United States v. Smith

482 F.Supp.3d 1218

UNITED STATES of America

v.Ruvel Alfred SMITH, Jr.

Case No.: 3:97-cr-120-J-34PDB

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division.

Signed August 31, 2020

Julie Hackenberry, US Attorney's Office, Jacksonville, FL, for United States of America.

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, United States District Judge

This case is before the Court on Defendant Ruvel Alfred Smith, Jr.’s pro se Motion for Compassionate Release (Doc. 138, Motion) and counseled Supplemental Motion (Doc. 145, Supplemental Motion). In 1997, when Smith was 47 years old, he was convicted and sentenced for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and the distribution of cocaine. (Doc. 135, Amendment 782 Memorandum and Presentence Investigation Report at 4-5); see also United States v. Smith, 201 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2000). Because the United States filed an information under 21 U.S.C. § 851 charging that Smith had two prior convictions for a felony drug offense – one in 1978 for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and one in 1991 for possessing cocaine – Smith was subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. (Doc. 43, Section 851 Information); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1997).¹

Smith is now a 70-year-old inmate imprisoned at Coleman Medium FCI. He has been incarcerated for 23 years. Smith seeks release from prison under the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), because he is an elderly inmate in declining health. He also seeks release because of the Covid-19 pandemic and the risks it poses for elderly prisoners. According to the latest data from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), 65 inmates and 33 staff members are currently positive for the virus at Coleman Medium FCI. Two inmates have died.²

The United States opposes the Motion because it argues Smith did not exhaust his administrative remedies and because Smith has not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling circumstances. The United States also argues that Smith is a danger to the community and that the § 3553(a) factors do not support a reduction in sentence. (Doc. 140, Response; Doc. 147, Supplemental Response).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Smith's request for compassionate release is due to be granted.

I. Compassionate Release

Generally speaking, a district court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). "The authority of a district court to modify an imprisonment sentence is narrowly limited by statute." United States v. Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2010). The compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), provides one avenue for reducing an otherwise final sentence.

Before Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, the Director of the BOP had sole discretion to decide whether to move for compassionate release, and the Director's refusal to do so was judicially unreviewable. See, e.g., Cruz-Pagan v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Low, 486 F. App'x 77, 79 (11th Cir. 2012) ; Crowe v. United States, 430 F. App'x 484, 485 (6th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). But in 2013, the Office of Inspector General for the Department of Justice reported that "[t]he BOP does not properly manage the compassionate release program, resulting in inmates who may be eligible candidates for release not being considered." Dep't of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Compassionate Release Program (April 2013), at 11, available at https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2013/e1306.pdf. Perhaps as a response to that, one of Congress’ stated purposes in passing the First Step Act was to "increas[e] the use and transparency of compassionate release." First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), § 603(b).

Following passage of the First Step Act, § 3582(c) now provides in relevant part:

(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ...

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Pursuant to its authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated a policy statement governing the circumstances when compassionate release is appropriate. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The policy statement provides:

Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may reduce a term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment) if, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable, the court determines that—

(1) (A) Extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; or

(B) The defendant (i) is at least 70 years old; and (ii) has served at least 30 years in prison pursuant to a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is imprisoned;

(2) The defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) ; and

(3) The reduction is consistent with this policy statement.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The Sentencing Commission has not updated the policy statement since the First Step Act became law.

The commentary accompanying the policy statement instructs that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist under certain enumerated circumstances. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. 1. As relevant here, these circumstances include:

(B) Age of the Defendant.— The defendant (i) is at least 65 years old; (ii) is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process; and (iii) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.

.... [or]

(D) Other Reasons.-- As determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).

Id., cmt. 1(B), 1(D). Notably, a movant for compassionate release bears the burden of proving that a reduction in his or her sentence is warranted. United States v. Heromin, No. 8:11-cr-550-T-33SPF, 2019 WL 2411311, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 7, 2019) ; cf. United States v. Hamilton, 715 F.3d 328, 337 (11th Cir. 2013) (a movant under § 3582(c)(2) bears the burden of proving that a sentence reduction is appropriate).

II. Smith Has Satisfied the Exhaustion Requirement

Smith submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden of his facility on January 20, 2020. See Response at 4; Supplemental Response at 2; (see also Doc. 145-3, Inmate Request). The warden denied the request on January 27, 2020. (Doc. 145-4, Warden's Denial). On or around February 27, 2020, more than 30 days after submitting his request to the warden, Smith filed the pro se Motion in this Court (Doc. 138). The United States initially argued that Smith did not satisfy § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s exhaustion requirement because he did not appeal the warden's decision. Response at 4-5; Supplemental Response at 2-4. However, the United States later filed an addendum stating that the Department of Justice "views the plain language of the First Step Act to allow an inmate to file a motion after 30 days have passed since the request was made to the warden, or after exhausting administrative review, whichever is earlier." (Doc. 148, Addendum at 2-3) (emphasis in original).

While the United States’ concession favors Smith, it is not dispositive. "The role of the judicial branch is to apply statutory language and we cannot cede our authority to interpret statutes to the parties or their attorneys."

Bourdon v. United States Dep't of Homeland Security, 940 F.3d 537, 547 n.6 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the Court must determine whether Smith actually satisfied § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s exhaustion requirement.

A district court can reduce the term of imprisonment "upon motion of the defendant" only "after [1] the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or [2] the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (bracketed numbers and emphasis added). As one jurist recently observed, the statute

does not contain an exhaustion requirement in the traditional sense. That is, the statute does not necessarily require the moving defendant to fully litigate his claim before the agency (i.e., the BOP) before bringing his petition to court. Rather, it requires the defendant either to exhaust administrative remedies or simply to wait 30 days after serving his petition on the warden of his facility before filing a motion in court.

United States v. Haney, 454 F. Supp. 3d 316, 321 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020) (emphasis in original).

In the view of the undersigned, the position initially urged by the United States is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) unambiguously provides that a defendant may either move for compassionate release after the defendant has fully exhausted...