United States v. Salas

106 F.4th 1050

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Salvador SALAS, Jr., Defendant - Appellant.

No. 23-8027

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

FILED July 3, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming (D.C. No. 1:21-CR-00077-SWS-1)

Kari S. Schmidt, Conlee, Schmidt & Emerson LLP, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant.

Christyne M. Martens, Assistant United States Attorney (Nicholas Vassallo, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney, Casper, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before PHILLIPS, SEYMOUR, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.

In July 2021, based on evidence seized pursuant to two warrants, one for illicit drugs and one for child pornography, Mr. Salvador Salas, Jr. was charged with, and eventually convicted of, one count of possession and five counts of production of child pornography. Prior to trial, Mr. Salas argued that all evidence found pursuant to the child pornography warrant should be suppressed because the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court agreed a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred but declined to suppress the child pornography evidence. It found that suppression was inappropriate because Mr. Salas's child pornography would have been inevitably discovered. On appeal, Mr. Salas contends that his child pornography would not have been inevitably discovered and, as such, should have been suppressed. We disagree and affirm.

I.

The factual events constituting Mr. Salas's case began February 27, 2021. That evening, while she visited his home, Mr. Salas gave methamphetamine to S.V.,¹ a 13-year-old girl, after which he sexually abused, filmed, and photographed her. S.V. was the daughter of Chelsea Gonzalez who had been a friend to Mr. Salas for approximately six years and whose children, including S.V., had often visited, stayed with, and babysat for Mr. Salas without incident. However, when S.V. returned home that night, Gonzalez noticed she was acting "really weird and not correct" and had a swollen white blister in her mouth. Rec., vol. V at 744. Concerned, Gonzalez took S.V. to the hospital, where a urinary analysis tested positive for methamphetamines. That next day, Gonzalez filed a police report with the Casper Police Department.

On March 1, based on Gonzalez's report, police officers obtained a warrant (the "First Warrant") to search Mr. Salas's home and vehicle for drugs and related evidence. On March 2, they executed it. During their search of Mr. Salas's home, the officers arrested him and his girlfriend, seized "a significant amount of narcotics," and seized Mr. Salas's iPhone and one hard drive. Aplt. Br. at 9. After interviewing Mr. Salas's girlfriend and noticing that he owned a significant amount of video and photography equipment, the officers further suspected him of producing or possessing child pornography. That same day they applied for, obtained, and executed a second search warrant (the "Second Warrant") to search for such evidence. Executing the Second Warrant, officers seized a Sony laptop, MacBook laptop, and Seagate hard drive from Mr. Salas's residence. In a subsequent search of the devices, a digital forensic analyst found child pornography in Mr. Salas's iPhone's Photo app (seized under the First Warrant) and on the Sony laptop and Seagate hard drive (seized under the Second Warrant).

On March 31, Mr. Salas was re-arrested on state charges of sexual assault, sexual exploitation of children, and drug use. While in custody, he made several incriminating statements confirming his production and possession of the child pornography on his devices.

The government indicted Mr. Salas in July 2021 on six federal counts of possessing and producing child pornography. In response, Mr. Salas moved to suppress the child pornography found on the Sony laptop and Seagate hard drive on the grounds that the Second Warrant lacked probable cause and, as such, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He also argued that the child pornography on his iPhone, seized under the First Warrant, would not have been inevitably discovered because the First Warrant only authorized the seizure, not the search, of his iPhone. Separately, Mr. Salas moved to suppress his incriminating March 31 statements, asserting that the police officers had ignored his invocation of his right to legal counsel.

Following a combined evidentiary hearing on Mr. Salas's motions, the district court declined to suppress the child pornography found on Mr. Salas's iPhone. It agreed with Mr. Salas that the Second Warrant, under which the other devices containing child pornography were seized, had "wholly lack[ed] probable cause." Rec., vol. II at 145. But it held that the First Warrant allowed for both the seizure and search of Mr. Salas's iPhone and therefore child pornography would have been inevitably discovered by the officers as part of their investigation into Mr. Salas's drug activities. The court separately declined to suppress Mr. Salas's statements, finding that he did not clearly invoke his right to counsel. The government presented the child pornography evidence at trial, and Mr. Salas was convicted on all counts. He timely appealed.

II.

Mr. Salas argues that the district court improperly denied his motions to suppress. "When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and accept the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous." United States v. Palms, 21 F.4th 689, 697 (10th Cir. 2021). We review de novo the ultimate question of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.² Id.

The Fourth Amendment establishes a right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. To be constitutionally "reasonable," a warrant must be supported by probable cause and describe with particularity the places to be searched and evidence to be seized. See id.; United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2017); Palms, 21 F.4th at 697. Moreover, "[a]fter obtaining a warrant, the Fourth Amendment also requires officers to conduct the search and seizure reasonably." Palms, 21 F.4th at 697. When a search violates the Fourth Amendment's mandates, any evidence obtained "will [generally] be suppressed under the exclusionary rule." United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir. 2014). See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-44, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (discussing the exclusionary rule's applicability and rationale); United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005) ("When a search violates the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule normally dictates that evidence obtained as a result of that search be suppressed."). If applicable, the reach of the exclusionary rule is broad: Its "sanction applies to any 'fruits' of a constitutional violation," including "evidence [that is] tangible, physical material actually seized in an illegal search, items observed or words overheard in the course of the unlawful activity, or confessions or statements of the accused obtained during an illegal arrest and detention." United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980). That said, the exclusionary rule has never been an absolutist doctrine and has long been subject to exceptions, albeit "jealously and carefully drawn" ones. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958) (citations omitted). One such exception is the inevitable discovery doctrine, under which "illegally obtained evidence may be admitted if it 'ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.' " See Christy, 739 F.3d at 540 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501). As we have noted:

The[se] "lawful means" need not be a second, independent investigation. Rather, the inevitable discovery doctrine will apply if there was "one line of investigation that would have led inevitably to the obtaining of a search warrant by independent lawful means but was halted prematurely by a search subsequently contended to be illegal."

United States v. Loera, 923 F.3d 907, 928 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Christy, 739 F.3d at 540) (citations omitted). The crux of the inevitable discovery doctrine "is to place the government officers in the same positions they would have been in had the impermissible conduct not taken place" and then to ask "whether the government would have inevitably discovered the evidence lawfully." Id. at 928 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 447, 104 S.Ct. 2501). The government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child pornography would have been discovered without the Fourth Amendment violation. Christy, 739 at 540.

Mr. Salas argues the district court improperly denied his first motion to suppress by erroneously applying the inevitable discovery doctrine. He contends the doctrine is inapplicable for three reasons: (1) the First Warrant was not sufficiently particular to allow the police to search his iPhone; (2) the government did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have obtained a subsequent warrant to search his iPhone for child pornography; and (3) the government did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, absent its unlawful conduct, Mr. Salas would have given consent to the police to search his iPhone. Because we "have discretion to affirm on any ground adequately supported by the record," Mr. Salas's climb to reversal is steep. Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004). To obtain a reversal, he must succeed on all of his three legal challenges, while the government need only succeed on one to affirm.

We ultimately need not rule on Mr. Salas's second or third arguments because his appeal fails on his first one. We hold that evidence of Mr. Salas's child pornography would have been inevitably discovered because the First...