United States v. Sims

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. WILLIE SIMS, Defendant.

No. 19 Cr. 857 (NSR) (01)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

July 29, 2022

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendant Willie Sims pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and 846. On April 7, 2021, the Court sentenced Defendant to 60 months' incarceration followed by 4 years of supervised release. Defendant's projected release date is January 5, 2024.

On May 3, 2021, Defendant moved pro se for compassionate release based on the harsh conditions of confinement resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as his history of chronic kidney disease, which increases his risk of contraction of or complications from COVID-19. (ECF No. 197.) Defendant subsequently filed supplements to his motion detailing grievances against the facilities where he has been housed and asking the Court to consider the developing COVID-19 variants. (ECF Nos. 198 & 226.) On September 28 2021, the Court granted Defendant's request to re-appoint counsel to file a compassionate release motion on his behalf. (ECF No. 221.)

On June 3, 2022, through counsel, Defendant filed the instant motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), seeking to be resentenced to time served, or alternatively, to reduce his sentence by one year and serve the remaining time under home confinement. (“Motion,” ECF No. 258.) The Government opposes Defendant's motion (“Response in Opposition,” ECF No. 266.) For the reasons that follow the Court DENIES Defendant's motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), courts may modify or reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment “upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

If the exhaustion requirement is met, a court “may [then] reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). While the Sentencing Guidelines provide “that ‘extraordinary and compelling' reasons include, the ‘[m]edical [c]onditon of the [d]efendant' if the defendant is ‘suffering from a serious physical or medical condition . . . that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover,'” id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 App. n.1(A)), courts have significant discretion to determine what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling circumstances,” United States v Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 235-36 (2d Cir. 2020).

As the proponent of release, the defendant bears the burden of proving that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist. See United States v. Butler, 970 F.2d 1017, 1026 (2d Cir. 1992) (“If the defendant seeks decreased punishment, he or she has the burden of showing that the circumstances warrant that decrease.”); United States v. Ebbers, No. 02 Cr. 1144 (VEC), 2020 WL 91399, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2020).

DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion Requirement

In its response in opposition, the Government expressly waives the exhaustion requirement for Defendant because at the time he filed the instant motion, Defendant was housed in a non-BOP facility. (Resp. in Opp'n at 2); see also United States v. Barajas, 18 Cr. 736 (NSR), 2020 WL 3976991, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2020) (noting that courts have deemed the exhaustion requirement waived or excused in cases where the defendant was housed in a non-BOP facility). Accordingly, the Court proceeds to determine the merits of Defendant's motion.

II. Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances

By his motion, Defendant advances four reasons that purportedly rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling circumstances under § 3582(c)(1)(A) that warrant a sentence reduction: (1) the harsh conditions of his confinement; (2) the Eliminating a Quantifiably Unjust Application of the Law Act of 2021 (the “EQUAL Act”); (3) his history of chronic kidney disease; and (4) his reduced likelihood of obtaining the full benefit of the potential sentence reduction from completing the Bureau of Prisons' (“BOP”) Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”). (Mot. at 22-33.) In opposition, the Government argues that none of the reasons Defendant proffers rise to level of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (Resp. in Opp'n at 3-4.) After due consideration, the Court agrees with the Government.

First, while the Court recognizes that Defendant's history of chronic kidney disease puts him at a higher risk from the COVID-19 virus, see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID-19 - People with Certain Medical Conditions, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html (last visited July 27, 2022), as of July 28, 2022, the BOP's website indicates that there are no active cases amongst inmates or staff in the BOP facility where he is housed-FCI Allenwood Medium. See Bureau of Prisons, “COVID-19 Update,” available at https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited July 28, 2022).

Further, as the Government correctly points out, Defendant's medical records indicate that he has been vaccinated and that he already had COVID-19 without any resulting abnormal kidney function or other complications. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 17 Cr. 214 (CM), 2021 WL 4120622, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2021) (collecting cases denying COVID-based compassionate release to vaccinated defendants). Additionally, none of the medical professionals who have evaluated Defendant has either suggested a more rigorous course of treatment or found any of his lab results troubling. Indeed, Defendant's most recent lab workups from November 2021 and April 2022 indicate that his “glomerular filtration rate”-“the best overall index of kidney function”- actually increased. (See Facciponti Decl., Ex. B at 4-7.)

Second, while it acknowledges that COVID-19 has presented difficult conditions of confinement, the Court does not find that those conditions constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons warranting a reduction of Defendant's sentence. “[T]he Court acknowledges that in most instances, a person is probably better off at liberty in the community during a pandemic, than incarcerated in a federal prison. That said, these harsher conditions of confinement are not unique to the defendant, i.e., ‘extraordinary' for purposes of § 3582(c).” United States v. Ramirez, 571 F.Supp.3d 40, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing United States v. Bryant, 2021 WL 738838, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2021) (explaining that the severe conditions of confinement during the pandemic are “not unique to Mr. Bryant and do not militate strongly in favor of finding there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction”)). “If the challenging conditions of confinement caused by the pandemic [standing alone] warranted a sentence reduction here, [then] essentially every inmate who has been [housed in the same facilities as Defendant] at any time since [October 2019] would be entitled to a sentence reduction.” Id. at 47.

Third, Defendant's reduced likelihood of participating in RDAP to obtain the full benefit of a potential sentence reduction also does not make his circumstances extraordinary and compelling. RDAP offers federal inmates who successfully complete the program up to a 12-month reduction in sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). Because inmates typically need at least 24 months remaining on their sentence to qualify for RDAP, Defendant argues that his lengthy detention at a non-BOP facility due to prior delays^[1] threatens his ability to participate in the program, as he has approximately 28 months remaining on his sentence. (Mot. at 16.) In fact, Defendant argues that these 28 months remaining do not even include any good time credit he may earn under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), which provides up to 54 days of sentence reduction per year for good behavior, which could also reduce his sentence by nearly a year. (Id.)

Hence, Defendant argues that even if he is transferred to a BOP facility immediately, and assuming he immediately starts participating in RDAP (which often has a waiting list), because RDAP takes at least 9 to 12 months to complete, it is very likely that Defendant would not get the benefit of a full 12-month sentence reduction for successful completion of the program. (Id.) Had he successfully completed RDAP, received the full amount of sentencing reduction (1 year), as well as the full amount of good time credit (nearly 1 year), Defendant argues that his sentence could be over as early as the fall of 2022-when Defendant could potentially be eligible to be released to a halfway house as early as this summer. (Id.)

To begin, however, Defendant's argument relies on speculation and a series of assumptions. While Defendant's ostensive commitment to complete RDAP (if admitted) and to continue with his good behavior while incarcerated is commendable, it is best not to count any chickens before they hatch. But most importantly, the...