United States v. Santamaria

516 F.Supp.3d 832

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Sergio SANTAMARIA, Defendant.

4:04-cr-00199

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa.

Signed February 1, 2021

Andrew H. Kahl, Maureen McGuire, United States Attorney's Office, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

ORDER GRANTING COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

ROBERT W. PRATT, Judge

Before the Court is Defendant Sergio Santamaria's Motion for Compassionate Release filed on November 23, 2020. ECF No. 522. The Government filed its Resistance on January 29, 2021. ECF No. 531. The matter is fully submitted.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 1, 2005, a jury found Defendant guilty of one count of conspiracy knowingly and intentionally to distribute methamphetamine. ECF No. 208. Less than a week before trial commenced, the Government had introduced a notice pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 asserting Defendant had two prior drug felony convictions: a California conviction for possession of marijuana for sale for which Defendant was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment, and a conviction for possession of cocaine base resulting in a sentence of ninety days’ imprisonment. ECF No. 522-1 at 4. As a result, the Court had "no alternative in the case ... except the statutory minimum, which in this case is life." ECF No. 460 at 13.

Since Defendant's sentencing in 2006, Congress passed the First Step Act, which, in addition to authorizing compassionate release in extraordinary and compelling circumstances, limited the applicability of the § 851 enhancement to "serious drug felonies," defined as drug felonies with a sentence of at least twelve months’ imprisonment. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5220 (2018). Further, in 2016, the state of California legalized possession of marijuana for sale. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11359. Pursuant to the revised law, in 2017 Defendant applied for and received a redesignation of his conviction for possession of marijuana for sale. ECF No. 522-2. Without this felony drug conviction, if Defendant were sentenced under current law he would be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of only 120 months. ECF No. 522-1 at 13. Defendant has now been imprisoned for over fifteen years and currently resides in United States Penitentiary (USP) Victorville. Id. at 7.

Since Defendant was sentenced, the disease known as COVID-19 has killed more than 441 thousand U.S. citizens and infected over 26.2 million. Latest Map and Case Count , N.Y. Times (Feb. 1, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www-nytimes-com.sw.library.ntpu.edu.tw:8443/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has also suffered from the pandemic. At least 3,117 inmates and 1,782 BOP employees have "open" and "confirmed" cases of COVID-19. COVID-19 Cases , Fed. Bureau Prisons (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus. Three employees and 210 inmates have died. Id. Meanwhile, 42,671 inmates and 4,321 staff have had the virus but recovered. Id. The pandemic is no distant threat at Defendant's prison, USP Victorville in Victorville, California. Twenty-three inmates and thirteen staff members currently have open cases of the virus. Id. Overall, the COVID-19 outbreak at Victorville has taken a heavy toll on the facility, with 492 inmates and sixty-four staff recovered from the virus. See id.

Defendant is now forty-five years old and suffers from obesity, prediabetes, and hypertension. ECF No. 522-1 at 16. On December 21, 2020, Defendant requested compassionate release from his warden on the basis that his health conditions, risk of severe illness should he contract the COVID-19 virus, and unjust life sentence constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. ECF No. 530-1. It does not appear that the warden ever responded to the request. See ECF No. 530.

II. ANALYSIS

The First Step Act of 2018 amended numerous provisions of the U.S. Code to promote rehabilitation of prisoners and unwind decades of mass incarceration. Cong. Research Serv., R45558, The First Step Act of 2018: An Overview 1 (2019). Congress designed the statute at issue here "to boost grants of compassionate release by reforming [ 18 U.S.C.] § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s procedures." United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098, 1104, (6th Cir. 2020). Under the old regime, defendants could only petition the BOP Director who could then make a motion at their discretion to the district court. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13 cmt. n.4 (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2018) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].

"The BOP used that power so ‘sparingly’ that the Department of Justice's Inspector General found in a 2013 report that an average of only 24 imprisoned persons were released each year by BOP motion." United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing U.S. Dep't of Just., Office of the Inspector Gen., The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Compassionate Release Program 1 (2013), https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/e1306.pdf). The amended provision for the first time allows defendants to petition district courts directly for compassionate release. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

A. Exhaustion

The First Step Act's gatekeeping provision creates two ways for a defendant to bring a compassionate release motion to a district court. The defendant may file a motion after he "has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

Here, Defendant satisfied the gatekeeping provision because thirty days have passed since the BOP received his request.¹ ECF No. 530. The Court may address the merits.

B. Merits

Compassionate release provides a path for defendants with "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to leave prison early. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Such a sentence reduction must comply with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and "applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Judge Guido Calabresi recently summarized the history of statutory compassionate release in United States v. Brooker , 976 F.3d 228, 231–34 (2d Cir. 2020). Prior to Brooker , no circuit had ruled as to whether the Sentencing Commission's outdated policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, and particularly Application Note 1(D), applied under § 3582(c)(1)(A). If applicable, § 1B1.13 would limit discretion to find "extraordinary and compelling" reasons justifying compassionate release exclusively to the BOP Director. Brooker , 976 F.3d at 235.

Many district courts, including this one, have concluded the Commission lacks an applicable policy statement regarding when a court can grant compassionate release. United States v. Brown , 457 F. Supp. 3d 691, 699 (S.D. Iowa 2020), appeal dismissed following government request , No. 20-2053 (8th Cir. June 16, 2020); United States v. Haynes , 456 F. Supp. 3d 496, 512 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing thirteen such cases). In Brooker , the Second Circuit affirmed this conclusion, holding,

[T]he First Step Act freed district courts to consider the full slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons that an imprisoned person might bring before them in motions for compassionate release. Neither Application Note 1(D), nor anything else in the now-outdated version of Guideline § 1B1.13, limits the district court's discretion.

976 F.3d at 237.

In the absence of an applicable policy statement, "the Court can determine whether any extraordinary and compelling reasons other than those delineated in" the Commission's outdated commentary support release. United States v. Cantu , 423 F. Supp. 3d 345, 352 (S.D. Tex. 2019). The result is that the district court can consider all relevant factors when assessing a defendant's motion. See Brooker , 976 F.3d at 236 ("Application Note 1(D) cannot constrain district courts’ discretion to consider whether any reasons are extraordinary and compelling."). In sum, if the First Step Act is to increase the use of compassionate release as intended, "When the BOP does not timely act or administrative options are exhausted, ‘whichever is earlier,’ discretion to decide compassionate release motions is to be moved from the BOP Director to the courts." Brooker , 976 F.3d at 237 (quoting § 3583(c)(1)(A)). "District judges must operate under the statutory criteria—‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’—subject to deferential appellate review." United States v. Gunn , 980 F.3d 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2020).

1. Defendant's Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

a. Excessive Sentence

Several courts, including this one, have concluded that drastic sentencing disparities created by sentencing law reforms can be an extraordinary and compelling reason supporting release. Brown , 457 F. Supp. 3d at 702 (holding changes to mandatory minimum sentence calculations for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) constitute one of several extraordinary and compelling reasons); e.g., United States v. McPherson , 454 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1053 (W.D. Wash. 2020) ("It is extraordinary that a civilized society can allow this to happen to someone who, by all accounts, has long since learned his lesson.").

Here, as the Court has long maintained, Defendant's life sentence for a non-violent drug trafficking offense "would be laughable if only there w[as not a] real p[erson] on the receiving end." United States v. Holloway , 68 F. Supp. 3d 310, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ; see also ECF No. 460. Defendant only faced a mandatory life sentence because the Government chose to flag two prior drug convictions under § 851. These prior convictions were incredibly minor—Defendant served a combined eight months for the two offenses—yet they were sufficient to trigger a mandatory life sentence under a more draconian version of 18 U.S.C. § 841. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000).

Congress has since made drastic changes to the law. Now, only a "serious drug felony" for which the defendant served more than a...