United States v. Simmons

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LEVON SIMMONS, Defendant.

Criminal No. 15-0025 (PLF)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

November 2, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge

Defendant Levon Simmons has filed an Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release (“Def. Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 439] requesting a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in order to care for his son following the death of the child's mother, and so that he can appeal an order granting custody of his son to a cousin of the child's mother. See Def. Mot. at 3; Response to September 23, 2021 Court Order (“Def. Second Suppl.”) [Dkt No. 472] at 2. The United States opposes Mr. Simmons's motion, arguing that he has failed to establish that a sentence reduction is warranted and that he should serve the remainder of his sentence to account for the serious nature of his offense. Government's Opposition to Defendant's Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release (“Gov't Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 449] at 1, 16-20 24. For the following reasons, the Court will deny Mr Simmons's motion without prejudice.^[1]

I. BACKGROUND

On March 3, 2015, the United States charged Mr. Simmons alongside six co-defendants, with five counts pertaining to conspiracy to distribute phencyclidine (“PCP”). Indictment at 2, 4-5; see also Superseding Indictment at 1-2, 4-5, 7. On June 23, 2016, Mr. Simmons pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one hundred grams or more of a mixture containing PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B)(iv). Plea Agreement at 1. The United States filed a notice of Mr. Simmons's prior felony drug conviction, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, triggering a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, or 120 months. See Notice of Prior Convictions; 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). On September 15, 2016, the Court sentenced Mr. Simmons to 120 months of imprisonment and 96 months of supervised release. Judgment at 2-3. At the time Mr. Simmons filed his reply brief, he had served approximately 74 months of his 120-month sentence. Def. Reply at 15; Def. Ex. 11 at 3.

Mr. Simmons's son, L.A., was three years old when Mr. Simmons was sentenced. PSR ¶ 81; Def. Mot. at 5. Prior to Mr. Simmons's incarceration, L.A. lived with his mother, Chevella Coleman. PSR ¶ 81. Mr. Simmons also lived with Ms. Coleman “on and off, ” Id. ¶ 83, and according to Mr. Simmons, he and Ms. Coleman were “jointly raising” L.A., Def. Mot. at 3. On August 31, 2020, Ms. Coleman died of cervical cancer. See Def. Mot. at 3; Sealed Def. Ex. 3 at 3. According to Mr. Simmons, a “rotating group of family members” began caring for L.A. following Ms. Coleman's death. Def. Mot. at 3. Mr. Simmons reports that his own mother, Linda Williams, would have taken responsibility for L.A., but that her chronic obstructive pulmonary disease prevented her from caring “for an energetic and grieving child alone.” Id.

On January 6, 2021, Ms. Coleman's cousin, Anquneta Coleman, initiated child custody proceedings concerning L.A. in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland. See Def. Mot. at 3; Def. Ex. 13 at 2.^[2] On March 21, 2021, Mr. Simmons moved for compassionate release “so that he can ensure that his parental rights are not terminated and be the stable and loving presence his son needs.” Def. Mot. at 3. On July 28, 2021, the Circuit Court for Prince George's County awarded “sole physical and legal custody” of L.A. to Anquneta Coleman. Def. Suppl. Reply at 1; see also Def. Ex. 13 at 4.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed . . . but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions.” Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). One such exception is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As modified by the First Step Act in 2018, Section 3582(c)(1)(A) allows courts to alter a sentence upon amotion by a defendant “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

A defendant who seeks compassionate release pursuant to Section 3582(c)(1)(A) must establish “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In evaluating this factor, courts historically have looked to a policy statement promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 2018, which describes several categories of circumstances that may qualify as “extraordinary and compelling.” See U.S. Sent'g Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.13 cmt. n.l (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2018). Because the Sentencing Commission has not updated the policy statement “to reflect the First Step Act's changes, ” United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2021), including the fact that defendants themselves may now move for compassionate release, the D.C. Circuit has held that the policy statement “is not ‘applicable' to defendant-filed motions, ” Id. at 355. In the wake of Long, district courts must “assess whether [a defendant] has demonstrated ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons' .. . without treating U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as binding.” United States v. Johnson, 858 Fed.Appx. 381, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (per curiam).

The compassionate release statute instructs courts evaluating whether to reduce a sentence to consider the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to the extent that they are applicable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). These factors include:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed-

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner ....

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). Consideration of the sentencing factors “requires a discretionary balancing, ” United States v. Long, 997 F.3d at 360, “with an eye toward whether it is necessary to maintain the prior term of imprisonment despite the extraordinary and compelling reasons to modify the defendant's sentence, ” United States v. Johnson, 464 F.Supp.3d 22, 30 (D.D.C. 2020).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

On October 7, 2020, Mr. Simmons submitted a letter to the Warden at FCI Rivers, where he was then incarcerated, requesting compassionate release “based on the August 31, 2020 death of Ms. Chevella Coleman, his girlfriend and the mother of their 7-year-old son.” Def. Ex. 1 at 2. BOP denied that request on October 26, 2020. Id. at 4-5. The United States concedes that Mr. Simmons has exhausted his administrative remedies “as to his claim regarding the need to care for his son, ” but argues that he has failed to do so “with respect to the issue of caring for his mother.” Gov't Opp. at 14. While Mr. Simmons's compassionate release motion focuses primarily on caring for L.A. and participating in child custody proceedings, it does note that releasing Mr. Simmons “would also benefit Mrs. Williams, ” Def. Mot. at 17, and contends that “Mrs. Williams's need for additional care” contributes to the extraordinary and compelling nature of Mr. Simmons's circumstances, Id. at 18.

The Court agrees with Chief Judge Howell that it is “a dubious proposition” that “an inmate's motion for compassionate release made to a court must be limited to precisely those claims the inmate made to the warden of her facility.” United States v. Bikundi, Crim. No. 14-0020-1, 2020 WL 5518465, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2020). But even if there were such a requirement, Mr. Simmons's letter to the warden at FCI Rivers was sufficient to “give BOP fair notice” of Mrs. Williams's medical condition and its relevance to Mr. Simmons's compassionate release request. United States v. Shepard, Crim. No. 07-0085, 2021 WL 848720, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 2021). The letter explained that L.A. was “in the custody of Mr. Simmons's 67-year-old mother, Linda Williams, who has chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), ” and that “when caring for the young boy becomes too much for Mrs. Williams, [he] has had to stay with a variety of other family members.” Def. Ex. 1 at 2-3. The Court is not precluded from considering Mrs. Williams and her medical condition in evaluating Mr. Simmons's circumstances.

B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

Mr. Simmons seeks compassionate release so that he can care for L.A. in the wake of Ms. Coleman's death and safeguard his parental rights. Def. Mot. at 3; Def. Second Suppl. at 2. He argues that “[a]ltogether, Ms. Coleman's death and L.A.'s circumstances, together with Mr. Simmons's need to participate in child custody proceedings, Mrs. Williams's need for additional care, and Mr. Simmons's good conduct in prison, constitute extraordinary and compelling circumstances supporting Mr. Simmons's release.” Def. Mot. at 18.

1. Providing Care for L.A.

Mr. Simmons asserts that “L.A. has lived since Ms. Coleman's death in a variety of locations and with many people on his mother's side of the family.” Def. Mot. at 11-12. He argues that these circumstances have “likely served to destabilize [L.A.]” as he grieves for his mother, Id. at 13, and that “[i]f released, Mr. Simmons will be able to give L.A. the stability and love he needs, ” Id. at 14.

Ms Coleman's death...