United States v. Ruiz

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONNIE WAYNE RUIZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 23-6159

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

August 8, 2024

D.C. No. 5:22-CR-00433-D-1, (W.D. Okla.)

Before HOLMES, SEYMOUR, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT ^[*]

Stephanie K. Seymour, Circuit Judge

Mr Ronnie Ruiz was sentenced to imprisonment for twelve months and one day^[1]for endangering another person while eluding a police officer in Indian Country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 13 and 1152, and Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 540A(B). On appeal, Mr. Ruiz argues that the district court erred by holding itself bound to impose the 1-year mandatory minimum sentence contained in Oklahoma's criminal statute, and that the court, therefore, committed reversible sentencing error. Because our circuit's precedents foreclose Mr. Ruiz's arguments, we affirm.

I.

On October 5, 2022, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Ruiz of endangering another while eluding a police officer in Indian Country. Because the offense occurred in Indian Country in Oklahoma, federal prosecutors used the Assimilative Crimes Act ("ACA") to try Mr. Ruiz in federal court, but under Oklahoma state law. Specifically, prosecutors charged Mr. Ruiz under the ACA with violating Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 540A(B), which makes it a felony for "[a]ny operator of a motor vehicle" to elude a peace officer "in such a manner as to endanger any other person." The statute includes a 1-year mandatory minimum and 5-year maximum term of imprisonment. § 540A(B). Mr. Ruiz pled guilty and was convicted.

During sentencing, the district court held itself bound to apply the 1-year mandatory minimum prison sentence in § 540A(B). Mr. Ruiz objected. He pointed to another Oklahoma sentencing law, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991a, which allows Oklahoma courts to suspend a qualifying defendant's prison sentence. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991a(A)(1) (allowing an Oklahoma court to "[s]uspend the execution of [a defendant's] sentence in whole or in part, with or without probation" and to impose certain conditions). This Oklahoma suspension provision, Mr. Ruiz argued, allowed the district court to impose the closest federal equivalent, a probationary sentence, in his case^[2]-which is what he asked for. The district court was unpersuaded. Relying on United States v. Polk, 61 F.4th 1277 (10th Cir. 2023), the court held it did not have the authority to go below the mandatory minimum prison sentence in § 540A(B) and sentenced Mr. Ruiz to imprisonment for twelve months and one day. Mr. Ruiz appealed.

II.

We review de novo legal questions under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Mason, 84 F.4th 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 2023). We begin with the ACA, the federal statute under which Mr. Ruiz was charged. The "basic purpose" of the ACA "is one of borrowing state law to fill gaps in the federal criminal law that applies on federal enclaves." Lewis v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1135, 1139 (1998). Typically, when criminal conduct occurs on federal enclaves, like Indian reservations, it is punished via federal criminal statutes. See Polk, 61 F.4th at 1279. But not always. "[S]ometimes . . . no particular federal statute covers the defendant's conduct, meaning it would not otherwise be a federal crime." Id. In those cases, the ACA creates a federal offense by "borrowing" and applying the law of the state in which the federal enclave is located. Id.^[3] More relevantly in Mr. Ruiz's case, the ACA "addresses not only which charges may be brought but also which punishments may be meted out." United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1171 (10th Cir. 2013).

After all, the ACA only authorizes federal courts to impose "like punishments" to those state courts can impose. 18 U.S.C. § 13(a). See also United States v. Sain, 795 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the purpose of the ACA is "to provide a method of punishing a crime committed on government reservations in the way and to the extent that it would have been punishable if committed within the surrounding jurisdiction" (emphasis added)).

The ACA's "like punishment" language means that, for example, "federal sentencing courts [must] abide any maximum and minimum prison terms proscribed by state law for an assimilated crime." Christie, 717 F.3d at 1171. See also United States v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 250, 256 (10th Cir. 1989). But it "does not require federal courts to incorporate every aspect of state criminal law that may apply to the newly created offense." Polk, 61 F.4th at 1279. See also Garcia, 893 F.2d at 254 (noting that we need not "duplicate every last nuance of the sentence that would be imposed in state court"); Christie, 717 F.3d at 1172 (same). Federal courts need only ensure a defendant receives a punishment "similar to the punishment he or she would receive in state court." Polk, 61 F.4th at 1279. Moreover, because an assimilated state crime "becomes a federal offense punishable under federal law," "[f]ederal sentencing law applies, including the [Sentencing Guidelines]." Mason, 84 F.4th at 1155 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 1 F.4th 788, 789 (10th Cir. 2021)). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) ("[A] defendant who has been found guilty of an offense described in any Federal statute, including sections 13 [the ACA] . . . shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of this chapter."); U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1 cmt. background ("The sentencing guidelines apply to convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 13 (Assimilative Crimes Act)."). As such, "federal courts must depart from state [sentencing laws] when Congress has expressed a specific and contrary penal policy." Polk, 61 F.4th at 1280 (quoting Christie, 717 F.3d at 1172).

Here, Mr. Ruiz does not assert that the Oklahoma state crime for which he was prosecuted-endangering another person while eluding a police officer in Indian Country in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 540A(B)-was improperly assimilated under the ACA. Rather, he argues the district court erred when it held it was required to sentence him to § 540A(B)'s express 1-year mandatory minimum. He notes that had he been tried in Oklahoma state court, an Oklahoma judge could have suspended, in whole or in part, his prison sentence via Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991a. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991a(A)(1). Thus, at bottom, Mr. Ruiz asserts that because of § 991a's suspension power, § 540A(B) has no mandatory minimum prison sentence the district court was required to impose and that it was error for the court to hold otherwise. He asks, as such, that we vacate and remand for resentencing.

Our precedents easily, and fatally, dispose of Mr. Ruiz's arguments. We have repeatedly refused to assimilate state "sentencing schemes," like and including Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991a. In United States v. Wood, 386 F.3d 961 (10th Cir. 2004), we were confronted with a nearly identical question. There, Wood asserted that the Indian Major Crimes Act ("IMCA"), the ACA's sister statute, "assimilates the entirety of Oklahoma sentencing laws, including 22 Okla. Stat. § 991a." Wood, 386 F.3d at 963. We disagreed.

We noted that "federal courts have consistently declined to assimilate state sentencing laws if such laws conflict with the Guidelines," and that "[b]ecause the Guidelines deny a district court the discretion to suspend a sentence of imprisonment, that option is unavailable to defendants" convicted of assimilated crimes in federal court. Id.^[4] We, accordingly, refused to assimilate § 991a.

If Wood alone were not enough, in United States v. Jones, 921 F.3d 932, 939 (10th Cir. 2019), we reiterated "that Wood precludes federal sentencing courts from incorporating and applying state suspension provisions to depart from a state mandatory minimum sentence." This seemingly raises two questions relevant to Mr. Ruiz. First, whether Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991a(A)(1) is a "state suspension provision," and second, whether Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 540A(B) contains a "state mandatory minimum sentence." Mr. Ruiz nowhere asserts that Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991a(A)(1) is not a suspension provision. Wood seemed to consider it as such, see 386 F.3d at 963, and the statute's very text confirms that it is. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991a(A)(1) (authorizing an Oklahoma court to "[s]uspend the execution of sentence in whole or in part, with or without probation" (emphasis added)).

The second question, whether Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 540A(B) includes a "state mandatory minimum sentence," we addressed recently in United States v. Mason. There Mason was tried and convicted under the IMCA for violating Oklahoma's first-degree burglary statute. See Mason, 84 F.4th at 1154. For such convictions, Oklahoma law imposes a mandatory minimum prison sentence of "not less than seven (7) years," which the Presentence Report recommended, and the district court incorporated and applied. Id. at 1154-55. Mason appealed. He argued because he was eligible for a suspended sentence under Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991a (the same statute Mr. Ruiz relies on now), that Oklahoma law did not impose a "true mandatory minimum" for his crime. Id. at 1154. We disagreed. We held that Oklahoma's use of "not less than" language in its burglary sentencing statute "reflect[ed] Oklahoma's desire to impose a mandatory minimum." Id. at 1156. Moreover, we also held an Oklahoma court's "ability to suspend or defer" a defendant's sentence via § 991a is "irrelevant" when an Oklahoma statute includes "not less than" language. Id. In other words, Mason stands for the propositions that (1) when an Oklahoma statute contains "not less than" sentencing language, it has enunciated an express mandatory minimum sentence that we must incorporate, see id. at 1155, 1157; and (2) the "presence of that exact...