United States v. Ruffin

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. ANDRE DWAYNE RUFFIN, Defendant.

No. 2:13-cr-00138

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

January 18, 2024

OPINION

Mark R. Hornak, Chief United States District Judge

On May 11, 2022, this Court granted the Defendant Andre Dwayne Ruffin's Motion to Vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the basis that the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v Borden, 141 S.Ct. 1817 (2021), rendered invalid the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) to Mr. Ruffin. (ECF Nos. 212 and 213). Mr. Ruffin is currently on bail awaiting resentencing compliant with the Court's decision, but no resentencing has to date occurred. The cause for this delay is a number of intervening, precedential cases (and the supplemental briefs of the parties about them) that the parties argue affect Mr Ruffin and his resentencing. The Court will now address the arguments of both parties and resolve the question central to them; namely, how many “crimes of violence” Mr Ruffin is considered to have committed for the purpose of calculating the Sentencing Guidelines to be applied to his resentencing.

After reviewing all the filings in this case in the context of the applicable law, the Court concludes that while Mr Ruffin's federal carjacking conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 does qualify as a “crime of violence” for purposes of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), his Pennsylvania aggravated assault conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(3) and his Pennsylvania robbery conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2703(a)(3) do not. As such, Mr. Ruffin has only one qualifying “crime of violence” predicate offense for resentencing purposes.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 7, 2013, a federal grand jury returned a one-count Indictment against Mr. Ruffin, charging him with Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) with an enhancement triggered by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). (ECF No. 1). That case was assigned to another member of this Court. At Mr. Ruffin's sentencing, the sentencing Court found that he qualified as a covered offender under the ACCA because he had three (3) prior convictions that qualified as violent felonies: a state robbery conviction, a state aggravated assault conviction, and a federal carjacking conviction. (ECF No. 142, p. 7). In consideration of his crime of conviction, and those prior qualifying convictions, Mr. Ruffin was sentenced to 300 months, or 25 years, of imprisonment. (ECF No. 146).

In June 2021, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Borden v. United States, a case interpreting the ACCA. 141 S.Ct. 1817 (2021). In Borden, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ffenses with a mens rea of recklessness do not qualify as violent felonies under ACCA.” Id. at 1834. As a result, Mr. Ruffin, via counsel, filed a Motion to Vacate his sentence, arguing that his state robbery conviction no longer constituted a violent felony for ACCA purposes under Borden. ECF No. 193. The matter was fully briefed, and on May 11, 2022 this Court issued its Opinion holding that Mr. Ruffin no longer qualified as an armed career criminal under the ACCA and granting his Motion to Vacate. (ECF Nos. 212, 213).

The Court held that Mr. Ruffin's ACCA sentence was no longer proper under the law on two separate, independent grounds. First, the Court held that, because Pennsylvania's robbery statute is divisible, the modified categorical approach applies, and the Shepard documents in Mr. Ruffin's case failed to establish on which set of the elements of the crime charged his conviction had rested, the robbery conviction could not categorically be considered a predicate offense under the ACCA. (ECF No. 212, p. 6-17). Second, the Court concluded that, even if Mr. Ruffin's conviction had rested on the portion of the state robbery statute requiring a mens rea of intent, that subsection was not an ACCA predicate offense under Borden. (ECF No. 212, p. 17-26). Because the Court concluded that Mr. Ruffin no longer qualified as an armed career criminal under either holding, it granted the Motion to Vacate, as well as Mr. Ruffin's Motion for Bail pending resentencing. (ECF No. 217). Mr. Ruffin was released on bail on May 12, 2022.

Then, in May of 2023, the Third Circuit issued a decision in United States v. Jenkins that further called into question Mr. Ruffin's ACCA eligibility. 68 F.4th 148 (3d Cir. 2023). Mr. Ruffin filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority alerting the Court to the Third Circuit's holding in Jenkins that Pennsylvania aggravated assault under 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(3) is not a violent felony under the ACCA. (ECF No. 241). Because of that ruling, Mr. Ruffin argued, now two of his underlying convictions failed to qualify as violent felonies: the robbery and aggravated assault convictions. The Government responded in opposition, (ECF No. 243), and Mr. Ruffin replied, (ECF No. 244).

Finally (for these purposes), in August of 2023, the Third Circuit issued two opinions interpreting Pennsylvania's robbery statute. United States v. Henderson, 80 F.4th 207 (3d Cir. Aug. 15, 2023); United States v. Cann, 2023 WL 5275054 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2023). The Government filed its own Notice of Supplemental Authority alerting the Court to the decisions, which each held that subsection (ii) of Pennsylvania's robbery statute, requiring a mens rea of intent, does in fact constitute a crime of violence. (ECF No. 245). These decisions, the Government argued, called into question this Court's first Opinion at ECF No. 212, and specifically the Court's holding that subsection (ii) of the state robbery statute did not constitute a crime of violence under Borden. Mr. Ruffin responded, (ECF No. 246), and the Government replied, (ECF No. 248). As these matters have been fully briefed by both parties, they are now ripe for the Court's resolution.

DISCUSSION

I. Disputed Resentencing Issues

The parties dispute several issues related to the impending resentencing. Specifically, while Mr. Ruffin argues that, as of now, none of his prior convictions qualify as “crimes of violence” as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) for the purpose of counting as predicate offenses under the ACCA, the Government argues that Mr. Ruffin has at least one qualifying offense and also offers arguments as to another two. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that only one of Mr. Ruffin's underlying convictions-his federal carjacking conviction-qualifies as a “crime of violence.”

A. Mr. Ruffin's carjacking conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 is a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2.

An individual may be held criminally liable for carjacking under federal law where he or she acts “with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle . . . from the person or presence of another by force or violence or by intimidation . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2119.

Mr. Ruffin posits that his 1993 conviction under this statute for carjacking cannot be considered a “crime of violence” because it does not necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, and thus is not a crime of violence following Borden. (ECF No. 228, p. 19.) This is because, Mr. Ruffin then argues, carjacking can be accomplished through intimidation, which he argues constitutes only a “reckless and/or general intent” offense. (Id. at 20.)

Citing to cases involving robbery through intimidation, Mr. Ruffin argues that accomplishing a crime via intimidation may only require a mens rea of recklessness as the individual being robbed-or in this case, having their car broken into-may interpret an action as a threat without the perpetrator intending to threaten force. (Id. at 20-21). Therefore, he contends, Mr. Ruffin's actions could have been accomplished without the intent to threaten force and thus his carjacking conviction does not constitute a crime of violence.

By contrast, the Government argues that, even if accomplished via intimidation, a federal carjacking conviction requires a mens rea of intent because the crime requires an individual to act with the knowledge that his or her actions will create the impression on the victim that she will be met by force if she does not comply. (ECF No. 234, p. 6.) This knowledge, the Government contends, necessitates intent. (Id. at 7).

The Court agrees with the Government's analysis as to this issue. Because an actor undertaking a carjacking, even where accomplished through intimidation, would necessarily possess and exercise the intent to intimidate a victim, the offense cannot be committed only with a mens rea of mere recklessness. And because a carjacker must act with volition to create intimidation or the fear of violence, carjacking is a “crime of violence” for Guidelines purposes. The Second Circuit held as much in United States v. Felder, 993 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2021):

Even when committed by intimidation, federal carjacking requires a defendant to act in a way that he knows will create the impression in an ordinary person that resistance to defendant's demands will be met by force. Indeed, that conclusion is only reinforced by the fact that, when a defendant commits carjacking by intimidation, he must act not only with the knowledge that his actions will create the impression that resistance will be met by force, but also ‘with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm,' something he achieves only through the use of physical force. Thus, we identify federal carjacking as a categorical crime of violence.

993 F.3d at 80. The Court adopts the same analysis here.

In the alternative, Mr. Ruffin argues that to be a qualifying “crime of violence” offense, an offense must also receive Criminal History points under...