United States v. Rudolph

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPER RUDOLPH, Defendant.

No. 19-30054

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Springfield Division

December 5, 2022

OPINION

SUE E MYERSCOUGH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Christopher Rudolph's Motion to Dismiss Information Charging Prior Offense under 21 U.S.C § 851 [d/e 26]. Because the elements of the Illinois statute are identical to the elements of the federal statute which is the critical inquiry under the categorical approach, the Court will deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Information.

BACKGROUND

On October 2, 2019, the Defendant was charged in a two-count Indictment. See d/e 1. Count One of the Indictment charged possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of actual methamphetamine while Count Two of the Indictment charged distribution of 5 grams or more of actual methamphetamine, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Id. If convicted, the Defendant would be subject to a five-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment in the absence of a qualifying conviction. See d/e 27, at 2.

The Indictment included a “Special Findings” section alleging Mr. Rudolph's prior Sangamon County conviction for unlawful delivery of methamphetamine, Case Number 2016-CF-142, qualified as a “serious drug felony.” See d/e 1. On July 26, 2022, the Government filed an information charging prior offense under 21 U.S.C. § 851, alleging the same. See d/e 24. The information provided that Defendant was subject to an enhanced sentence under § 851 based on his prior Sangamon County conviction for unlawful delivery of methamphetamine. Id. If the prior conviction is properly considered a serious drug felony, the Defendant will be subject to an enhanced statutory minimum term of imprisonment of ten years. See d/e 27, at 2.

In Defendant's motion to dismiss the information, the Defendant contends the prior conviction is overbroad and cannot qualify as a predicate offense for statutory enhancement purposes because the statute punishes drugs broader than the federal definition. See d/e 27, at 1-3. The Government alleges that, because the federal and state statutes are identical, the Defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a “serious drug felony” and the sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 851 applies. See d/e 29, at 6-8.

In Defendant's Reply, the Defendant included a new argument-that Illinois methamphetamine offenses are impermissibly overbroad because the statutes punish usable byproducts of the substance, when federal law does not. See d/e 31, at 5-6. As directed, the Government filed a sur-reply addressing the Defendant's new argument. See d/e 34.

DISCUSSION

Section 841(b)(1)(B) provides that if a defendant has “a prior conviction for a serious drug felony . . . such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than ten years and not more than life imprisonment.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).

Without a qualifying conviction, the statutory penalty range is five to forty years of imprisonment. Id. A “serious drug felony” is “an offense described in section 924(e)(2) of Title 18 for which the offender served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months; and the offender's release from any term of imprisonment was within 15 years of the commencement of the instant offense.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(57). As relevant here, section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) describes a qualifying offense as “an offense under State Law, involving distributing . . . a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 924€(2)(A)(ii).

In determining whether a state offense qualifies as a serious drug offense under federal law, courts apply the categorical approach. See United States v. Elder, 900 F.3d 491, 497-501 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601-02 (1990)). Using the categorical approach, “courts look solely to whether the elements of the crime of conviction match the elements of the federal recidivism statute.” United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Elder, 900 F.3d at 501). “If, and only if, the elements of the state law mirror or are narrower than the federal statute can the prior conviction qualify as a predicate felony drug offense.” United States v. De La Torre, 940 F.3d 938, 948 (7^th Cir. 2019).

The Defendant's prior Sangamon County conviction fell under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 646/55(a)(1), which makes it “unlawful knowingly to engage in the delivery or possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine or a substance containing methamphetamine.” At the time of the Defendant's offense, Illinois law defined methamphetamine as follows:

“Methamphetamine” means the chemical methamphetamine (a Schedule II controlled substance under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act) or any salt, optical isomer, salt of optical isomer, or analog thereof, with the exception of 3, 4-Methylendioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or any other scheduled substance with a separate listing under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.

720 ILCS 646/10 (2012). The federal statute encompasses “methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.” De La Torre, 940 F.3d at 951 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule II(c), Schedule III(a)(3)). The Government states that the two definitions are the same except for the mention of an analog substance in the Illinois definition. See d/e 29, at 4. While federal law does not explicitly include analogs, the Controlled Substance Analog Enforcement Act incorporates any analog of a controlled substance into Schedule I. See McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 188-89 (2015).

The Defendant claims that the federal and Illinois definitions for a controlled substance analog/analogue differ in that a broader range of substances satisfy Illinois' definition. See d/e 27, at 5. Under federal law, “controlled substance analogue” is defined as:

(32)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the term “controlled substance analogue” means a substance--

(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or II;

(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II;

(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II.

21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A). The Illinois' definition of a “controlled substance analog” is identically worded, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 570/102(f-5) (2015), since Illinois amended the definition of “controlled substance analog” in 2012 and adopted the federal definition. See P.A. 97-334, § 5, eff. Jan. 1, 2012. The Government claims that is the end of the analysis. See Ruth, 966 F.3d at 648 (“[W]e compare the state statute to the federal recidivism statute at issue and ask only if the state law is the same as or narrower than federal law.”) Because the state and federal statutes are exactly the same, the Government alleges the Defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a “serious drug felony” and the sentencing enhancement under § 851 applies. See d/e 29, at 6.

The Defendant notes that the federal statute and Illinois statute have been interpreted differently by the courts. See d/e 27, at 5. The federal statute requires a conjunctive reading: a substance must satisfy both the chemical structure prong and either of the substantially similar effect or intended effect prongs. See United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 522-23 (7th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by McFadden, 576 U.S. at 186. The court in Turcotte noted that the text of the Controlled Substances Act analogue provision is “not a model of clarity” and is “susceptible to either a disjunctive or conjunctive reading.” Id. at 522. The Defendant alleges the Illinois definition is disjunctive-that is, a substance need only meet the chemical structure prong or have a similar/intended effect. See People v. Monteleone, 112 N.E.3d 637, 645-46 (Ill.App.2d 2018) (evidence sufficient when defendant knew the products were illegal under federal law and knew the effect the substances had on the nervous system).

The Government alleges the Defendant's claim that the court in Monteleone employed a “disjunctive” approach in determining whether defendant possessed knowledge of the unlawful nature of the substance he sold is incorrect. See d/e 29, at 7. Moreover, the court in Monteleone did not indicate it was applying a standard different that that applied in federal courts. Id. In fact, the court expressly stated that defendant “knew the products were illegal under federal law and knew the effect the substances had on the central nervous system.” Monteleone, 112 N.E.3d at 646. The court further found the analysis in McFadden to be “instructive.” Monteleone, 112 N.E.3d at 643.

The Defendant alleges the Illinois definition of an “analog thereof” is broader than its federal counterpart because a substance may have either a similar chemical structure or a similar/intended effect. See d/e 27 at 6. Under federal law, it must have both. Id. The Defendant contends, therefore, that Defendant's 2016 Illinois conviction under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 646/55(...