United States v. Shabazz

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. RAHMAN SHABAZZ, Defendant.

CRIMINAL ACTION No. 17-43 (JDB)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 22, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

JOHN D. BATES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a motion by defendant Rahman Shabazz seeking compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c). This Court denied his motion in November 2020, but, after a timely appeal, the D.C. Circuit vacated this Court's opinion and remanded the case with instructions to reconsider Mr Shabazz's motion in light of United States v Long, 997 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Considering Mr Shabazz's motion in accordance with the D.C Circuit's order, the Court will again deny the motion.

Background

Rahman Shabazz is 55 years old and is currently serving a 67-month sentence for racketeering and conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine. He has currently served 46 months of that sentence and, accounting for good time credit, he is set to serve 12 more, with a release date scheduled in September 2022. See Suppl. to Compassionate Release Mot. (“Suppl. Mot.”) [ECF No. 30] at 2-3. On September 10, 2020, Mr. Shabazz filed the present motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), arguing that his need to care for his octogenarian mother constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason” meriting early release. See Mot. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) for Order Reducing Sentence &Granting Immediate Release or, in the Alternative, Modifying J. to Allow Remainder of Sentence to be Served on Home Confinement (“Original Release Mot.”) [ECF No. 17].^[1] On November 24, 2020, this Court denied Mr. Shabazz's motion, finding that his desire to care for his mother, while noble, “d[id] not qualify as an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason' for release.” United States v. Shabazz, 502 F.Supp.3d 194, 196 (D.D.C. 2020). Mr. Shabazz appealed, and, while his appeal was pending, the D.C. Circuit decided United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir. 2021), which held that U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13 is “not applicable to compassionate release motions filed by defendants” and thus is not binding on district courts considering such motions. Id. at 347. The D.C. Circuit then vacated this Court's denial of Mr. Shabazz's motion, remanding “for further consideration of [Mr. Shabazz's] compassionate release application in light of [Long].” United States v. Shabazz, 848 Fed.Appx. 441, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

On remand, this Court ordered supplemental briefing on Mr. Shabazz's motion. Min. Order (July 22, 2021). In his brief, Mr. Shabazz renewed his argument that “[h]is mother's precarious [health] situation” requires “regular care” that only Mr. Shabazz can provide and that this constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling reason” justifying his release. E.g., Suppl. Mot. at 6-7. Mr. Shabazz's mother, Irene Hunt, is 80 years old and suffers from dementia, gait instability, hypertension, and partial deafness. Id. at 3. Her condition has “compromised] [her] ambulation, ” Suppl. Mot. Ex. B [ECF No. 30-2], and she is at a high risk of falling in her home, Suppl. Mot. at 5-6. In addition, between her dementia and poor balance, she has repeatedly burned herself on the oven or stove while trying to prepare her own food. Id. Her doctor sums up the situation with the conclusion that Ms. Hunt's “combination[] of conditions has made it impossible for her to continue living by herself.” Suppl. Mot. Ex. B.

Mr. Shabazz argues that Ms. Hunt's condition justifies his early release because he “is the one person who can provide the consistent and regular in-home care that his mother needs.” Suppl. Mot. at 12. At present, what care Ms. Hunt receives is provided by Mr. Shabazz's sister, Deborah Rodgers. Id. at 5-6. But Ms. Rodgers lives in South Carolina and is only able to travel to New York every couple of weeks, and defendant argues that, given the kind of care Ms. Hunt requires, these biweekly visits are not sufficient. Id.; see also id. at 9-10. Moreover, Ms. Rodgers is already spread thin, working as a nurse, caring for her disabled granddaughter, and, now, helping her husband recover from recent knee surgery. Id. at 11-12; Suppl. Mot. Ex. A [ECF No. 31-1]. Because Mr. Shabazz is the only person who can provide round-the-clock care for Ms. Hunt's needs, he contends that her “well-being depend[s] on Mr. Shabazz's release, ” Suppl. Mot. at 6, and that this fact qualifies as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

The government continues to oppose Mr. Shabazz's motion. The government contends that Mr. Shabazz has “struggled to raise . . . new factual allegations” in his supplemental brief and urges the Court to reject what it calls Mr. Shabazz's “attempt[] to take a second bite at the apple.” Gov't's Resp. to Def.'s Suppl. to Compassionate Release Mot. [ECF No. 32] (“Suppl. Resp.”) at 2-3. In addition to questioning the seriousness of Ms. Hunt's health problems, see id. at 4, the government also argues that, in light of the efforts of Ms. Rodgers and of Ms. Hunt's neighbors, Mr. Shabazz's release is not needed to provide care for his mother. “Defendant's mother may be living alone, ” the government submits, “but she certainly is not being neglected.” Id. at 3. In short, Mr. Shabazz's desire to care for his mother does not constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for release, according to the government, because “options are available [for Ms. Hunt's care] short of releasing a recidivist and dangerous drug trafficker into the community.” Id. at 4.

The parties also dispute whether the factors listed in § 3553(a) favor Mr. Shabazz's release, a necessary consideration before granting compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). In particular, the parties disagree about whether defendant would pose a danger to the community if released. Mr. Shabazz refers the Court to his largely (though not entirely) clean disciplinary record in prison; the non-violent nature of the crimes for which he was sentenced; and this Court's decision permitting Mr. Shabazz to remain out of custody following his guilty plea. See Suppl. Mot. at 14-16; Suppl. Reply [ECF No. 33] at 4-5. For its part, the government argues that Mr. Shabazz's long criminal history, an earlier violation of probation conditions on a previous charge, and his citation for possession of a cell phone during his current stint of incarceration demonstrate that he “is a danger to the community and has failed to satisfy the § 3553(a) factors.” Suppl. Resp. at 6; see also Gov't's Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Compassionate Release or Home Confinement [ECF No. 22] at 18-19 (Oct. 16, 2020).

Analysis

Under the First Step Act of 2018, a court may, upon motion of a defendant, reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment if “after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] to the extent that they are applicable, ” the court concludes that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).^[2] Thus, motions for compassionate release require the court to make “two essential determinations”: “whether there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for the reduction, ” and, if so, “whether, despite the fact that a sentence reduction is warranted, section 3553(a)'s purposes of punishment require maintenance of the original prison term.” United States v. Johnson, 464 F.Supp.3d 22, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2020); see also United States v. Edwards, Crim. A. No. 03-234 (JDB), 2021 WL 3128870, at *4 (D.D.C. July 22, 2021) (“If [defendant] had presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, the Court may reduce his term of imprisonment only after considering the § 3553(a) factors.”). “As the moving party, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that he is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v. Long, Crim. A. No. 10-171-1 (JDB), 2021 WL 3792949, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2021) (quoting United States v. Demirtas, Crim. A. No. 11-356 (RDM), 2020 WL 3489475, at *1 (D.D.C. June 25, 2020)).

The Court first considers whether Mr. Shabazz's need to care for his ailing, octogenarian mother qualifies as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” warranting release under § 3582. Cutting short a duly authorized prison sentence is, in the statute's own words, an “extraordinary” step to take, and it requires a justification which is more than sympathetic and indeed nothing short of “compelling.” Congress has not defined with specificity what satisfies this standard, but it is clear that the bar is exceedingly high. See, e.g., United States v. Winston, No. 1:94-cr-296-11 (RCL), 2021 WL 2592959, at *6 (D.D.C. June 24, 2021) (“Congress did not define the term ‘extraordinary,' so the Court takes guidance from the text's plain meaning at the time of enactment. When § 3582 was passed in 1984, ‘extraordinary' meant (as it still does today) ‘very exceptional.'” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Extraordinary, Webster's II New Riverside Univ. Dictionary (1984)); see also United States v. Hunter, No. 21-1275, 2021 WL 3855665, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2021).

The Court finds that Mr. Shabazz does not meet this high bar. To be clear, the Court fully credits the assertions of Mr. Shabazz, his sister, and Ms. Hunt's doctor with regard to Ms. Hunt's condition. But Mr. Shabazz has not shown that he is the “only available caregiver” for his mother, nor is his situation so rare as to qualify as “extraordinary.” While the Court is deeply sympathetic with the plight of Mr. Shabazz, his mother, and his sister, this case simply does not present the kind of “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances required to reduce a defendant's sentence under § 3582(c).

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