CR19-0115, 2020 WL 2705415, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 18, 2020). Defendant argues that, like the officers in Sam, the officers in this case unlawfully physically intruded into his phone or violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone without a warrant. Defendant also analogizes to Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) where the Supreme Court held that the government's use of trained police dogs to investigate the curtilage of a home was a search. Defendant's Reply to Government's Response to Motion to Suppress (“Reply”), ECF 133 at 2-3. Defendant argues that Jardines establishes that any warrantless physical intrusion or trespass by law enforcement onto a constitutionally protected area to learn information is an unconstitutional search. Id.

Defendant's argument is unavailing because none of the activities he describes with respect to the iPhone 6 constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A search must be “done for the express purpose of obtaining information.” United States v. Dixon, 984 F.3d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 2020). In Sam, Dixon, and the other cases Defendant relies on, the government's action led directly to the discovery of information relevant to the case. In Sam, powering on the phone let officers discover a name that appeared on the phone's lock screen. 2020 WL 2705415, at *1. In Dixon, inserting a key into a vehicle's lock allowed officers “to learn whether [the defendant] exercised control over the minivan.” 984 F.3d at 820. And in Jardines, the canine sniff search alerted police to the presence of drugs within the home. 569 U.S. at 3-4.

Here, by contrast, the officers' actions were not undertaken to obtain information. They were simply done to see if they could make the phone work, so that it could later be searched pursuant to a warrant. Law enforcement did not obtain any information by disassembling the phone, replacing the circuit board, booting it up in recovery mode, or re-flashing the firmware. The only possible thing Detective Clay could have learned was that the phone was inoperable, which the Government already knew. In order to obtain the information contained on the phone-data confirming that Defendant owned the phone, whether the phone contained any contraband, and evidence of Defendant's internet use-the officers here, unlike in Dixon, Sam, and Jardines, had to take additional steps. The officers' preliminary steps to render the phone functional did not independently produce any information.

Taking such preliminary steps to attempt to power up a phone is distinct from using electronic tools...