United States v. Sanfilippo

91 F.4th 1380

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph A. SANFILIPPO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-11175

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Filed: February 8, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cr-60006-RKA-1

Nicole D. Mariani, Lisa Tobin Rubio, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney Service - Southern District of Florida, U.S. Attorney Service - SFL, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Humberto Dominguez, Humberto R. Dominguez, PA, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Jordan, Lagoa, and Marcus, Circuit Judges.

Lagoa, Circuit Judge:

Joseph Sanfilippo appeals his conviction for wire fraud pursuant to a guilty plea and contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment against him because it was issued after the expiration of the federal statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Sanfilippo argues that the district court misinterpreted § 3282(a), and thus incorrectly concluded that the government indicted him within the statute of limitations. We conclude, however, after careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, that we cannot resolve this issue, as Sanfilippo entered an unconditional guilty plea to one of eight counts in the indictment and, under our precedent, waived his ability to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Because Sanfilippo waived any challenge to the timeliness of his indictment by entering a knowing, voluntary, and unconditional plea, we dismiss Sanfilippo's appeal.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND¹

Sanfilippo met the victim, a wealthy widow, in 2008 or 2009, and the pair had a long-distance relationship that lasted for a few years. In 2013, Sanfilippo informed the victim that he was moving to South Florida, and the couple's relationship rekindled once he did. In 2015, Sanfilippo convinced the victim that she should invest in Cayman Shipping and Distribution, LLC ("Cayman Shipping"), which allegedly bought excess inventory from companies like Walgreens and CVS and shipped it to South America for resale. Sanfilippo told the victim that he knew the president of Cayman Shipping, who would only accept investment money directly from him. So, in late October and early November 2015, the victim wrote four checks, payable to Sanfilippo, for a total of $100,000. In return for her investments, Sanfilippo gave the victim a fraudulent promissory note. Sanfilippo deposited these checks into one of two personal bank accounts, and almost immediately thereafter withdrew the money in increments of less than $10,000. In April 2017, the victim hired an attorney, who unsuccessfully tried to contact Cayman Shipping seeking return of the victim's investment. Agents later learned that Cayman Shipping did not exist, nor did the person Sanfilippo said was the president.

For a large part of 2020, grand jury sessions were suspended in the Southern District of Florida due to the COVID-19 pandemic. See S.D. Fla. Admin. Order 2020-22 (suspending all grand jury sessions as of March 26, 2020); S.D. Fla. Admin. Order 2020-76 (providing that two grand jury sessions per week were to resume on November 16, 2020). As a result, by late 2020, the government still had not brought its case. Under federal law, however, "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed." 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).

Unable to bring an indictment, the government instead filed an eight-count information in the Southern District on October 23, 2020. Because the government alleged that Sanfilippo committed four acts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 between October 28, 2015, and November 2, 2015, and four acts of structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324 between October 29, 2015, and November 4, 2015, the information was filed within the five-year period provided by § 3282(a). The parties agree that Sanfilippo could be prosecuted by information only if he waived prosecution by indictment "in open court and after being advised of the nature of the charge and of [his] rights." Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b); see U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury. . . ."). But Sanfilippo did not provide such a waiver.

After grand jury sessions resumed, the government indicted Sanfilippo on the same eight counts on January 14, 2021. The government then moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) to dismiss the information without prejudice, which the district court granted on February 26, 2021. Sanfilippo then moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it was "filed after the Statute of Limitations had expired" for all eight counts.

The district court denied Sanfilippo's motion. The district court first concluded that an information is "instituted" when it is filed, and thus the government acted timely under § 3282(a), even though Sanfilippo had not waived his right to prosecution by indictment. The district court then turned to 18 U.S.C. § 3288. When an information charging a felony is dismissed after the statute of limitations expires, § 3288 provides, with some exceptions, a six-month window in which the government can indict the defendant. See § 3288. While the government cannot invoke this provision when the reason for the dismissal "was the failure to file the indictment or information within the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations, or some other reason that would bar a new prosecution," id., Sanfilippo did not argue that either applied in his case. Even if he had, the district court concluded that "any reliance on these exceptions would have been futile." Therefore, the district court concluded that the indictment was timely, and, after rejecting other arguments not relevant to this appeal, denied Sanfilippo's motion to dismiss.

Sanfilippo later agreed to plead guilty to one count of wire fraud. The written plea agreement does not contain a reservation of the right to appeal the district court's denial of Sanfilippo's motion to dismiss. At the plea colloquy, Sanfilippo stated that he had discussed the plea agreement with his counsel and fully understood its terms, including the fact that the plea agreement "fully reflect[ed] [his] agreement with the United States." The district court summarized the terms of the plea agreement and alerted Sanfilippo to the last paragraph, which stipulated "that this plea agreement represents the entire agreement and understanding between you and the United States, and that there are no other secret or mysterious agreements, promises, or guarantees that have been made to you in order to induce you to plead guilty in this case." Sanfilippo confirmed that the plea agreement represented his entire understanding with the government and that he understood he was waiving certain rights by pleading guilty. Sanfilippo's counsel indicated that Sanfilippo understood the rights that he was waiving in signing the agreement. Sanfilippo then pleaded guilty to Count Four, and the district court accepted his plea, adjudging him guilty.

After Sanfilippo's guilty plea was entered and the district court sought to end the hearing, the government interjected, "there is one other issue." The government noted that United States v. B.G.G., another case that raised similar statute of limitations questions, was on appeal to this Court. If it turned out, based on this Court's decision in B.G.G., that the government was "in error by filing an information within the statute of limitations," the government said that "Sanfilippo would be exonerated at that point, just as a matter of fundamental fairness." In such a case, "what [the government] would probably do is allow [Sanfilippo] to withdraw his guilty plea, and then [the government] would have to dismiss the charges, because the statute of limitations had run." Sanfilippo would be able to "file a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations again, in which case it would be granted at that point." Both the district court and Sanfilippo agreed to this potential path.

The district court subsequently sentenced Sanfilippo to 24 months' imprisonment with three years of supervised release and restitution in the amount of $300,000.² This appeal follows.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a defendant waived the right to appeal a district court's decision on a pretrial motion by entering a guilty plea is a question of law this Court reviews de novo. See United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1320 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2003).

III. ANALYSIS

We have long held that a "defendant's [unconditional] plea of guilty, made knowingly, voluntarily, and with the benefit of competent counsel, waives all non-jurisdictional defects in that defendant's court proceedings." United States v. Pierre, 120 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Yunis, 723 F.2d 795, 796 (11th Cir. 1984)); see, e.g., Patti, 337 F.3d at 1320 (same). And we have held that a statute of limitations defense is one of those non-jurisdictional defects. In United States v. Najjar, we rejected the argument that "in a criminal case, the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional bar that cannot be waived in a plea agreement." 283 F.3d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 2002). Instead, we recognized that, "pursuant to binding precedent, the statute of limitations is a matter of defense that must be asserted at trial by the defendant." Id. (citing Capone v. Aderhold, 65 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1933)). And in Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 248, 136 S.Ct. 709, 193 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016), the Supreme Court held in a case involving § 3282(a)—the statute of limitations at issue here—that "[i]n keeping with § 3282(a)'s...