United States v. Singleton

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. AMOS SINGLETON

CRIMINAL ACTION No. 11-76-1

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

May 18, 2023

MEMORANDUM

Gerald Austin McHugh United States District Judge

This is a § 2255 challenge to the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), following the Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) and Borden v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 1817 (2021). Defendant Amos Singleton argues that his prior, state-law robbery convictions can no longer be considered predicate crimes under ACCA, rendering his sentence enhancement under the statute illegal. I am constrained to agree and will therefore grant his motion in part but deny his additional claims for relief.

I. Relevant Background

Mr Singleton was charged in a four-count indictment on February 8, 2011. The facts of the case are deeply troubling. Singleton, with his co-defendant, robbed the manager of an apartment complex at gunpoint, during which Singleton shot the manager, blinding her in her left eye and shattering her jaw and several teeth. The four counts of the indictment are as follows:

1. Conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a);

2. Hobbs Act Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a);

3. Using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and

4. Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Mr. Singleton was convicted by a jury of all four counts, ECF 169, and he was sentenced by Judge Norma Shapiro to a total of 360 months of incarceration. Specifically, Mr. Singleton was sentenced to 240 months on Counts One and Two, running concurrently; 60 months on Count Three, running consecutively to Counts One, Two, and Four; and 300 months on Count Four running concurrently with Counts One and Two. ECF 210. Because Singleton had several prior robbery convictions and an aggravated assault conviction when he was found guilty under § 922(g), the sentencing court applied the sentencing enhancement mandated by the ACCA, which requires a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. If the ACCA mandatory sentence not been imposed, Mr. Singleton's sentence on Count Four could not have exceeded 120 months of incarceration, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2010), and had the remainder of the sentence stayed the same, the maximum sentence would have been 300 months.^[1]

After his conviction was affirmed, and his petition for writ of certiorari denied, Mr. Singleton filed a timely pro se § 2255 motion claiming that his sentence was illegal under Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). ECF 245. His motion was denied, and he filed an appeal with the Third Circuit, ECF 295 & 296, which remanded the case for consideration of Mr. Singleton's claims under Johnson and Borden. ECF 329. While his appeal was pending, Singleton asserted two additional claims.^[2] He has now withdrawn his claim under Rehaif but seeks to preserve a Davis claim for purposes of appeal. ECF 356.

II. Discussion

A, Mr. Singleton is not subject to the ACCA sentencing enhancement.

The ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum on a person who violates § 922(g) and “has three previous convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Thus, the question presented by this case is whether Mr. Singleton's prior convictions for Pennsylvania first-degree robbery under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(i)-(iii) qualify as “violent felon[ies]” under the law.^[3] Although the governing law on this matter is both daunting and counter-intuitive, I must apply the law as it stands to resolve the pending motion.

1. Legal background

Under ACCA, a crime qualifies as a “violent felony” if it either (1) requires proof of “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i); or (2) is a crime of “burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). In Johnson, the Supreme Court invalidated as unconstitutionally vague what is called the “residual clause” of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“any crime . . . [that] otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”). 576 U.S. at 2563; see also Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016) (holding that Johnson applies retroactively). In so doing, the Court left just two narrow bases for determining whether a prior conviction is an ACCA predicate - the conviction must satisfy the elements clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) or it must be one of the four offenses enumerated in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Further narrowing the elements clause, the Supreme Court held recently that crimes which can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness cannot qualify as a violent felony, as they do not inherently require the intentional “use of physical force.” See Borden, 141 S.Ct. at 1833-34.

To determine whether Mr. Singleton's prior convictions are predicate offenses for ACCA, courts must employ the “categorical approach.” See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). This requires courts “to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense,” and “not to the particular facts underlying those convictions.” Id. at 600, 602 (cleaned up) (emphasis added). Further, to determine whether an offense is a “violent felony” under either clause of § 922(e)(2)(B), the sentencing court must “compare the elements of the crime of conviction with the elements of the ‘generic' version of the listed offense - i.e., the offense as commonly understood.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 503 (2016); see United States v. Antoine Singleton, 252 F.Supp.3d 423, 427-28 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (McHugh, J.). The prior conviction “qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if the statute's elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.”^[4] Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013); Antoine Singleton, 252 F.Supp.3d at 428; see Mathis, 579 U.S. at 510 (“How a given defendant actually perpetrated the crime . . . makes no difference; even if his conduct fits within the generic offense, the mismatch of elements saves the defendants from an ACCA sentence.”). Stated differently, if the statute providing the basis for the defendant's prior conviction extends to conduct broader than the generic offense at common law, that prior conviction cannot serve as an ACCA predicate offense.

In certain, narrow circumstances, however, a sentencing court may be permitted to “go beyond identifying the crime of conviction and reviewing the statutory definition.” Antoine Singleton, 252 F.Supp.3d at 428 (quoting Mathis, 579 U.S. at 511). This “modified categorical approach” is relevant when the statute of conviction is divisible, in that it “comprises multiple, alternative versions of a crime.” United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211, 231 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Descamps, 570 U.S. at 260-62). In such cases, courts may look to “a narrow category of ‘extra-statutory materials' known as Shepard documents,” which include the charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Id. at 231; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005). Utilizing these documents, the court may “identify, from among several alternatives, the crime of conviction so that the court can compare it to the generic offense.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 264; Peppers, 899 F.3d at 231-32. In short, the modified approach allows the sentencing court to use the Shepard documents to determine which “alternative version” of a divisible statute formed the basis of the defendant's prior conviction, and then compare that version of the crime to the generic offense. See Antoine Singleton, 252 F.Supp.3d at 429.

If, however, no Shepard documents are available, the modified categorical approach becomes “a useless tool,” and the sentencing court must revert to the general categorical approach. Peppers, 899 F.3d at 232. Indeed, without Shepard documents - and without the ability to study the facts underlying a conviction - a court has no other way of determining which sub-provision of the relevant statute formed the basis of the defendant's conviction.

2. The Pennsylvania robbery statute does not categorically constitute a violent felony

The Government contends that four^[5] of Mr. Singleton's prior convictions - all robberies in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701 - qualify as predicate acts for the ACCA enhancement. Because robbery is not a crime enumerated within § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), I must determine if a prior conviction for robbery under § 3701 can satisfy ACCA's elements clause under Johnson and Borden.

Mr. Singleton was convicted of robberies in 1975, 1985, and 1999. In 1975, at the time of Mr. Singleton's first robbery conviction, the Pennsylvania robbery statute read:

(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he:

(i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another;

(ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury; [or]

(iii) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of the first or second degree[.]

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701. By the time that Mr. Singleton was later convicted under the statute, in 1985 and 1999, two additional subsections had been added, deeming theft to constitute robbery if the accused:

(iv) inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens another with or intentionally puts him in

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