United States v. Serrano

651 F.Supp.3d 1192

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Jose Angel SERRANO, Defendant.

Case No.: 21-CR-1590 JLS

United States District Court, S.D. California

Signed January 17, 2023

Connie Wu, Assistant United States Attorney, U.S. Attorneys Office, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff.

John Owen Lanahan, Law Office of John Lanahan, San Diego, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER (1) DENYING DEFENDANT'S AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND (2) DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIREARM CHARGES

(ECF Nos. 40, 49)

Janis L. Sammartino, United States District Judge

Presently before the Court is Defendant Jose Angel Serrano's ("Defendant" or "Serrano") Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence ("Evid. Mot.," ECF No. 40) and Motion to Dismiss Firearm Charges ("Firearm Mot.," ECF No. 49). The Government filed Responses to both of Defendant's Motions ("Evid. Opp'n," ECF No. 50; "Firearm Opp'n," ECF No. 51). After an evidentiary hearing, the Court requested supplemental briefing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Government submitted a Supplemental Response thereto (ECF No. 57), and Defendant submitted a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Suppress (ECF No. 58). The Court also requested supplemental briefing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Firearm Charges. See ECF No. 59. The Government provided a supplemental response (ECF No. 63) and Defendant filed a reply thereto (ECF No. 64). Having considered the Parties' arguments and the law, the Court DENIES Defendant's Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Firearm Charges.

BACKGROUND

On March 15, 2021, the Chula Vista Police Department responded to Defendant's residence at 1760 Fernwood Drive in Chula Vista after receiving a report that Defendant had sexually assaulted his stepdaughter. See ECF No. 57 at 2; ECF No. 58 at 2.¹ Defendant was not home when the investigating police officers arrived. ECF No. 57 at 2; ECF No. 58 at 2. While the officers did not have a search warrant for the residence, Defendant's wife, Ms. Valenzuela, allowed the officers inside to conduct the investigation. ECF No. 57 at 2; ECF No. 58 at 2. The victim told police that Defendant had given her cocaine and sexually assaulted her the previous night. See ECF No. 35-3 at 6. Ms. Valenzuela and her other daughter (the victim's sibling) led the officers to the garage, where Defendant kept a locked workbench allegedly containing cocaine and other drugs. ECF No. 57 at 2-4; ECF No. 58 at 2-3. Before Ms. Valenzuela was able to locate the key for the workbench, Agent Shaun Myers, one of the investigating Chula Vista police officers, attempted to view what was inside by peering through a one-inch gap in the workbench with the aid of a flashlight. ECF No. 57 at 3; ECF No. 58 at 2. Myers testified that he could see what appeared to be weighing scales and a white residue that resembled either cocaine or fentanyl. ECF No. 57 at 3; ECF No. 58 at 2. Ms. Valenzuela's daughter asked police if they could break into the workbench, but Myers told her police could not do so without a search warrant. D3 R15 at 0:35-0:45.

Upon learning that police were unable to arrest Defendant in connection with the alleged sexual assault that evening, Ms. Valenzuela took police back into the garage, unlocked the workbench with a key she had since located, and opened the drawer so that police could see inside. ECF No. 57 at 4; ECF No. 58 at 2. Ms. Valenzuela then rummaged through the toolbox, showing officers various illegal drugs, including cocaine and methamphetamine. ECF No. 57 at 4; ECF No. 58 at 3; D2 R25 at 6:39-9:15. Police subsequently arrested Defendant, who by that time had arrived home and was being questioned about the sexual assault allegations. ECF No. 57 at 4; ECF No. 58 at 3. While conducting a search of Defendant's person incident to the arrest, officers discovered an electronic key. ECF No. 58 at 3. The key opened a safe located in the bedroom of Claudia Beltran, a tenant living in Defendant's home. Id. The safe contained about 500 grams of cocaine, 100 grams of methamphetamine, $46,000 in cash, a handgun, and ammunition. Statement of Facts and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence ("Evid. Mem.," ECF No. 40-1) at 5.

Defendant was ultimately charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm (counts one through four); possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute (count five); possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (count six); possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking (counts seven through ten); possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number (count eleven); and possession of an unregistered firearm silencer (count twelve). See generally ECF No. 17.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Defendant moves the Court to suppress all evidence found within the toolbox, as well as any resulting "fruit of the poisonous tree." ECF No. 58 at 8. The Court DENIES the Motion for the reasons that follow.

I. Discussion

A. Common Authority Over Garage

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. "[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). "It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is 'per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' " Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). "[O]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." Id. Law enforcement officers may obtain consent to a search from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-72, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). Common authority rests "on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched." Id. at 172 n.7, 94 S.Ct. 988; see also United States v. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579, 1582 (1997) (finding that defendant assumed the risk that his associate would consent to search of storage locker by instructing the associate to lease the lockers, granting him access to the lockers, and allowing him to retain the keys).

Defendant maintains that the garage was his private "man cave," which was usually locked and limited to Defendant's use. ECF No. 58 at 2. Therefore, Defendant argues, Ms. Valenzuela "could not consent to [a] warrantless search of that space." Evid. Mem. at 9. According to the Government, on the other hand, police body-camera footage demonstrates that Ms. Valenzuela and her daughter possessed common authority over the garage and lawfully consented to the search. ECF No. 57 at 5-6.

Here, the Court finds that Ms. Valenzuela had common authority over the garage and therefore had the right to permit police officers to inspect the garage. Defendant himself concedes that the garage "was used to shelter family pets" and that there is a refrigerator in the garage that "was used and accessed by family members." ECF No. 58 at 2. The body-camera footage from the evening of the investigation shows Ms. Valenzuela ushering a dog into the crate and Ms. Valenzuela's daughter perusing the contents of the refrigerator as police investigated the locked workbench. D3 R15 at 0:44, 4:04. Such behavior is strong evidence that Ms. Valenzuela and other family members had open access to the garage. Moreover, Ms. Valenzuela told police officers that while everything in the garage belonged to Defendant and that she did not often enter the garage, she used the garage when working on house projects or the couple's motorcycles. Id. at 5:24-5:35. Finally, while the garage was locked when police first arrived, Ms. Valenzuela had access to the key and unlocked it so that the officers could see the workbench. ECF No. 57 at 3. Access to a key is consistent with common authority over the premises. See Kim, 105 F.3d at 1582.

In sum, the body-camera footage and Defendant's own concessions are convincing evidence that Ms. Valenzuela had joint access to the garage for most purposes, and that Defendant assumed the risk that she might permit police to search the garage. Accordingly, Ms. Valenzuela had actual authority to consent to the search of the garage. See United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that a third party has actual authority to consent to a search of someone else's property if the third party had mutual use of or joint access to the property).

B. Agent Myers's Peek Inside the Workbench

Next, Defendant contends that Agent Myers's "peek" inside the workbench exceeded the scope of the "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches because he used a flashlight for aid. ECF No. 58 at 5. The Government did not explicitly address the "plain view" argument raised by Defendant. It did note, however, that Agent Myers did not "manipulate[e], pull[ ], or pry[ ]" the workbench while peering inside it, implying that no unconstitutional seizure resulted from Agent Myers's conduct. Id. at 3.

As stated above, a "search," for Fourth Amendment purposes, occurs when the government invades a "subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable." Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33, 121 S.Ct. 2038. If an object is already in plain view,...