United States v. Segoviano

30 F.4th 613

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Jose SEGOVIANO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-2930

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 1, 2021

Decided April 1, 2022

Grayson Sang Walker, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Christopher Grohman, Anne L. Yonover, Attorneys, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Manion, Rovner, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.

Rovner, Circuit Judge.

Jose Segoviano, Jr., was charged in a two-count indictment with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), respectively. In the district court, Segoviano filed a motion to suppress the evidence uncovered during a search of his apartment by agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives ("ATF") and statements made by him to them during his detention. The court determined that no evidentiary hearing was necessary and denied the motion. Segoviano then pled guilty to both counts pursuant to a conditional plea agreement under which he reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. Segoviano now appeals the denial of that motion.

I.

The events that led to the search began on May 4, 2018, when an ATF agent conducting a covert law enforcement operation in the Back of the Yards neighborhood in Chicago was shot. An arrest warrant was issued for Ernesto Godinez, charging him with assault of a federal agent. Two days later, agents obtained cellphone location data that placed a known telephone of Godinez at or near Segoviano's apartment building. The agents began surveillance of that apartment building at approximately 1 p.m. that day, and at approximately 5 p.m. they observed Godinez's girlfriend, Destiny Rodriguez, exit the apartment building. They detained her,¹ and a couple of hours later, at 7:23 p.m., federal agents entered the apartment building in search of Godinez. According to the agents, when they entered the vestibule of the building, they saw a closed door to their left and another door in front of them that led into a stairway to the second floor. Two agents diverted to the door on the left, and the others proceeded through the door to the stairway. About halfway up the stairs, they realized that the stairs did not merely lead to a common area of the second floor, but instead led directly into a second floor apartment. They called out to the occupant of the apartment, Segoviano, who came to the top of the stairs. The agents then asked Segoviano if there was anyone else in the apartment and asked for permission to search his apartment for the purpose of determining if a fugitive, Godinez, was there. Segoviano replied that there was no one else in the apartment and consented to that search of his apartment. The agents removed Segoviano from the apartment, handcuffed him, and conducted the limited search. While the agents were calling out to Segoviano from the stairs in the initial entry, an occupant of the apartment to the left of the building entryway opened the apartment door, and two agents asked her to step back into the apartment; the agents then entered with her, conducted a sweep of the apartment at which time they found another occupant, and detained the residents of that apartment as well.

Although the search of Segoviano's apartment revealed no other persons in the apartment, the agents nevertheless kept Segoviano in handcuffs, brought him back into his own apartment, and seated him at his dining room table. Approximately 6-7 agents were present in the apartment as agents questioned Segoviano. For approximately 20-30 minutes of that questioning, Segoviano remained handcuffed, and later the agents removed the handcuffs but continued to question Segoviano. When Segoviano asked the agents if he was under arrest, they responded that he was "detained."

In the course of that interrogation, Segoviano acknowledged possessing marijuana and cocaine in the apartment, and the presence of firearms for which he possessed a Firearm Owners' Identification card. The agents informed Segoviano that based on that admission they could obtain a search warrant for the apartment, and Segoviano then signed a consent to allow the search of the apartment, the grounds, and the detached garage. The agents never provided Miranda warnings to Segoviano.

The search yielded four firearms, approximately 2.28 kilograms of marijuana, and approximately 95 grams of cocaine. Segoviano was subsequently charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. At some point, the agents also searched the backyard and a detached garage, and found in that detached garage a white Kia Sorrento, which was the same color, make, and model of the SUV that surveillance cameras recorded Godinez entering on the day of the shooting approximately 30 minutes prior to that shooting. The agents determined that the Kia in the garage was a vehicle registered to Rodriguez.² During the subsequent interview at his home, Segoviano informed the agents that Godinez had visited his home earlier that day before he became aware that Godinez was wanted for a criminal offense. Segoviano was never charged with any offense related to harboring a fugitive.

The district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the interrogation and search, and Segoviano pled guilty to both counts under a conditional plea agreement that allowed him to appeal that denial of the motion to suppress. Segoviano asserts on appeal that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress, arguing that the evidence should have been suppressed because: "(1) the statements and consent were given during an unlawful detention and therefore were not voluntary; (2) the statements and search were the result of an unlawfully extended detention, which continued beyond law enforcement's stated purpose, and therefore were not voluntary; and (3) the statements were obtained as a result of a Miranda -less custodial interrogation." Appellant's Brief at 6.

II.

The pre-arrest detention in this case was constitutionally problematic. As an initial matter, the agents lawfully could enter the vestibule of the apartment building, as that was a public area as to which a resident would have no reasonable expectation of privacy. See United States v. Vargas , 915 F.3d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 2019) ; United States v. Sweeney , 821 F.3d 893, 902 (7th Cir. 2016). And the parties agree that the entry into the stairwell was not an intentional entry into Segoviano's apartment, and was based on the false belief that the stairwell was also part of the public area of the apartment building.

According to the government, Segoviano did not challenge his initial detention during the sweep of his apartment, which was undertaken with his consent. The government maintains that Segoviano's first challenge is to the continuing detention of him once the agents had determined that the fugitive was not present. We need not consider whether Segoviano challenged the initial seizure and handcuffing, nor whether the search of the garage was constitutional as part of that sweep, because even if we bypass those issues, the continuation of that seizure after the sweep cannot survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. At the "very core" of that guarantee is a person's "right ... to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Caniglia v. Strom , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1599, 209 L.Ed.2d 604 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); Florida v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). Accordingly, the Court has recognized that: " ‘[i]n terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.’ " Steagald v. United States , 451 U.S. 204, 212, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), quoting Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) ; Lange v. California , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2018, 210 L.Ed.2d 486 (2021). Absent permission, the threshold of a home therefore cannot be crossed without a warrant, subject to certain exceptions which enable law enforcement officials to address emergency situations presenting a " ‘compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.’ " Lange , 141 S. Ct. at 2017, quoting Riley v. California , 573 U.S. 373, 402, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). Among those recognized exceptions allowing for a warrantless entry are the need to render emergency assistance and the prevention of the imminent destruction of evidence or a suspect's escape. Id. at 2017. Because " ‘[f]reedom’ in one's own ‘dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment,’ " the contours of any exception to the warrant requirement are " ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ in keeping with the ‘centuries-old principle’ that the ‘home is entitled to special protection.’ " Id. at 2018 (refusing to recognize categorical exception to warrant requirement when a suspected misdemeanant flees from police into his home), quoting Payton , 445 U.S. at 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, and Georgia v. Randolph , 547 U.S. 103, 109, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006). Therefore, for instance, even if they have probable cause, law enforcement agents ordinarily may not constitutionally enter a home to effectuate an arrest absent consent or exigent circumstances. Steagald , 451 U.S. at 212, 101 S.Ct. 1642 ; Lange , 141 S. Ct. at 2017.

The Fourth Amendment protections apply equally to seizures as well as to searches. Steagald , 451 U.S. at 212, 101 S.Ct. 1642 ; Payton , 445 U.S....