United States v. Sitzmann

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. GREGORY JOEL SITZMANN, Defendant.

CRIMINAL No. 08-0242 (PLF)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

March 25, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge.

Pending before the Court are defendant Gregory Joel Sitzmann's pro se Request for Reduction of Sentence (“Def. Pro Se Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 319] and his Motion for Compassionate Release Pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (“Def. Suppl. Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 327] filed through counsel. Mr. Sitzmann contends that his advanced age, numerous medical conditions, and deteriorating overall health justify a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Def. Pro Se Mot. at 3-4; Def. Suppl. Mot. at 1-2.

The United States opposes these motions, arguing that Mr Sitzmann's concerns surrounding his health and aging do not establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, and that Mr. Sitzmann's offense and his criminal history weigh against releasing him. See United States' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to the Compassionate Release Statute (“Gov't Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 329] at 1. The government maintains that Mr. Sitzmann should serve out his full sentence to account for the serious nature of his offenses and because he remains a danger to the community. Id. at 1. For the following reasons, the Court will deny Mr. Sitzmann's motions for compassionate release.^[1]

I. BACKGROUND

A federal grand jury charged Mr. Sitzmann in a one count indictment filed on August 7, 2008, with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Five Kilograms or More of Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C § 846. Indictment at 1. At the time of the indictment, Mr. Sitzmann had served in a French prison for charges related to drug trafficking in France. Gov't Opp. at 15-16; PSR at ¶¶ 65-68. The following day, French authorities deported him to the United States, where he was immediately arrested at Washington Dulles International Airport in connection with this case. Gov't Opp. at 2; PSR at 1.

On May 21, 2012, following a 23-day trial, a jury found Mr. Sitzmann guilty of the single charge in the indictment, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine. United States v. Sitzmann, 893 F.3d 811, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Jury Verdict Form at 1. On October 23, 2015, the Court sentenced Mr. Sitzmann to 348 months (29 years) of incarceration, to be followed by 120 months (10 years) of supervised release. Judgment at 2, 3. The Court took into account twelve months of time Mr. Sitzmann served in French prison when calculating this sentence, and Mr. Sitzmann was also given credit for approximately seven years of time served in the D.C. jail. See Transcript of Day 3 of Sentencing [Dkt. No. 305] at 104. Mr. Sitzmann appealed his sentence on four grounds, asserting improper venue, lack of jurisdiction, Brady and Napue violations, and ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. See United States v. Sitzmann, 893 F.3d at 819. The court of appeals affirmed Mr. Sitzmann's conviction on June 29, 2018. See id.

Mr. Siztmann, now seventy-one-years-old, is incarcerated at Federal Medical Center (“FMC”) in Lexington, Kentucky. See Gov't Opp. at 16. At the time Mr. Sitzmann filed his motion for compassionate release, he had served approximately 12 years and 1 month of his 29-year sentence. See Def. Ex. A. He has a projected release date of April 26, 2033. Def. Exs. A-B. Mr. Sitzmann submitted three pro se letters concerning his request for a sentence reduction, written on June 1, 2020, July 14, 2020, and September 17, 2020. See Letter 1; Letter 2; Letter 3.^[2] On October 10, 2020, the Court docketed Mr. Sitzmann's pro se request for sentence reduction. Def. Pro Se Mot. On April 9, 2021, Mr. Sitzmann filed through counsel a supplemental motion for compassionate release, arguing that his failing health, advanced age, and twelve years of time served are grounds for his early release. See Def. Suppl. Mot. at 6.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed . . . but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions.” Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). One such exception is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As modified by the First Step Act in 2018, Section 3582(c)(1)(A) allows courts to modify a sentence upon a motion by a defendant “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Once a defendant satisfies this exhaustion requirement, they must show that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In evaluating extraordinary and compelling circumstances, courts historically have looked to a policy statement promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. See U.S. Sent'g Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A) (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2018); United States v. Clark, Crim. No. 10-133, 2021 WL 5630795, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2021); United States v. Speaks, Crim. No. 18-0111-1, 2021 WL 3128871, at *3 (D.D.C. July 23, 2021); United States v. Hicks, Crim. No. 93-97-2, 2021 WL 1634692, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2021). The Sentencing Commission issued this policy statement in 2018 before enactment of the First Step Act. Because the Sentencing Commission “has lacked a quorum since early 2019, . . . it has been unable to update its preexisting policy statement concerning compassionate release to reflect the First Step Act's changes.” United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Specifically, the policy statement refers only to motions brought by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and does not account for the fact that defendants may now bring compassionate release motions on their own behalf. See id. at 349.

The D.C. Circuit therefore has held that the policy statement “is not ‘applicable' to defendant-filed motions for compassionate release under the First Step Act.” United States v. Long, 997 F.3d at 355. In the wake of Long, district courts must “assess whether [a defendant] has demonstrated ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons' warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(1)(A), without treating U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as binding.” United States v. Johnson, 858 Fed.Appx. 381, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (per curiam). Even as the policy statement is not binding, however, it may still provide guidance as to the extraordinary and compelling nature of a defendant's circumstances. See United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2021); United States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020).

According to the policy statement, “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist where the defendant is “suffering from a serious physical or mental condition” or “experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process, that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(ii)(I), (III). Health conditions that limit one's ability to practice self-care in a detention facility include those that “compromise a defendant's ability . . . to provide for his own activities of daily living, such as eating and drinking, toileting, washing and dressing, and mobilization.” United States v. Morris, Crim. No. 12-154, 2020 WL 2735651, at *7 (D.D.C. May 24, 2020).

The compassionate release statute instructs courts to consider the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to the extent that they are applicable” in evaluating whether to reduce a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). These factors include:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed-

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2).^[3] A court's consideration of the sentencing factors “requires a discretionary balancing, ” United States v. Long, 997 F.3d at 360, “with an eye toward whether it is necessary to maintain the prior term of imprisonment despite the extraordinary and compelling reasons to modify the defendant's sentence, ” United States v. Johnson, 464 F.Supp.3d 22, 30 (D.D.C. 2020).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The parties do not dispute that Mr. Sitzmann has exhausted his administrative remedies. Def. Suppl. Mot. at 5; Gov't Opp. at 20 n.3. On March 20, 2020, he submitted a request to the warden at FMC Lexington for reduction of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Def. Suppl. Mot. at 5. More than thirty days elapsed with no response from the warden. Id. Mr. Sitzmann therefore exhausted his administrative remedies and his request is properly before this Court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

Mr Sitzmann's motions raise concerns that his advanced age, failing health, and time spent incarcerated establish extraordinary and compelling circumstances for a sentence reduction. Def. Mot. at 6. Specifically, Mr. Sitzmann asserts that he has fifteen diagnosed medical conditions: atrial fibrillation, bilateral atrial enlargement, macular degeneration, pes cavus, plantar fasciitis, Dupuytren's...