United States v. Sanchez

692 F.Supp.3d 1025

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Andres SANCHEZ, Defendant.

Case No. 1:21-cr-00238-BLW

United States District Court, D. Idaho

Signed September 19, 2023

Sean Michael Mazorol, Darci Ward Crane, United States Attorney's office District of Idaho, Boise, ID, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

B. Lynn Winmill, United States District Court Judge

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant Andres Sanchez's motion for a new trial (Dkt. 70). Having thoroughly considered the parties briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motion for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

In late 2021, Mr. Sanchez was indicted on eight counts of aiding and assisting in preparing and presenting false and fraudulent tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). See Dkt. 1. After Count Seven of the Indictment was dismissed, this matter proceeded to trial in February 2023. Following a five-day trial, an eleven-member jury found Mr. Sanchez guilty as to Counts Two through Six and Eight of the Indictment and was hung as to Count One. See Dkt. 69. The crux of this motion, however, involves the events that unfolded during the jury's deliberations.

After both parties rested on the fourth day of trial, the case was given to the jury. That afternoon, the jury sent its first question to the Court, which requested the trial transcript from a particular witness. While the Court was in the process of arranging a read-back of the witness's testimony, the jury sent two additional questions. The jury first asked, "if it's a hung jury on one count, are the other counts hung as well?" See Jury Questions at 5, Dkt. 68. The Court then informed the jury that its decision as to each Count is independent of its decision regarding any other Counts. Id. at 6. The jury subsequently asked, "if it's a hung jury on a count, how long do we have to continue deliberation?" Id. at 7. Among other things, the Court responded that "[t]here is no formula or rule as to how long a jury should deliberate[,]" as only "jurors can decide whether further deliberations would be productive in trying to reach a unanimous verdict." Id. at 8. Eventually, the jury was sent home at the end of the fourth day with instructions to return the following morning to continue deliberations.

The next morning—the fifth day of trial—the Jury Commissioner reported to the Court that a juror had attempted to present a note to her before deliberations had resumed. Similarly, a law clerk, who was not assigned to work on this matter, reported that a juror had approached him and asked to speak with the Court's clerks "[b]ecause there is some stuff going on in the jury room, some racism I don't want to be part of." Trial Tr. 7:4-5, Dkt. 82. After the Court inquired into the communications on the record, it was determined that the juror who contacted court staff that morning was Juror 16.

Soon after the Court learned about Juror 16's concerns about potentially biased comments, the twelve-person jury informed the Court that it had reached a verdict. The Court, however, decided that before it could accept a verdict from the jury, it needed to further inquire into the "racism" comment Juror 16 had made that morning. The Court then brought Juror 16 into the courtroom to further investigate his concerns. Juror 16 informed the Court that a juror said something to the effect of "[y]eah. And anyway, the Mexicans, all they want to do is screw us over anyway." Id. at 15:3-5.

In addition to the in-court inquiry, the Court had a Magistrate Judge, with no substantive prior involvement in the case, review Juror 16's letter and redact any portions that would reveal the jury's deliberative process, only leaving what was necessary to consider the issue of potential bias.¹ See id. at 23:19-22. After reviewing the redacted letter, the Court found it "very corroborative or at least consistent with what [Juror 16] testified to here." Id. at 24:2-3. Following its investigation into Juror 16's concerns, the Court noted that it "is quite clear that a racially motivated comment was made during deliberations which the juror found to be offensive and troublesome." Id. at 17:13-15.

At that point, the defense moved for a mistrial, arguing that the comments Juror 16 described violated Mr. Sanchez's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial because even one biased juror is enough to warrant a new trial. See id. at 18:9-22. The Court took the motion under advisement, determining that there was a need to conduct a further inquiry into (1) whether the potentially biased statement was made, (2) whether other jurors heard the statement, (3) if the statement was made, when did it happen; and (4) if any juror heard the statement, whether it would affect their deliberation or verdict in any way. See id. at 24:8-22. The Court proceeded to bring each juror into the courtroom to conduct an in camera inquiry with only the court staff and the parties present. After meeting with each juror, the Court developed a general idea of what had occurred during the first day of deliberations.

Although there was some confusion regarding which juror made the allegedly biased statements, the Court ultimately concluded that Juror 5 made statements regarding either individuals who are Hispanic or people who are Mexican nationals. See Def.'s Br. at 2, Dkt. 70; Gov.'s Resp. at 9, Dkt. 87. However, only a few other jurors heard any comments that they considered indicative of racial bias. Of those jurors who did hear a concerning statement, Juror 25 noted that Juror 5 made a statement "about the Mexican culture and more of how they act compared to Americans when they come over here." Trail Tr. 42:15-17, Dkt. 82. Juror 25 described the comment as something like, "[w]hen Mexicans come here, they act like they can't speak English to get away with certain things." Id. at 43:10-11. Juror 15 explained that he heard Juror 5 make a comment that he described as "more ignorant than it was a derogatory comment," which had something to do with "cartels." Id. at 60:4-62:12. Juror 12 heard comments about "how the Hispanic community kind of pulls together for themselves." Id. at 68:7-69:13. However, Juror 12 did not interpret the comments as biased, nor was she able to identify who made them. Id.

While only a few jurors heard any comments they considered biased, it was clear that additional jurors heard Juror 16 accuse someone of being racist. Although there was again some confusion about who Juror 16 directed his accusation at, multiple jurors understood it to be directed at Juror 1. However, the Court inevitably determined that Juror 16's accusation was "misdirected at Juror [1] because there [are] really no allegations here that [he] was, in fact, biased or prejudiced." Id. at 99:2-100:1. Nevertheless, the Court found that:

all the jurors [other than Juror 5] unequivocally expressed their view that they were not affected by any statement or any accusation of discrimination; [and] that they do not believe that their individual verdict or the verdict of other jurors except perhaps Juror [5] would have been affected by any statement or accusation of racism made during the jury's deliberations.

Id. at 98:16-21.

Following the Court's inquiry, the defense renewed its motion for a mistrial. Id. at 96:18-19. The Court again denied the motion, stating that "in this circumstance, there [are] not grounds for granting a mistrial." Id. at 98:16-14. The Court did, however, decide to dismiss Juror 5 for good cause, explaining that Juror 5 "made a statement that demonstrated animus based upon national origin or ethnicity. And for that reason, he cannot and his verdict . . . should not be received or his vote should not be made part of the jury's conclusion in this case." Id. at 100:14-19. The Court then decided that rather than seating an alternate, "proceeding with [the eleven] jurors [was] the appropriate course." Id. at 101:17-18. The Court explained, "the jury [had] been waiting virtually all day" and if it was to seat an alternate, the jury would presumably have to start over with its deliberations the next week. Id. at 101:11-116.

Having decided the proper course of action, the Court brought the jury back into the courtroom. After dismissing Juror 5, the Court informed the remaining jurors that, "the thing you should consider [when the jury returns to its deliberations] is whether excusing Juror [5] and functioning as a jury of 11, whether you have reached a different verdict or would reach a different verdict[.]" Id. at 107:5-8. Soon after the eleven-person jury returned to deliberations, the jury informed the Court that it had again reached a verdict, which the Court proceeded to accept. As noted, the jury found Mr. Sanchez guilty of Counts Two through Six and Eight of the Indictment. See Dkt. 69.

After the trial was completed, Mr. Sanchez again filed a motion for a new trial. See Def.'s Br., Dkt. 70. In his motion, Mr. Sanchez relies predominately on the same arguments he made during the trial. Specifically, Mr. Sanchez argues that he is entitled to a new trial under the Sixth Amendment because (1) Juror 5's presence for virtually the entirety of the jury's deliberations amounts to a structural error, and (2) even if Juror 5's presence does not rise to the level of a structural error, the interests of justice demand a new trial because Juror 5's bias tainted the jury's verdict. See id. at 3-10. Mr. Sanchez also argues that the Court's decision to proceed with an eleven-member jury was a mistake because a retrial would not have been too burdensome. Id. at 10-11.

LEGAL STANDARD

A new trial may be granted by the district court when the "interest of justice so requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). A motion for a new trial should only be granted "in an exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the verdict." United States v. Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1985)....