United States v. Sanchez

1

UNITED STATES, v. EDGAR MARINO SANCHEZ, Defendant.

No. 01 Cr. 74-2 (PAC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

October 27, 2023

OPINION & ORDER

PAUL A. CROTTY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Edgar Sanchez, Defendant, moves pro se for reconsideration of the Court's denial of his motion for compassionate release pursuant to the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Sanchez alleges extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting a sentence reduction including (1) his age at the time of the offense; (2) his inability to challenge legal issues related to his conviction and sentencing; (3) evidence of his rehabilitation; and (4) the need to care for his parents. The Court finds that Sanchez has not met his burden of demonstrating extraordinary and compelling circumstances and finds that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) continue to weigh against his release. Sanchez's motion is therefore DENIED without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with the facts, which are set forth in its previous orders. See Sanchez v. United States (“Sanchez IV”), No. 01 Cr. 74-2 (PAC), 2021 WL 5234978 at *1 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 10, 2021) (collecting opinions). The Court thus provides only a brief summary of the legal, factual, and procedural history of the case.

On July 7, 2003, Sanchez was convicted at trial of three offenses conspiracy to distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C § 846; intentional murder while engaged in a major narcotics conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A); and murder in the course of using and carrying a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j). See Judgment, ECF No. 226; Sanchez IV, 2021 WL 5234978 at * 1. The convictions stem from Sanchez's “participat[ion] in the violent and wide-ranging drug dealing gang known as the Hughes Boys” where he “committed one murder as well as distribut[ed] heroin cocaine and crack.” Sent'g Tr. at 15:14-17, ECF No 465-5. In particular, Sanchez attended a Hughes Boys meeting on December 15, 2000, during which Sanchez and his cohorts were offered $5,000 to kill a rival gang member. See United States v. Sanchez (“Sanchez V”), 01 Cr. 74-2 (PAC), 2022 WL 4298694, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2022). Sanchez accepted this offer and on December 19, 2000, he murdered Earl Edwardson, an eighteen-year-old rival gang member. Id. Sanchez was 26 years old at the time. See Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) ¶¶ 2-3. A jury convicted Sanchez of all three counts following an eight-week trial.

On June 15, 2004, Judge Scheindlin sentenced Sanchez to 360 months' imprisonment on Counts 1 and 2 followed by a mandatory consecutive ten-year term of imprisonment on Count 17. Sent'g Tr. at 17:5-12.^[1] On April 15, 2008, the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. United States v. Martinez, 311 Fed. App'x 378, 382 (2d Cir. 2008).

Sanchez is currently incarcerated at FCI Fairton and is expected to be released on June 23, 2035. See Inmate Locator Service, BOP Registration No. 11708-265, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/. Since his incarceration, Sanchez has pursued a series of collateral challenges, all of which have been denied. See Sanchez IV, 2021 WL 5234978, at *1 (describing Sanchez's history of collateral review, including § 2255 motions and Rule 36 motions).

On January 27, 2022, Sanchez filed an initial pro se motion for compassionate release, supplemented by his counsel's memorandum in support of the initial motion on February 22, 2022. See ECF Nos. 456, 463. Sanchez's initial motion was denied by this Court on September 19, 2022. See Sanchez V, 2022 WL 4298694. Sanchez now again moves pro se seeking reconsideration of the Court's denial. See Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 474.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Reconsideration

Because Sanchez is proceeding pro se in this matter, his motions and supporting documents must be liberally construed and held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995). Pro se litigants' pleadings should thus be read “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Green v. United. States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d. Cir. 2001).

While there is no Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure that specifically recognizes motions for reconsideration, such motions “have traditionally been allowed within the Second Circuit.” United States v. Yannotti, 457 F.Supp.2d 385,388 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). District courts “have applied the applicable civil standard to such motions in criminal cases.” United States v. Larson, No. 07 Cr. 304, 2013 WL 6196292, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2013). Courts typically apply the standard outlined under Local Rule 6.3 in deciding reconsideration motions. Yannotti, 457 F.Supp.2d at 389. This Court will therefore apply the Local Rule 6.3 standard in the instant motion.

Local Rule 6.3 requires a moving party to indicate controlling decisions or data that the deciding court overlooked, such as “matters that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transportation. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating “an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice,” Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted). A motion for reconsideration may not be used by a party to advance new arguments not previously presented to the court, nor may it be used to present arguments that were previously litigated and decided upon by the court. See CSX Transportation. Inc., 70 F.3d at 257. Reconsideration may be granted only where the court has made such errors as overlooking matters or controlling decisions “which might have materially influenced the earlier decision.” Morales v. Quintiles Transnational Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d 369, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citations omitted).

Sanchez has put forward no new evidence, clear error of law, or manifest injustice that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the Court. He instead introduces new arguments that were not raised in his prior motion and couples them with the renewal of two prior arguments: the need to care for his ailing parents and evidence of his service and rehabilitation while incarcerated. But “[a] motion for reconsideration should not relitigate issues already resolved by the court and should not be used to put forward additional arguments which the movant could have made, but neglected to make before judgment.” Goldstein v. State of New York, No. 00 CIV. 7463, 2001 WL 893867, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2001), aff'd, 34 Fed.Appx. 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, Sanchez fails to articulate grounds for reconsideration, and his motion is DENIED.

II. Renewed Motion for Compassionate Release

Despite failing to raise adequate grounds to support a motion for reconsideration, the Court alternatively construes Sanchez's motion as a renewed motion for compassionate release. Even so, Sanchez's motion fails because he does not establish extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting a sentence reduction.

A court may not modify a term of imprisonment once imposed except for where a statutory exception applies. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Musa v. United States, 502 F.Supp.3d 803, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). One such exception, often referred to as “compassionate release,” permits a defendant to petition the district court for a sentence reduction or to end that defendant's term of imprisonment. Under section 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may reduce or end a defendant's term of imprisonment and impose a term of supervised release that does not exceed the unserved portion of the defendant's original sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

A defendant may bring a motion for compassionate release on his own behalf after “fully exhaust[ing] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Upon exhaustion of administrative remedies, a district court may reduce a defendant's sentence if the defendant establishes that (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction,” and (2) a sentence reduction would be consistent with the “factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable” and “with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. A district court has broad discretion to “consider the full slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons that an imprisoned person might bring before them in motions for compassionate release.” United States v. Brooker, 976F.3d228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020). However, the Court may not consider rehabilitation alone as an extraordinary and compelling reason. Id. at 237-38.

A. Exhaustion

The Government does not dispute that Sanchez previously exhausted his administrative remedies. See Sanchez V, 2022 WL 4298694, at 2 n.4; Def's Mot., Ex. O, ECF No. 474. Sanchez's initial request for compassionate release was denied by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) on July 22, 2021. Sanchez appears to have renewed his request on September 29, 2022. Over 30 days have passed since this request was filed.

The Government contends, however, that Sanchez has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not specifically petition the BOP for release based on his age at the time of the offense, despite raising it as grounds for relief in the instant motion. The Court disagrees. There is a “split among courts in...