United States v. Ruiz

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ALEX IGNACIO RUIZ, Defendant.

Case No.: 19-cr-1285-GPC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 22, 2021

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR INDICATIVE RULING GRANTING COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

[ECF No. 73]

Defendant Alex Ignacio Ruiz has filed a motion seeking an indicative ruling that this Court would reduce his sentence to time served with Probation-monitored home confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). ECF No. 73. The Government opposes. ECF No. 77 ("Opp."). For the reasons that follow, Ruiz's motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Ruiz was convicted by guilty plea of one count of Importation of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960(a)(1). ECF No. 57. Ruiz was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 60 months, followed by 4 years of supervised release. Id.; ECF No. 63. Ruiz is currently serving his sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution, Mendota ("FCI Mendota"). Ruiz has served about 23 months of his sentence, and has slightly over two years remaining before his projected release date. ECF No. 73 at 2; Opp. at 1.

On February 14, 2020, Ruiz filed a notice of appeal from his final judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. ECF No. 64. On August 18, 2020, the Ninth Circuit issued an order to stay Ruiz's appellate proceedings pending the resolution of other cases involving Ruiz's codefendants. ECF No. 68. In January 2021, Ruiz moved for an indicative ruling that the Court would reduce his sentence to term served with probation-monitored home confinement under the First Step Act. ECF No. 73 at 1. The Government opposed. ECF No. 77. In response, Ruiz submitted a Reply and Supplemental Briefing on the matter. ECF Nos. 79, 80.

Ruiz is 34-years-old and is obese. Opp. at 18; see also ECF No. 33 ("Presentence Investigation Report" or "PSR") at 2. His body mass index ("BMI") is 31.3. ECF No. 73 at 1, 34; Opp. at 15. He has no other documented health issues. See generally PSR; ECF No. 73; Opp. Ruiz is Hispanic, which he asserts places him at increased risk for severe illness should he contract COVID-19. ECF No. 73 at 2.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"As a general rule, the filing of a notice of appeal divests a district court of jurisdiction over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Stein v. Wood, 127 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 1997). "This rule is 'designed to avoid the confusion and waste of time that might flow from putting the same issues before two courts at the same time.'" United States v. Stokes, No. 14-cr-3537-BAS, 2019 WL 259139, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019) (quoting Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1988)). However, a district court may make an "indicative ruling" while an appeal is pending pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure ("Rule") 37. See Fed. R. Crim. Pr. 37. Rule 37 provides:

(a) Relief Pending Appeal. If a timely motion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the court may:

(1) defer considering the motion;

(2) deny the motion; or(3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 37. "If the district court states that it would grant the motion or that the motion raises a substantial issue, the court of appeals may remand for further proceedings but retains jurisdiction unless it expressly dismisses the appeal." Fed. R. App. P. 12.1(b). "If the district court issues an indicative ruling, either that it would grant the motion or that there is a substantial issue, the court of appeals then decides whether to remand the case for a ruling by the district court." Olivas v. Whitford, No. 3:14-cv-01434-WQH-BLM, 2020 WL 2991509, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jun. 4, 2020). A finding that the "motion raises a substantial issue does not bind the district court to a particular ruling on the motion after remand." Id.

For the reasons below, the Court would DENY Ruiz's request for compassionate release "if the court of appeals remands for that purpose," and finds that the motion does not present a substantial issue meriting remand for further proceedings. Fed. R. Crim. P. 37.

III. DISCUSSION

Ruiz now moves for an indicative ruling that the Court would grant release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which provides, in relevant part:

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—

(1) in any case—

(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or

(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);

. . .

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

Accordingly, there are two questions before the Court: first, whether Ruiz has satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement, and second, whether Ruiz has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction.

The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, "amends numerous portions of the U.S. Code to promote rehabilitation of prisoners and unwind decades of mass incarceration." United States v. Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 448 (S.D. Iowa 2019) (citing Cong. Research Serv., R45558, The First Step Act of 2018: An Overview 1 (2019)). One of the changes resulting from the Act is that it "allows defendants, for the first time, to petition district courts directly for compassionate release." Id. As one district court recently explained:

The effect of the amendments is that a district judge has the ability to grant a prisoner's motion for compassionate release even in the face of BOP opposition or its failure to respond to a prisoner's request for compassionate release in a timely manner. . . . Congress's express purpose in implementing these changes was to expand the use of compassionate release sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See, e.g., First Step Act, PL 115-391, 132 Stat 5194, 5239 (titling the subsection amending § 3582, "Increasing the Transparency and Use of Compassionate Release"); 164 Cong. Rec. S7314- 02, 2018 WL 6350790 (Dec. 5, 2018) (statement by Senator Cardin, cosponsor of the First Step Act, noting that its purpose was to "expand[s] compassionate release" and "expedite[] compassionate release applications").

United States v. Young, No. 2:00-CR-00002-1, 2020 WL 1047815, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2020); see also United States v. Maumau, No. 2:08-CR-00758-TC-11, 2020 WL 806121, at *4 (D. Utah Feb. 18, 2020) ("[O]ne of the express purposes of the First Step Act was to increase the use and transparency of compassionate release.").

A. Exhaustion Requirement

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) imposes an exhaustion requirement requiring a defendant to fully exhaust all administrative rights to appeal before a defendant may move the court for release. On August 10, 2020, Ruiz submitted a request for compassionate release to the Warden of FCI Mendota, which was denied on August 21, 2020. ECF No. 73 at 4; Opp. at 8 n.7. The Government does not dispute that Ruiz has met the exhaustion requirement. Opp. at 8 n.7. Accordingly, the Court finds that it can consider the merits of Ruiz's motion.

B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) permits a sentence reduction only upon a showing of "extraordinary and compelling reasons," and only if "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines further explains that a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) may be ordered where a court determines, "after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)," that:

(1) (A) Extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; or

. . .

(2) The defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); and

(3) The reduction is consistent with this policy statement.

Application Note 1 to this Guidelines provision enumerates certain circumstances constituting "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that justify a sentence reduction, including certain serious medical conditions, advanced age, certain family circumstances,or some "other" reason "[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons." The Note specifies that "a serious physical or medical condition . . . that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover" constitutes "extraordinary and compelling reasons" which justify compassionate release. While the Court's decision is guided by this policy statement, a number of district courts have found that the amended Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) grants courts independent discretion to determine whether a defendant has provided extraordinary and compelling...