United States v. Santillanes

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DAMIAN ENRIQUE SANTILLANES, Defendant.

No. 1:20-cr-01441-KWR

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

October 13, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KEA W RIGGS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment with Prejudice for Violations of Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Right and the Speedy Trial Act (Doc. 33). Defendant seeks to dismiss his indictment on the grounds that post-indictment delays have violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Having reviewed the pleadings and the relevant law, the Court finds that Defendant's motion is not well-taken and, therefore is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This case stems from a post-indictment delay in bringing Defendant to federal court while he was in state custody. Defendant is charged in this case with Possession with Intent to Distribute Heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C §§841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), Possession of a Firearm by a Felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§922(g)(1) and 924 and Using and Carrying a Firearm During and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).

Defendant was arrested after officers found a brown tar-like substance and observed a handgun in his vehicle. On May 28, 2020, Defendant was charged in state court based on the same alleged conduct in this case. That same day, Plaintiff was booked for failure to comply with probation in a separate state case. The state criminal case was later dismissed, and Defendant was sentenced for the probation violation in state court.

On June 4, 2020, the United States filed a criminal complaint in 20-MJ-1155 SCY, charging the defendant with a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924, that is, being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition.

On June 16, 2020, Defendant was scheduled for an initial appearance in federal court. However, the defendant had not yet been transferred into federal custody, and the initial appearance did not occur. 20-MJ-1155, Doc. 5.

On June 24, 2020, the district attorney entered a nolle prosequi in the state criminal case, stating that “[t]his matter is being referred to the United States Attorney's Office for federal prosecution.” Doc. 34-1 at 1. Defendant was indicted by a federal grand jury that same day. Defendant remained in state custody while his state probation violation was being prosecuted.

On September 10, 2020, Defendant began serving a state sentence of 365 days of imprisonment for violating the terms of his state probation. Defendant was taken into custody by the United States Marshall on September 23, 2021, after serving his state sentence. Defendant had his initial appearance in federal court on September 24, 2021, and was arraigned on September 28, 2021. The next day the Court set trial for November 4, 2021.

On October 28, 2021, Defendant filed his first unopposed motion to continue trial. He filed subsequent motions to continue, until filing this motion on August 2, 2022.

A notice of supplemental authority was filed on September 9, 2022. An objection or response was not filed within fourteen days, therefore the Court assumes this matter is now fully briefed.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the Government violated his Sixth Amendment and statutory speedy trial rights by in part failing to give him notice of his federal indictment while he was in state custody serving a state sentence. The Court disagrees and finds that no violation of his constitutional or statutory speedy trial rights occurred.

I. The United States did not violate the Speedy Trial Act.

Defendant asserts that his case should be dismissed because the Government violated the notice provisions of both the Speedy Trial Act and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”). The Court concludes that any violation of the notice provisions does not constitute a violation of the Speedy Trial Act warranting dismissal.

The Speedy Trial Act serves to “protect a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy indictment and trial, and to serve the public interest in bringing prompt criminal proceedings.” See United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993). The Act provides, in part, that a defendant's trial “shall commence within seventy [70] days from the filing date of the.. .indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (emphasis added). If the Government fails to comply with this time limit, the charges in the complaint must be dismissed, with or without prejudice. See id. at § 3162(a)(1). Generally, however, a state arrest does not trigger the Speedy Trial Act's clock, “even if the arrest is for conduct that is the basis of a subsequent indictment for a federal offense.” See Allen, 986 F.2d at 1356 (quoting United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186, 1189-90 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Asfour, 717 Fed.Appx. 822, 825 (10th Cir. 2017).

Here, Defendant's 70-day speedy trial period started on September 24, 2021 - the day that he made his initial appearance in federal court. 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(c)(1). At most, approximately 35 days ran until October 29, 2021, when the Court issued its first continuance order. The Court finds that Defendant's argument is not supported by the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act which provides that trial must commence within 70 days from the date of the “indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1); United States v. Kalady, 941 F.2d 1090, 1094 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Under the plain language of the Speedy Trial Act, the seventy-day period therefore began to elapse on the ‘last occur [ing]'date”). Regardless of when Defendant's federal detainer “kicked in,” the appropriate measure of time is the date from the federal indictment or Defendant's first appearance, whichever occurred last. See Kalady, 941 F.2d at 1094; see also United States v. Taylor, 814 F.2d 172, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The Speedy Trial Act does not begin to run when the defendant is arrested by state authorities on state charges, nor does it begin when a federal detainer is lodged with state authorities.. .Instead, only a federal arrest triggers the start of the time limits set in the Act.”).

Defendant asserts that while he was in state custody, he did not receive notice of the federal detainer by Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) staff. Defendant argues that the Government's alleged violation of the notice provision of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers should be considered a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, warranting dismissal. The IAD “creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer by one State against a prisoner held in another.” United States v. Lualemaga, 280 F.3d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 2002). The IAD requires that the entity with custody over a defendant provide notice of a detainer lodged against him. 18 U.S.C. § APP. 2 § 2(c). However, a violation of the IAD notice provisions does not create a statutory speedy trial violation. As explained above, the speedy trial clock did not begin to run until his first appearance in federal court on September 24, 2021, after he was taken out of state custody.

Alternatively, the Tenth Circuit has held that “dismissal of the indictment is not an available remedy for a violation of the notice provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.” United States v. McIntosh, 514 Fed.Appx. 783, 794 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished), quoting United States v. Robinson, 455 F.3d 602, 606 (6th Cir.2006). Although Mcintosh is unpublished, it followed the five other circuits which had considered the issue at the time, and the Court sees no reason to deviate from McIntosh's reasoning. See Robinson, 455 F.3d at 606; United States v. Lualemaga, 280 F.3d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Walker, 255 F.3d 540, 543 (8th Cir.2001); United States v. Pena-Corea, 165 F.3d 819, 821-22 (11th Cir.1999); Lara v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 239, 243 (5th Cir.1998).

There is a similar notice provision under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(j)(1), and dismissal of the indictment is also not an available remedy. United States v. Torres-Centeno, 211 F.3d 1279, 2000 WL 377475, at *3, (10th Cir. 2000) (ruling “that even if [defendant] could establish that the government failed to act ‘promptly' in obtaining his presence for trial or service the detainer, he has failed to demonstrate that dismissal of the indictment would be an appropriate remedy.”). The Tenth Circuit noted that “every circuit that has addressed this issue has held that dismissal is not an available remedy for a violation of § 3161(j)(1).” Id., cited in United States v. Chavira, No. 16-CR-0848-WJ, 2018 WL 2744981, at *10 (D.N.M. June 7, 2018).

Therefore, there was no violation of Defendant's statutory speedy trial rights, and even if there were, dismissal is not an appropriate remedy for the violation of notice provisions.

II. The United States did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial right.

Defendant alternatively argues that the United States violated his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. Among its guarantees, the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend.

VI. “Although the right is somewhat amorphous, the remedy is severe: dismissal of the indictment.” United States v. Margheim, 770 F.3d 1312, 1325 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Seltzer, 595 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2010)).

A court must analyze a four-factor framework to determine whether a delay has caused a defendant to be deprived of his right to a speedy...